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INTRODUCTION 
The American Civil War unleashed great violence and chaos in the western mountains of 
Virginia. There, in Appalachia, guerrilla warfare impacted a greater number of southerners than 
the war’s organized military campaigns. It quickly evolved into two distinct types: hostilities 
aimed against outside invaders and violence that occurred among neighbors. Missouri and 
Arkansas experienced this conflict on the largest scale, but the Appalachian Mountains, where 
the terrain provided shelter and the element of surprise for guerrillas, also suffered a sizable 
amount of armed internal conflict. From northern Georgia, western North Carolina and Virginia, 
and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, mountaineers battled national and state upheaval while 
trying to discern which political allegiances offered the securest future. This was especially 
challenging for those who lived along the northern border of the Confederacy, an area that 
changed hands as organized troops battled for supremacy. In addition, those in western Virginia 
experienced turbulence on two levels—a division of the state occurring within the division of the 
country. The conflict there between Unionists and secessionists remained bitter throughout the 
war, even after 50 counties split away to form the state of West Virginia in 1863. 
Guerrilla conflict in the Confederacy created an outlet for those with strong family ties to 
contribute to the war effort close to home, but it also opened the door for violence and 
lawlessness to spread in contested areas. According to historian Daniel Sutherland, guerrilla 
conflict was not a sideshow to the larger war, but a crucial part, influencing the strategy of both 
politicians and soldiers. “It touched the lives of untold numbers of southern civilians and their 
communities. In much of the South, it was more than just part of the larger war; it was the war 
itself, a war with its own rules, its own chronology, its own policies, its own turning points, its 
!1
own heroes, villains, and victims. In the end, it altered the nature of the entire conflict to a 
startling degree.”  1
An understanding of that guerrilla conflict, then, is essential to gain a complete picture of 
the Civil War. However, for nearly a century after the war’s end, scholars largely ignored this 
particular subject. In the foreword of Virgil Carrington Jones’s 1956 groundbreaking work Gray 
Ghosts and Rebel Raiders, Bruce Catton lamented that guerrilla warfare in the Civil War had 
been treated “as a colorful, annoying, but largely unimportant side issue.”  For the citizens who 2
lived under the terror and anarchy guerrilla warfare provoked, however, the subject was anything 
but a side issue. Soldiers who fought in the great campaigns could clearly identify their enemies, 
but those left at home often had no such luxury. As law and order collapsed in the chaos of a 
lingering war, southerners became trapped in a style of conflict that did not differentiate between 
combatant and civilian. The unpredictability of when violence might occur added to the horror, 
as neighbor turned against neighbor and communities split over political differences.  3
Western Virginia’s unique civil war occurring within the context of the national struggle 
caused an area once united against the aristocratic eastern half of the state to be divided by a new 
state line in June 1863. The area impacted included all of present-day West Virginia and 
southwestern Virginia. The northern counties bordered the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio 
state lines, while the western and southern boundary continued along Virginia’s 1861 boarder 
touching Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina. The eastern border followed the higher  
!2
 Daniel E. Sutherland, “Sideshow No Longer,” Civil War History 46:1 (Mar. 2000): 5.1
 Sutherland, “Sideshow No Longer,” 5; Bruce Catton, foreword to Virgil Carrington Jones, Gray Ghosts and 2
Rebel Raiders: The Daring Exploits of the Confederate Guerrillas (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956), vii.
 For a more in-depth study on the characteristics of guerrilla warfare during the Civil War, see Michael 3
Fellman’s introduction in Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the American Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989).
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elevation on a Virginia topographic map, with Carroll, Floyd, Montgomery, Craig, Alleghany, 
Bath, and Highland Counties marking the boundary. 
A study of guerrilla warfare in western Virginia is valuable to the historiography of Civil 
War studies in at least four ways. First, it supports findings from studies of other areas of 
Appalachia that seek to explain the prevalence of such conflict in the mountains. The importance 
of kin was central to mountaineers’ actions, and family ties contributed to the brutality of the 
guerrilla conflict in the area. Second, such a study challenges the myth of a Union Appalachia 
during the war. While some areas of the mountains remained loyal to the Union, the region as a 
whole was not united and contained much secessionist sentiment. Third, it offers the backdrop 
for the political wrangling on both state and national levels that culminated in the creation of the 
state of West Virginia. Some politicians in favor of the new state argued that a separate state was 
necessary to pacify the region. Finally, it fills an important gap in the historiography of Civil War 
Virginia. 
What work has been done on guerrilla warfare in Virginia focuses mainly on northern 
Virginia. Western Virginia needs further study and consideration because it was unique from any 
other area in Appalachia or the Confederacy. When historian Stephen Ash wrote about the 
occupied South, he opted not to consider western Virginia at all, because in that area it was 
debatable “just who the real ‘invaders’ were,”  and he believed it deserved a separate telling.  4
Although Appalachia Virginia was similar to other areas of Appalachia in some respects—the 
citizens, for example, held firm to their beliefs regardless of outside influences or what the 
political climate dictated—it was unique in that a portion of its residents successfully seceded 
!4
 Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: 4
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), x.
from their state, thereby officially asserting their independence and intention to do what was best 
for themselves, regardless of consequences. In the few studies available on western Virginia, 
historians have separated the southwestern portion from the group of counties that now make up 
West Virginia and do not consider the area as the bloc that it was before the war, with no clear 
line dividing north from south.  5
By the mid-nineteenth century, western Virginia was separated from the eastern part of 
the state by geology, economic systems, social characteristics, and political orientations. These 
regional tensions had existed since the earliest days of settlement. The Allegheny Mountains 
formed the most distinct physical division within Virginia, separating eastern Virginia from 
western. Eastern Virginia’s agricultural economy relied extensively on slave labor, a system not 
conducive to the rough terrain in the west where significantly fewer slaves lived. The most 
divisive differences, however, lay in the political realm. The planter aristocracy from mostly 
English descent in the Tidewater and Piedmont regions dominated Virginia politics, while settlers 
in the western part of the state were Scotch-Irish with more democratic roots. Those Scotch-Irish 
roots had created a culture filled with endemic violence and retributive justice where individuals 
were the guardians of their own interests and self-sovereignty kept the order. Politically, eastern 
and western Virginia differed on issues such as internal improvements, education, land policies, 
and taxation; ultimately eastern control of state politics ensured those disagreements were 
!5
 Kenneth Noe correctly points out that several regions existed within these east/west sections, and that 5
antebellum Virginians referred to “northwest” and “southwest” as frequently as “east” and “west.” However, while 
ethnicity, economics, and slavery divided the two western regions, they also paradoxically united them with mutual 
antagonism against the eastern regions. What line there was between the two western sections was blurred and 
existed much further north than the present day West Virginia state line. For a more detailed discussion on the 
sectional and regional differences in antebellum Virginia, see Kenneth Noe’s “Red String Scare: Civil War 
Southwest Virginia and the Heroes of America,” The North Carolina Historical Review 69:3 (July 1992): 301-322, 
especially pages 303-311.
decided to benefit the east.  6
As westerners grew decidedly frustrated at their political weakness, Virginia took steps to 
create more sectional parity. In 1850, the state passed a new constitution, which offered political 
reforms such as universal white male suffrage, the direct election of local and state officials, and 
increased western political representation.  Solutions were also put forward to address the 
transportation problems in the western portion of the state, where the mountains served as a 
physical barrier between the sections. Construction on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad began 
in 1850, connecting the southwestern part of the state to Lynchburg. The long discussed 
Kanawha Canal to connect the James River to the Kanawha River in the northwestern part of the 
state gained traction in the early part of the century and by 1840 it was completed to Lynchburg. 
These measures, however, failed to completely stifle the sectional antagonism. As 
railroads became the dominant mode of transportation, plans for the Canal stalled. Virginians in 
the northern part of the state turned to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to transport their goods, 
connecting that portion of the state economically to their northern neighbors rather than to the 
rest of Virginia. Other socioeconomic and political differences remained, as well. The developing 
western industries of salt and coal relied on free labor and were very different from eastern 
Virginia’s slave-based agricultural economy. The 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford Supreme Court 
decision and John Brown’s 1859 raid on Harpers Ferry inflamed old sectional tensions. In most 
counties in western Virginia, fewer than 10% of white families owned slaves, and in no counties 
did more than 20%, a stark contrast to the counties in the eastern, more slavery-based portion of 
!6
 David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed, Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 6
1989), 765-771.
the state.   7
While these differences caused sharp disagreements, a state split was not necessarily 
imminent before the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln and the subsequent secession crisis, nor 
did a clear dividing line exist, should such a rift occur. At Virginia’s April 17, 1861 secession 
vote, nearly two-thirds of the votes opposing the measure came from the northwestern counties. 
North of Charleston support for the Confederacy was scarce, since those counties’ economic 
systems resembled that of Ohio rather than the rest of Virginia, and secession from the Union 
would leave them surrounded by enemy territory on three sides. South of Charleston, however, 
sentiment for the Union was not as strong. Mountaineers tended to side with whichever political 
institution they believed most benefitted their livelihood and the safety of their families. While 
secession from the Union meant almost immediate invasion to those in the northern counties, 
those in the southern counties did not face such an immediate threat. Their loyalty lay with their 
state.  8
Although a new state eventually formed in 1863, not all of the counties it included solidly 
supported the split. When the First Wheeling Convention met in May 1861 to discuss the 
formation of a new government loyal to the Union, nine southern counties in present day West 
Virginia voted solidly to remain with Virginia and secede from the Union: Greenbrier, Monroe, 
Fayette, Raleigh, Mercer, Boone, Wyoming, McDowell, and Logan. The counties in the West 
Virginia panhandle were also strongly pro-secession. These counties remained committed to 
Virginia and the Confederacy as the war progressed, even when politically they were included in 
!7
 Ronald L. Heinemann et al., Old Dominion, New Commonwealth: A History of Virginia 1607-2007 7
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 194-195; Otis K. Rice and Stephen W. Brown, West Virginia, A 
History (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 90.
 Rice, West Virginia, 90; Robert R. Mackey, The Uncivil War, Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865 8
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 97.
the new state of West Virginia and militarily lay in Union hands. The presence of the Union army 
allowed the pro-Union northwestern Virginia delegates to return to Wheeling in June 1861 and 
form the Restored, or Reorganized, Government of Virginia, with Francis Pierpont as its 
governor. The Federal government gave this body legitimacy by granting representation in 
Congress. The Restored Government then approved the creation of a new state comprised of 39 
western counties. The Second Wheeling Convention convened in November 1861, and delegates 
debated the new state’s status as a free or slave state, the number of counties it incorporated, and 
its name. Ultimately the U.S. Congress passed the statehood bill that required gradual 
emancipation of slaves and allowed the new state of West Virginia to include 50 counties, many 
of which never voted on the measure or acknowledged the change until well after the war. 
Abraham Lincoln signed the bill on December 31, 1862 and West Virginia officially became a 
state on June 20, 1863.  9
 The new state, however, was divided in loyalty. Little disparity existed in the number of 
troops who fought for each side throughout the war as enlisted West Virginians served equally 
for both the Union and the Confederacy.  Similarly, the southwestern counties that ultimately 10
remained a part of Virginia were not solidly Confederate. Unionism there was visible from the 
beginning; some communities remained loyal throughout the conflict despite pressure from 
!8
 Rice, West Virginia, 120.9
 Many West Virginia historians have tried to emphasize the divided nature of the state throughout the Civil 10
War. In an interview about the publication of West Virginia and the Civil War: Mountaineers Are Always Free, Mark 
Snell stressed that West Virginia was the most divided state in the country, with half of its soldiers fighting for the 
Union and the other half for the Confederacy. (“Interview: Mark Snell,” http://bullrunnings.wordpress.com/
2011/11/17/interview-mark-snell-west-virginia-and-the-civil-war/, accessed October 21, 2013.) Tim McKinney also 
tried to debunk the myth that West Virginia was “a bastion of Nationalism or Union solidarity,” noting that 25 of the 
state’s 50 counties supported the Confederacy and did not want to break with Virginia. This compromised 2/3 of the 
state’s total area and 40% of its population. Even in some Union counties, secessionist minorities were as high as 
40% (Tim McKinney, Robert E. Lee and the 35th Star (Charleston, WV: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 
1993), 2). Also see McKinney’s The Civil War in Fayette County West Virginia (Charleston, WV: Pictorial Histories 
Publishing Company, 1995) and Otis K. Rice’s West Virginia for further examples of the lack of solidarity in the 
region during the war.
surrounding areas to conform. This fierce division that was not separated by any clear 
geographical lines created an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare.  11
Western Virginia’s natural resources and transportation routes held value for both the 
Confederacy and Union, and early in the war both sides conducted campaigns to secure the area. 
The armies’ struggle to gain control created chaos, and the area’s mountainous terrain with its 
crags and ravines offered a safe haven for deserters or bushwhackers who wished to evade 
capture or attack enemies without being observed. It also made transporting support to 
counterguerrilla units difficult, giving guerrilla fighters an added advantage. Bushwhackers 
could, and did, spring from the mountainous nooks and crannies, waylaying lone soldiers or 
civilians. Local guerrillas knew the backroads and paths in a way those brought in to oppose 
them did not, which added to their efficiency.  12
Because of their tendency to attack at any time and from anywhere, identifying the 
western Virginia guerrillas and discerning their intentions proved difficult. Some targeted only 
soldiers, while others attacked without restraint. Both pro-Union and pro-Confederate guerrilla 
bands formed in different areas of western Virginia. Some wanted to contribute to the war effort 
in their own way, while others wanted to take advantage of the turbulent times for their own 
selfish ambition. The confusion concerning the identity of these guerrillas extended to the 
vocabulary both Union and Confederate contemporaries used to describe them. “Guerrilla,” 
“bushwhacker,” “bandit,” “ranger,” “scamp,”  “marauder,” and “deserter” were all used, often 
interchangeably, to describe people who did not fight using traditional tactics. While each term 
!9
 Cathleen Carlson Reynolds, “A Pragmatic Loyalty: Unionism in Southwestern Virginia, 11
1861-1865” (Master’s Thesis, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1987), 27.
 William W. Freehling, The South vs. the South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the 12
Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 56; Mackey, Uncivil War, 20.
carried its own specific meaning, those meanings were often blurred depending on the 
connotation the writer desired to communicate.  
“Guerrilla” was typically used as a more generous term by sympathetic writers to 
describe irregular fighters who usually refrained from overt stealing or vandalism, at least against 
those of the same political orientation. “Bushwhacker” carried a more dishonorable meaning and 
referred to those who robbed, raped, and murdered without restraint. Nancy Hunt, a resident of 
Mountain Cove, West Virginia, made this distinction when describing two different bands 
operating in the vicinity of her hometown. While she considered members of one band to be 
murderous thugs or bushwhackers, she described the other band as guerrillas, writing, “I never 
heard of Riley bushwhacking. He gives them a chance for their lives.”  The term 13
“bushwhacker” originated in Missouri, initially meaning armed bands of men who committed 
depredations upon the local population. They hid in the bush and “whacked” or killed those who 
passed. During the Civil War, a “bushwhacker” was typically a Confederate sympathizer and a 
“jayhawker” his northern counterpart, but that term was only used in the western and trans-
Mississippi theaters. Many historians use the term “guerrilla” to encompass both “bushwhacker” 
and “jayhawker,” a practice some of the war’s contemporaries engaged in, as well.  14
At times, civilians used the term “bushwhacker” to slander their enemies, regardless of 
whether or not the person they were referencing actually engaged in irregular warfare. 
Sometimes Unionists equated “secesh,” a slang term for southern sympathizers, with 
“bushwhacker,” insinuating that all secessionists were lawless vagabonds. The interchangeable 
!10
 Nancy Hunt, September 3, 1863, Letters of Nancy Hunt, Virginia Historical Society, Special Collections, 13
Richmond, VA (VHS).
 Gary C. Walker, The War in Southwest Virginia, 1861-1865 (Roanoke, VA: Gurtner Graphics and Printing 14
Co., 1985), 29; Jeffrey Weaver, The Civil War in Buchanan and Wise Counties, Bushwhackers’ Paradise 
(Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1994), 63.
terminology can make understanding the nature of the guerrilla war challenging. Organized 
military forces often failed to differentiate between raiders, rangers, marauders, and guerrillas, 
but civilians usually did in their actions, if not their words. To them, partisans and raiders were 
more or less responsive to the government, while guerrillas were citizens, not soldiers. They 
were, therefore, an arm of their community, not their government, and usually operated close to 
home. While a part of the war, the war was a personal, not a national, one to them. Because their 
survival was dependent on friendly natives, guerrillas were inseparable from their community.  15
To help clarify the ambiguity, historians have attempted to break the lines of irregular 
warfare down into three different types. Most of the literature, however, emphasizes guerrillas’ 
tactics rather than their motivations, an approach that does not correlate well to the independence 
inherent in guerrilla warfare. The first type, raiding warfare, was the most organized of the three, 
and involved regular cavalry officers—Union or Confederate—temporarily operating outside of 
the regular command structure. These raiders, usually with the permission of regular authorities, 
attacked strategic locations, such as railroad bridges or depots. They lived off the land, helping 
themselves to supplies from houses of enemy civilians and inflicting maximum damage before 
slipping back into the safety of their own lines. 
Another type of irregular warfare was partisan warfare, conducted by partisans or rangers 
who were government sanctioned irregular troops loosely attached to the conventional army. 
Many of these groups formed immediately upon the outbreak of war. They lived behind enemy 
lines, receiving support and supplies from sympathetic civilians. To avoid capture, partisans 
mustered for specific operations and then went home after completing them, fading into the local 
!11
 Clay Mountcastle, Punitive War, Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals (Lawrence: University Press of 15
Kansas, 2009), 3; Ash, When the Yankees Came, 48-49.
civilian population. To try to organize these groups and gain some control over them, the 
Confederate Government passed the Partisan Ranger Act in 1862. This put partisans on the 
government payroll, gave them prisoner of war status in the eyes of many Union officials, and 
stipulated they give any weapons they captured to the Confederate government. The rangers 
were permitted to keep anything else they captured, making the position of a partisan as 
potentially lucrative as it was dangerous. The act was revoked in 1864, however, because 
partisans were too independent to accept direction from the army, and their actions often harmed 
loyal Confederate citizens. 
The third category of guerrilla warfare identified by historians encompasses the rest of 
the participants—those who operated in the least civilized or honorable way according to 
nineteenth-century rules of warfare. This is usually called the “people’s war” or just the 
“guerrilla war,” deriving its name from its participants being regular civilians who became 
involved over local concerns. Bushwhackers, Jayhawkers, and bandits operated in this realm, 
taking advantage of the breakdown in law and order the war brought and generally paying no 
attention to national goals. They victimized regardless of age or sex, although they generally 
killed only men and boys. While the word rape does not often surface in primary sources, 
historian Michael Fellman noted that in Missouri “extreme brutality toward women was 
common, including what one might call near rape or symbolic rape, often combined with looting 
and the killing of men.” A similar pattern emerged in western Virginia, where women were not 
exempt from the violence and brutality. Because the term “guerrilla war” is often applied 
exclusively to this last category of guerrillas, historians now typically use the term “irregular 
!12
warfare” to incorporate all three types.  16
The inherent challenge historians encounter when researching irregular conflict is a lack 
of sources, especially firsthand accounts from the guerrillas themselves. Many guerrillas who 
gained considerable prominence during the war in western Virginia, such as Champ Fergeson, 
John McNeill, and John Hunt Morgan, did not survive long enough to provide such accounts. 
The nature of the war also meant that many of the participants were mountaineers who remained 
close to home, many of whom were illiterate or lived in such rough conditions during the war 
that they had no means to record their thoughts or hold correspondence. Therefore, most of the 
surviving sources are from the point of view of the victims rather than the perpetrators of the 
attacks. Because the sources are scarce, drawing a complete picture of guerrilla warfare can be 
challenging. However, the guerrillas’ actions hint at their motives, thus offering the means to 
determine the different motivations that led to their involvement.  17
Not only is it possible to study the subject with limited sources, but its scope and 
prevalence make such study necessary. Scholarly work over the past fifty years has proven 
guerrilla warfare was a crucial part of the larger war and the only war many civilians 
encountered in western Virginia and the rest of the Confederacy. Until the mid-twentieth century, 
guerrilla conflict was essentially ignored because, as John Inscoe speculated, Lost Cause writers 
dominated the literature in the years following the war, and “there was no room for divided 
loyalties, internal dissent, or guerrilla warfare.” However, Casey Tefertiller’s assertion that 
“shock value always has longer shelf life than tedious detail” rings true about this topic, as local 
!13
 Fellman, Inside War, 207, Sutherland, “Sideshow No Longer,” 6.16
 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 47; John C. Inscoe, “Guerrilla War and Remembrance,” Appalachian Journal 17
34:1 (Fall 2006): 76.
lore and oral tradition kept the atrocities committed during the guerrilla war in the public 
memory. As the stories were passed down from generation to generation, many grew legendary. 
Local amateur historians captured these accounts, but did little to verify their accuracy or curb 
the mythology interwoven into them. What few biographical works historians did do focused 
only on colorful personalities, such as the partisan John S. Mosby in northern Virginia or the 
notorious bushwhacker William Quantrill in Missouri, showing them as heroic and romantic 
adventurers rather than treating them in a scholarly way.  18
Changes in modern warfare in the twentieth century sent historians on a search for 
historical relevance, and the beginning of guerrilla studies emerged. Elihu J. Sutherland helped to 
pave the way when he set out to create a folk history of the Sandy Basin—an area that included 
most of present-day Dickenson County—based on family histories of its first settlers. From the 
1920s to the 1940s, he interviewed over 100 residents about their memories or stories their 
parents and grandparents told. Historian Ralph Mann later used this collection to discover new 
truths about the nature of guerrilla warfare in Appalachia during the Civil War. He concluded that 
it was shaped by kinship networks, gender roles, and community dynamics rather than 
economics or politics.  19
In the 1960s and 1970s the scope of research broadened and the field gained 
sophistication with an improved quality of scholarly examination. The Vietnam War brought new 
words, such as “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency,” into the study, and the widening interest in 
the Civil War’s irregular war created a new historiographical trend, one that encompassed a 
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 Inscoe, “Guerrilla War,” 75; Casey Tefertiller, Wyatt Earp: The Life Behind the Legend (Hoboken, NJ: John 18
Wiley & Sons, 1999), 157; Sutherland, “Sideshow No Longer,” 5-7.
 Sutherland, “Sideshow No Longer,” 7-9; Inscoe, “Guerrilla War,” 79.19
greater geographical spread. Previous writers had focused only on Missouri’s guerrilla war or the 
partisan war in northern Virginia that Mosby waged, but in the 1970s, the western and trans-
Mississippi theaters attracted the attention. Missouri received little attention from writers, and 
Virginia received essentially no attention at all, as the only mention that decade of guerrilla 
warfare in the state was confined to a single issue of the Civil War Times Illustrated.  20
Phillip Paludan opened another new field of study in 1981 when he published Victims: A 
True Story of the Civil War. He looked at the war’s social impact and put a human face on the 
brutality of the guerrilla conflict, focusing on the victims rather than the purveyors of irregular 
warfare. Victims told the story of a remote Appalachian valley in North Carolina, where 13 
Unionists ranging from ages 13-59 were shot by Confederate soldiers in January 1863. Calling 
the deaths “atrocities,” Paludan claimed that looking at only 13 of the over 600,000 casualties of 
the Civil War forced the reader to confront the horror that the large, faceless number obscures. 
He explored the lives of specific people to show the “capacity to commit atrocity” that humans 
have had throughout history. He also noted that the guerrilla war was a “footnote in the study of 
the war” and called for additional consideration of it. His aim, then, was to show how that type 
of war tested allegiances and loyalties and what that testing cost in anxiety and anguish.  21
Paludan’s worked paved the way for Michael Fellman’s definitive 1989 Inside War: The 
Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the American Civil War. While Virgil Carrington Jones 
had raised awareness of the subject thirty years before, Fellman’s work became the model for 
future historians studying guerrilla warfare. Daniel Sutherland noted that, astonishingly, Fellman 
!15
 Sutherland, “Sideshow No Longer,” 10-13; Mackey, Uncivil War, 22.20
 Sutherland, “Sideshow No Longer,” 15; Phillip Shaw Paludan, Victims, A True Story of the Civil War 21
(Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1981), ix-x.
was the first scholar to use archival manuscript collections in his research, including those at the 
National Archives, and “the result, a grimly realistic account of the raw, unregulated, no-holds-
barred nature of the contest, exposed the horrific guts of war. There had been nothing like it in 
guerrilla studies.”  22
The account offered a sophisticated analysis of the Civil War’s guerrilla war, and looked 
closely at its impact on noncombatants. Fellman examined the clash between Unionist and 
secessionist civilians, the reasons guerrillas became involved, the official government responses, 
the impact on communities, and the roles that women and blacks played. He said he chose 
Missouri as his case study because it suffered from the worst guerrilla warfare in the war, and 
emphasized that for Missourians, the struggle was over the survival of their culture, not secession 
or emancipation. People there knew the difference between civilization and barbarism, but the 
roots for how people channeled their behavior had been destroyed. Both terror and a sense of 
justice affected civilians. He concluded that “most rural white Missourians lost a great deal 
during the war—male kin, property, security, decent communal relations—all building blocks of 
a normal life. They had to lie and cheat and bear false witness just to survive.” While his work 
was pivotal and showed the complexity of waging war in a deeply divided environment, it was 
limited in scope since he only examined Confederate guerrillas in Missouri. This left the door 
open for more research in other areas of the Confederacy and showed the need for an 
examination of Unionist guerrillas.  23
Stephen V. Ash joined Fellman in 1995 in deromanticizing the war and demanding more 
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attention on the southern civilian population in When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in 
the Occupied South, 1861-1865. He looked at how the southern experience of occupation 
changed as the war progressed and how citizens clashed with each other, providing good 
contextual information for guerrilla studies. While Fellman’s findings attracted attention to the 
guerrilla war and Ash’s raised awareness of the great hardships civilians faced, the field itself 
remained obscured by the continual focus on the organized troops. Mark Grimsley noted in 1997 
that the guerrilla struggle remained “one of the relatively forgotten dimensions of the Civil War.” 
In The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865, 
Grimsley tried to put guerrillas into the context of broader wartime strategies, looking at Federal 
attempts to cope with Confederate guerrillas. His work built off of what Archer Jones briefly 
addressed in Civil War Command and Strategy, The Process of Victory and Defeat. Jones noted 
that the Union army paid for its success against guerrillas and a precarious security of rail 
communications by seriously weakening its main forces to keep back large numbers of men from 
the front lines. The Union armies only used two-thirds of their total strength in their campaigns, 
since the remaining one-third had to occupy conquered territory and combat guerrillas.  24
Grimsley took a more in-depth look at what the Union’s policy was, especially 
concerning southern civilians. When an early policy of conciliation failed to weaken the 
Confederacy, the Federal command turned to “hard war,” with emancipation as its “touchstone,” 
to demoralize the Confederacy and destroy its economy. In addition to explaining how the North 
came to such a policy, he also detailed what the policy was like in action. The Union army held a 
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liberal attitude toward the general population and practiced retaliation against citizens who 
assisted the war effort, but Grimsley argued that neither of these measures “did much to curtail 
the irregular warfare, which continued for the balance of the conflict.” Once the Union 
implemented its policy of hard war, though, its primary objective remained the restoration of the 
Union, not destruction of the South. Soldiers forged when they needed to forge and retaliated 
when they were beset by guerrillas, but otherwise they considered civilians peripheral.  25
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the divided nature of the Confederacy’s 
population, a heavy contributor to the rise of the guerrilla war, garnered increasing attention. In 
2001, William Freehling published The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners 
Shaped the Course of the Civil War. He argued that “the divided southern homefront crippled 
Confederate battle heroes.” Not only did the “other half” of whites and blacks throughout the 
South withhold their support from the new Confederacy, they also “piled on psychological, 
economic, and geographic burdens that ultimately helped flatten white Confederates’ 
resiliency.”  26
As the decade progressed, historians Robert R. Mackey, Clay Mountcastle, and Daniel E. 
Sutherland disputed how beneficial the guerrilla war really was for the Confederacy and how 
effective the Union was at countering it. In The Uncivil War, Irregular Warfare in the Upper 
South, 1961-1865, Mackey looked at guerrilla war aimed against outside invaders while ignoring 
the aspect of it that occurred among neighbors. He argued that the Confederacy “overtly 
organized” and fought an irregular conflict that was an integral yet subordinate part of the 
conventional war, and lost both. After having tried all three types of irregular war—raider, 
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partisan, and marauder—the Confederacy surrendered rather than try to continue an irregular war 
because it had not worked. He also claimed that federal inventiveness, superior organization and 
logistical support, and the use of Unionists as counterguerrilla groups allowed the Union to stop 
all types of irregular warfare by early 1865.  27
Mountcastle disagreed that the Union successfully countered the southern guerrilla war 
effort, noting that it constantly had to shift its response due to ineffectiveness. In Punitive War, 
Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals, he looked at the Union’s response to guerrillas by 
theater rather than chronologically to show how the irregular war grew throughout the 
Confederacy at varying times and to varying degrees. As he noted in his title, Mountcastle 
focused on how the Union waged a punitive war in response to the vexing problem of guerrilla 
warfare in the South, and he argued the punitive measures ultimately resulted in the Union’s 
victory of the entire war. Much of the extensive damage that was done in the South during the 
Civil War came as the direct or indirect result of the guerrilla problem. Irregular methods were so 
common that encountering them was not surprising, yet they became noteworthy because of the 
effect they had on Union attitudes toward southern civilians and their property.  28
Daniel Sutherland agreed with Mountcastle that the Union never completely bested 
Confederate guerrillas in A Savage Conflict, The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American 
Civil War. However, he also noted that the independence and unmanageableness of the guerrillas 
hurt the Confederacy as well, especially when southern officials had an indecisive attitude on 
how to handle them. When guerrilla warfare pitted neighbor against neighbor, the conflict 
became local and caused civilians to lose sight of national goals. People began to lose faith in the 
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Confederate government’s ability to protect them as the internal war grew more fierce. The 
guerrillas, however, successfully kept the enemy army in check by demanding constant attention 
and resources, and showed federal officials that to win the war they had to crush rebellion on the 
home front as well as be successful in conventional battles. This turned the war more brutal and 
destructive, until ultimately the tragedy of guerrilla warfare was that “it left people with neither 
homes nor providers.”  29
While the broad overviews of guerrilla warfare show how it fit into the war as a whole, 
more focused studies are helpful in determining its nature and impact. Michael Fellman’s Inside 
War covered in-depth the Confederate guerrillas in Missouri. Noel Fisher’s War at Every Door 
examined the conflict in eastern Tennessee from the beginning of the war through 1869, while 
Todd Groce looked at Confederate sentiment in the overwhelmingly Unionist mountains of that 
region in Mountain Rebels. As those rebels tried to gain support from Richmond in their struggle 
for political domination and survival at home, they essentially fought three fronts: a hostile 
Confederate government, hostile Unionist neighbors, and the occupation by federal forces. Many 
Confederate sympathizers in what is now southern West Virginia faced many of the same 
challenges.  30
The mountains of western North Carolina have also received attention from recent 
scholarship, most notably from John Inscoe and Gordon McKinney’s The Heart of Confederate 
Appalachia and Martin Crawford’s Ashe County’s Civil War. Crawford particularly stressed the 
importance of kin over economic class in the guerrilla struggle. Brian Steel Wills looked at 
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southeastern Virginia in a combined social, economic, political, and military study in The War 
Hits Home. Jonathan D. Sarris considered north Georgia in A Separate Civil War through a study 
of Fannin and Lumpkin Counties, two mountain communities that had very different responses 
to the national upheaval, despite their initial mutual support of the Confederacy. Plain Folk in a 
Rich Man’s War, by David Williams, Teresa Crisp, and David Carlson, also looked at Georgia 
and showed that, just as in southwestern Virginia, the loyalty of the poor was not reliable. 
Margaret Storey looked at southern dissent and unionism in Alabama in Loyalty and Loss, 
demonstrating how Alabama’s Unionists had to rely on traditional kin networks to survive. The 
guerrilla war in Arkansas was particularly brutal and unmanageable, and Daniel Sutherland and 
Anne Bailey compiled an excellent collection of essays that illustrate this in Civil War Arkansas: 
Beyond Battles and Leaders. The legacy of bitterness the conflict left plagued the state long after 
the war ended.  31
Southwest Virginia and eastern Kentucky were particularly ignored until Brian McKnight 
took steps to correct that oversight in 2006. In Contested Borderland: The Civil War in 
Appalachian Kentucky and Virginia, he looked at how the geography of the area helped to dictate 
the course of the war, and how in every community that saw organized forces, a great conflict 
arose between the accomplishment of military goals and the maintenance of civilian life. For 
four years the border between Kentucky and Virginia was no-man’s land, where soldiers from 
both armies passed through looking for food or patrolling the area. As deserters congregated in 
bands and used the mountains to conceal themselves, they frequently turned their military 
training on civilians to survive, which added to the instability of the region. The region itself was 
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largely pro-Confederate, but many of the men who lived in contested areas remained at home to 
fight the war in their own way, often turning to bushwhacking tactics to protect their families.  32
Kenneth Noe also contributed to the historiography of guerrilla warfare in Virginia and in 
Appalachia during the Civil War. He studied county and state records for his detailed “Who Were 
the Bushwhackers? Age, Class, Kin, and Western Virginia’s Confederate Guerrillas, 1861-1862,” 
and discovered that the average age of bushwhackers early in the war was quite a bit older than 
the average age of enlisted soldiers. He also dispelled the myth that guerrillas were mostly from 
the lower classes, demonstrating that many came from successful backgrounds and were leaders 
in their communities. He suggested the centrality of kin and neighborhood in the making of a 
guerrilla.  33
While some work, then, has been done on western Virginia, an opening exists for further 
study. West Virginia has received attention with its recent sesquicentennial celebration, but that 
focus has been exclusively on the counties that comprise that state and not on western Virginia as 
a whole. Noe noted that one shortcoming in recent studies was the lack of coverage in some 
areas, including western Virginia where “more can and should be done.” Mackey called Virginia 
a “suitable study for evaluating the irregular warfare,” while Mountcastle agreed because 
“Virginia served as the focal point for the culmination of three years of anger, frustration, and 
hardened federal attitudes.” Edward L. Ayers believed that studies of guerrilla warfare in Virginia 
“could be multiplied many times over and still not exhaust the stories to be told.”  34
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A consideration of the nature of the guerrilla war in the entirety of western Virginia as it 
was in 1861 must include clearer divisions within irregular warfare. The standard approach to 
differentiate guerrilla fighters solely by the tactics they employed as raiders, rangers, or 
marauders, while a good start, is rather simplistic. The final people’s war category is still too 
large to be entirely helpful. In his definition of irregular warfare, Mark Grimsley tried to break 
that category into two. The first he described as “politicized civilians who fought covertly, 
masquerading as noncombatants,” while his final category contained the outlaws who used the 
war as “an excuse to indulge in mayhem.” He pointed out that to add to the confusion, individual 
guerrillas themselves drifted between the groups.  35
While Grimsley’s categorization creates a better distinction between guerrilla fighters, the 
problem still remains that these categories only try to address the type of warfare irregulars 
engaged in while ignoring the nuances that exist within a guerrilla war.  It does not distinguish 36
between the hostilities aimed against outside invaders and the violence neighbors perpetrated 
against each other. The typical categories also do not incorporate the bands that engaged in 
standard “guerrilla” activities, such as stealing or killing, solely for self-defensive or survival 
purposes. 
The existing categories of raiding warfare, partisan warfare, and the people’s war also 
present the opportunity to generalize for clarity when in reality the guerrilla war was very messy. 
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In The Uncivil War, Mackey argued that Arkansas had “a guerrilla war of the ‘people’s war’ 
model,” compared to “the organized partisan war in Virginia and the raiding war in Tennessee 
and Kentucky.” These simplistic generalizations look only at some of the most famous guerrillas 
in those areas, and lose sight of the prevalence of all types of guerrilla warfare throughout the 
Confederacy and how involved many southern civilians became in the conflict.  
The true “people’s war” occurred wherever people’s way of life was threatened. When 
the Federal cavalry raided Wytheville in Wythe County, Virginia, in July 1863, the people of the 
town grabbed their guns and engaged them. In December 1864, West Virginia Governor Arthur 
Boreman called on loyal citizens to rise up and form vigilante bands to hunt down and kill the 
“outlaws” who had “thrown themselves outside of all rules or laws, military or civil for the 
government of society.” He turned to civilians to restore peace and order to the state because “on 
account of the great numbers of these banditti, and the fact that they always go armed, it is 
impossible for the civil officers to arrest or the civil courts to punish them. Indeed, all the prisons 
in the state would hold but a small part of them.” Additionally, Boreman claimed that military 
forces could not successfully “rid the country of them” because they operated in such small 
bands; therefore, he “earnestly” recommended “the loyal people…organize themselves into 
Companies…for the purpose of hunting down and capturing or killing these outlaws wherever 
they may be found.” Irregular warfare in Virginia, especially western Virginia, then, was much 
more than a partisan affair; it incorporated more than just government-recognized groups, those 
who fought covertly, or those who simply wished to indulge in mayhem.  37
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An analysis of motives rather than tactics provides a clearer definition of irregular 
warfare and aligns more closely with the nuances that existed within the people’s war in western 
Virginia. Studying guerrillas according to why they fought rather than how they did so explains 
how guerrilla warfare became so prevalent and why politicians and organized troops could not 
easily answer or control it. Some of the same types of fighters—raiders, partisans, bushwhackers, 
deserters, bandits, etc.—fought for different motivations. Additionally, some Confederate and 
Union sympathizers who engaged in guerrilla warfare were not willing participants. Examining 
motives and goals is especially important when looking at western Virginia, since the area had a 
population divided between Unionists and secessionists as well as a landscape that offered 
shelter for those who needed a place to hide. 
Overall, irregulars in western Virginia were motivated by at least three things. One 
motivation, a driving factor for fighters from all three historical categories, was the opportunity 
to assist in military strategy for a political cause. Both raiders and partisans, who at least 
answered to their government in name, if not always in practice, fought for this reason, as did 
those bands of bushwhackers who targeted enemy soldiers or supply lines. These were often the 
bands that sympathetic civilians referred to as “guerrillas” rather than “bushwhackers.” Those 
who desired to assist the organized war effort in western Virginia derailed trains, attacked 
foraging parties, and generally threatened the efficient conduct of military operations. This 
option appealed to many patriotic mountaineers who wanted to both assist their cause and remain 
present at home to defend and provide for their families. Home guards, considered the final line 
of defense for communities and towns, also fall under this category and prove once again how 
the war in nature was a people’s war. Members of the home guard lived at home in the 
!25
community and mustered when invading armies or guerrilla bands threatened their town. 
However, some also engaged in guerrilla tactics and threatened civilians during missions to hunt 
down deserters or draft-evaders. Sometimes home guards further complicated things by engaging 
in activities beyond their job description, turning to bushwhacking and becoming part of the 
problem. In western Virginia, some of the most active irregular fighters who fought for the war 
effort were Capt. John McNeill around the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Gen. John Imboden in 
cavalry raids throughout the area, and the Moccasin Rangers around Lewisburg in Greenbrier 
County.  
Guerrillas were also motivated by personal reasons, including spite, revenge, or the 
opportunity for advancement. These guerrillas implemented their own law and killed with little 
concern for cause or political alliances. They took advantage of the chaos of war to prey on their 
neighbors, looking to exact revenge for old disagreements or gain power and wealth through 
illegal means. While civilians often grew annoyed at military-motivated guerrillas who lived off 
the land and took their supplies, they held guerrillas who fought for spite, such as Hernden’s 
band in the Kanawha Valley, Bill Pierson in Braxton County and Burleson’s rangers in Scott 
County, in terror. 
Finally, there were those who fought for self-preservation. Often these desired only to be 
left alone but were forced to embrace guerrilla tactics to survive. They stole food or robbed 
houses to gain the materials they needed for survival, and killed if they were hunted down or 
attacked. This included deserters from both armies, draft-evaders, and Unionists or secessionists 
who lived in areas not sympathetic to their beliefs. The most successful band of deserters in 
western Virginia lived in Floyd County, and they not only managed to survive and evade capture, 
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but also united with Unionists in the county 
to wrest control away from the Confederate 
sympathizers and declare independence 
from Virginia. 
This categorization system could 
benefit guerrilla warfare studies by 
dividing irregular fighters according to 
their types of involvement rather than 
simply according to the tactics they used. It 
can be applied to both Unionist and 
secessionist guerrillas who congregated in bands throughout western Virginia to fight outside 
invaders as well as intimidate their neighbors. Their reasons and methods varied little—only 
their enemy was different. This system also helps to explain why the official governmental 
responses for dealing with guerrillas so often failed. Because they failed to differentiate between 
irregular fighters who fought for military aims, personal greed, and self preservation, the 
governments attempted to respond to each using the same methods, and were therefore 
unsuccessful in controlling any of them. The Union army, especially, implemented a system of 
reprisals on civilians in response to the lingering guerrilla war they could not effectively control, 
which meant that civilians suffered at the hands of both bushwhackers and the regular army. The 
historiography debates to what extent the civilian suffering was on account of guerrillas and how 
much of it was a natural consequence of war, but no doubt exists that civilians suffered greatly 
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Any categorization of a topic as messy as guerrilla warfare will 
naturally result in some overlap. While three distinct motivations 
for guerrilla warfare existed in western Virginia, some guerrillas 
saw their motivations change as the war progressed while others 
fought with multiple motivations simultaneously. An understanding 
of this overlap is essential in any study of guerrilla warfare.
from irregular warfare.  38
Western Virginia guerrillas and their impact on their communities are best considered 
according to their motives for involvement. Many fighters who involved themselves in the 
irregular war to assist the broader war effort desired only to fight the enemy. Other guerrillas 
used irregular war tactics for personal advancement and implemented terror over former 
neighbors. Finally, some groups included the more unwilling participants who were forced to 
become involved for self-preservation and fought any who threatened their families or their lives. 
All of these groups require explanations about which types of irregular fighters they included, 
what those fighters’ motivations and goals were, how the Union and Confederate governments 
responded to them, and how effective their methods were according to what they hoped to 
achieve. As in other areas of Appalachia, Virginia mountaineers placed high value on family and 
put local concerns over state or national concerns, and how guerrilla warfare was conducted in 
the area was a direct result of those customs.  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CHAPTER I 
Family and Cause: Guerrillas Who Fought for Military Strategy !
The most sophisticated and organized type of guerrilla warfare was conducted by those 
who became involved to assist the military and political strategy of the rivaling state or national 
governments. These participants fought under different labels, but the reason for their 
involvement dictated their motivations and goals, and defined their effectiveness. The 
governments’ lack of understanding of the reasons behind their participation resulted in measures 
that were never fully successful. These guerrillas included cavalry raiders, partisan rangers, some 
bushwhackers, and members of home guards. Three factors motivated these guerrillas to fight. 
First, they desired to defend their communities and stay close to home and their loved ones. 
Second, they hoped to contribute to the larger cause on their own terms. Finally, those who 
fought as partisan rangers also saw guerrilla warfare as a potentially lucrative opportunity.  
Their actions took on four main goals. They looked to assault military targets such as 
railroads and steamboats, impede the progress of advancing armies, attack political opponents to 
undermine civilian support for their enemies, and do whatever they could to impact, either 
negatively or positively, West Virginia’s establishment as a new state. The Confederate 
government tried to regulate their own sympathetic guerrillas while taking a harsh stance against 
those who supported the Union. To try to bring peace to the turbulent area under their control, 
Union commanders implemented harsh reprisals against Confederate guerrillas and encouraged 
Unionists to turn to guerrilla warfare to help counter them. While these guerrillas had little 
impact when they tried to operate against much larger armies, Confederate guerrillas did succeed 
in forcing the Union to keep much greater numbers of troops in the areas than federal officials 
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would have preferred. Similarly on a large scale, Union guerrillas were instrumental in helping 
the northwestern counties successfully establish the state of West Virginia. 
Geography and resources played a key role in guerrilla warfare in western Virginia. When 
Virginia seceded from the Union in 1861, federal officials immediately developed plans to 
invade the state. They viewed western Virginia as a possible gateway to the James River Valley, 
which offered an early invasion route into the rest of Virginia, and they took steps accordingly to 
try to control it. The Confederate government also recognized the strategic importance of the 
area, and sent troops under orders to secure the area’s resources and answer the unionism 
sentiment present in the northwestern most counties. While not a big industry yet, coal mining 
had developed in the northern counties and government officials recognized the vast amount of 
coal the mountains held.  1
The southern counties had valuable salt and lead works, and provided access to Kentucky 
through the Cumberland Gap. The saltworks at Saltville had been producing salt since 1788, and 
were one of only five places in the Confederacy with salt-producing capability. It was so vast 
that it produced over 300,000 bushels in 1863, but by that time it was one of only two salt 
operations left under Confederate control. By 1864 it was producing nearly four million bushels, 
more than the railroad could transport. Such production made it an attractive target for the Union 
and vitally important for the Confederacy. Salt was necessary not only to preserve food for the 
army, but also for preserving hides in leather making and in making various medicines. The 
mineral also affected the health of livestock, as a hoof and tongue disease among Robert E. Lee’s 
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cavalry horses in 1862 was attributed possibly to a lack of salt.  2
The lead mines in Wythe County were also a concern to the Confederate authorities, since 
they were the only source of lead in the South. The mines produced over 60,000 pounds of lead 
each month and were critical to the Confederacy’s ammunition production. Iron works and 
foundries in several southwestern towns added to the area’s value, since the South had to rely on 
its own resources to repair rails, make cannons, and produce armor for ironclad ships. 
Southwestern Virginia also had the capability to grow a surplus of wheat, rye, corn, oats, and 
potatoes, while the West Virginia counties were America’s most important wool production 
center east of the Mississippi River. As historian James Robertson notes, southwestern Virginia’s 
contribution to the Confederacy was as much material as it was manpower.  3
 Western Virginia also held two strategic railroad lines. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 
along the region’s northern border, was vital to the Union army’s supply lines, as was the 
Virginia & Tennessee Railroad in southwestern Virginia to the Confederacy. Due to their 
importance, both lines remained continuous targets of guerrilla warfare and cavalry raids 
throughout the duration of the conflict. 
The northwestern portion of Virginia fell quickly, as Union troops defeated the 
Confederates in 1861 at Philippi and Rich Mountain on June 3 and July 11, respectively. These 
victories in the Monongahela Valley and the Confederates’ inability to do anything further except 
conduct sporadic raids to the region allowed the Reorganized Government of Virginia to form, 
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which led to the eventual creation of the state of West Virginia. Although the Confederacy 
enjoyed great sympathy in the Kanawha Valley, mismanagement and ineptness by Confederate 
commanders Henry A. Wise and John B. Floyd soon led to a Confederate retreat from the Valley, 
as well. Confederate Virginia Governor John Letcher sent Robert E. Lee to the area to regain the 
lost territory, but Lee’s efforts failed badly. By 1862, guerrillas conducted most of the fighting in 
the area and dominated it for the remainder of the war.  4
Although the organized armies had conducted campaigns in the region at the beginning of 
hostilities, local residents had not shied away from also getting involved. By the time Union 
General George McClellan received his first assignment of the war in western Virginia, one 
Union newspaper referred to his responsibilities there as “guerrilla duty.” Throughout the trans-
Allegheny region, battles over the state’s firearms broke out. In Parkersville, Unionists and 
secessionists exchanged gunfire over muskets to arm a home guard company. In Sisterville, a 
group of secessionists succeeded in gaining control over the town’s muskets, but Unionists 
secured two cannons. Additionally, calls from across the state began for the people to assist in 
their own defense. Letcher appealed to western Virginians to do their “patriotic duty” and 
organize partisan bands to defend themselves. An advertisement in the Kanawha Valley Star in 
April 1861 boasted that since western Virginian men were accustomed to bearing arms since 
youth, if “the abolitionists of Ohio send an invading army into Western Virginia, not a soldier 
among them will ever return alive. The mountain boys will shoot them down as dogs.”  5
While Union commanders ceased to believe western Virginia held a good invasion route 
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to the rest of the state by 1863 and no longer considered it important to their military strategy, 
mountaineers who desired to contribute to a political cause continued to attack military targets. 
They aligned themselves with Union or Confederate government-sanctioned raiders to conduct 
the most organized guerrilla warfare with raids against mines and railroads. Brig. Gens. Albert G. 
Jenkins, William E. Jones, and John D. Imboden led the most organized raids for the 
Confederacy in western Virginia, while Brig. Gens. William W. Averell, George Crook, Stephen 
Burbridge, and Col. Maj. Gen. George Stoneman did the same for the Union.  6
Although Jenkins was a commissioned officer in the Confederate army, Union soldiers 
routinely referred to the men who fought under him as “Jenkins’ guerrillas,” and he became the 
region’s most feared irregular fighter, since he had the freedom to strike wherever and whenever 
he desired. In October 1862, the New York Herald reported that Jenkins’ men were the only 
“rebels” left in the Little Kanawha Valley, although their calculations failed to take civilians into 
account. Born in 1830 in Cabell County, Virginia, Jenkins was educated at Harvard and prior to 
the war served as a United States Congressman. Once the war began in 1861, he focused his 
actions in western Virginia on terrorizing Unionists and threatening neighboring communities in 
Ohio. By 1862, Union commanders were forced to assign as many as 4,800 men to protect 
telegraph lines, railroad bridges, and tunnels against the threat of Jenkins’ men. The protection of 
these military targets, however, meant that federal soldiers could no longer effectively protect as 
many neighborhoods, leaving many Unionists to feel as though the army abandoned them.  7
Jenkins’ most notorious raid occurred in late summer 1862. He added home guards and 
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guerrillas to his regular cavalry troops and journeyed 500 miles through northwestern Virginia 
and into Ohio. As Union militia and guerrillas responded as best as they could, Jenkins’ men 
captured prisoners and munitions, caused Unionists to live in a state of fear, and proved that the 
Union’s grasp on northwestern Virginia was not impenetrable. Jenkins continued his raids into 
northwestern Virginia and offered what defense he could to Confederate-held southwest Virginia 
until he was killed in the Battle of Cloyd’s Mountain on May 21, 1864.  8
With impending West Virginia statehood in 1863, Confederate leaders made one final 
effort to block it by increasing their presence east of the Allegheny Mountains. In April, Imboden 
and Jones launched separate yet concurrent raids into the Little Kanawha Valley, hoping to reach 
the B&O and and destroy all of the bridges and trestles between Oakland and Grafton. They also 
sought to defeat Union detachments in towns along the railroad, enlist secessionists into the 
Confederate army, and harass the Reorganized Government by influencing the May elections. On 
April 29, Imboden, a native of Lewis County, reached Fairmont. He demolished an important 
railroad bridge and burned Virginia (USA) Governor Francis Pierpont’s private library, after 
which his raiders purportedly dragged half-burnt books, including the family Bible, through the 
streets.  9
The Jones-Imboden Raid proved successful. The raiders destroyed Union barracks, 
blockhouses, railroad structures, and the oilfield equipment in Burning Springs in Wirt County 
along with an estimated 150,000 barrels of crude oil. Their actions benefitted the organized 
military, and many of the horses, cattle, and supplies they captured were sent to the Army of 
!34
 Sutherland, Savage Conflict, 161; H. E. Matheny, Wood County, West Virginia, in Civil War Times, With an 8
Account of the Guerrilla Warfare in the Little Kanawha Valley (Parkersburg, WV: Trans-Allegheny Books, Inc., 
1987), 275-276.
 Rice, West Virginia, 136-138; “Recollection by Mrs. M. M. Eaton,” Scrapbook, Lewis County, ca. 1910s, 9
WVA.
Northern Virginia and used in its Pennsylvania campaign. Despite the success of their raid, Jones 
and Imboden were unable to derail the drive toward statehood for West Virginia.  10
Bands of local guerrillas and partisan rangers assisted Jones, Imboden, and other raiders 
in their forays into enemy territory, and then remained in the area after the raids. Capt. John 
McNeil, who operated in Hardy County, led one of the most successful partisan bands in the 
Confederacy and accompanied Jones on his 1863 raid, cutting telegraph wires and destroying 
bridges at Oakland. Later, he and Imboden raided a Union camp in Hardy County at sunrise, 
capturing 150 men and 12 wagons at a cost of only two of their men badly wounded. McNeill’s 
success as a partisan extended well beyond his assistance to cavalry raiders, however. Operating 
over one hundred miles away from any Confederate-controlled area, he rendered more effective 
service than any other partisan group in either army except for the Confederate John S. Mosby, 
who operated in northern Virginia against the Army of the Potomac’s supply lines.  11
McNeill based his headquarters at Old Fields in his family’s home and focused his 
objectives on attacking the B&O and foraging for beef cattle for the Confederate armies in the 
Shenandoah Valley. After he was mortally wounded in a raid on October 3, 1864, his son, Jesse, 
took over the leadership of the band, and, in February 1865, conducted the band’s most famous 
exploit when, in a well-planned scheme, McNeill’s Rangers captured Union Brig. Gen. Benjamin 
Kelley and Maj. Gen. George Crook from their headquarters in Cumberland, Maryland. The two 
were then delivered to Lieut. Gen. Jubal Early, who transported them to Richmond where they 
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were held as prisoners of war.  12
For the duration of their operation, the McNeill Rangers forced the Union to divert an 
estimated 25,000 troops from the front lines to guard the B&O, and they captured around 40 
prisoners for every man listed on the roster. Rebecca Van Meter, a secessionist from Hardy 
County, recorded in her diary a personal perspective of the Rangers’ effectiveness in the area 
throughout 1863. On January 8, she wrote that the federal troops were “awfully afraid” of 
McNeill. On April 7, she noted that Union troops were pouring into town because McNeill had 
captured some Union wagons and that was “what started them all up here after them.” In August 
that year the federal cavalry was back, but were once again foiled by McNeill’s actions. The 
riders came “roving in every direction after horses & Cattle, they are like mad Men, full of 
venom at what we have been destroying in Pennsylvania and Western V. …Capt McNeill 
bushwhacked them as they come into town on the Wardensville road[. He] killed a few & 
wounded some took some of them prisoners, & released several of our Citizens they had 
captured at Howerdslick.”  13
Local roots and success against the Union army won the rangers the support of their 
neighbors. Van Meter recorded that the neighborhood “bake[d] them bread as much as they can,” 
and the men hurriedly ate with the civilians before they set out on their raids. Her admiration for 
the band was obvious in the weeks following one of their attacks on a Union supply wagon train 
when she wrote, “They are on dangerous ground, but it seems they are a terror to the Yankeys, 
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they have not been back since with their trains as they said they would be.” Despite the danger 
from federal pursuers, McNeill’s band continued to operate in the same region for the rest of the 
war. One month after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, McNeill’s Rangers surrendered to Union 
troops under Gen. Rutherford B. Hayes, ending the last remaining organized Confederate 
presence in western Virginia.  14
As the Confederate raiders and rangers operated in northwestern Virginia, their Union 
counterparts did the same in the south. After the battle of Gettysburg, the federal high command 
ordered the first raid against the salt mines at Saltville. Raiders under Col. John Toland became 
involved in a skirmish in Tazewell County and feared it would alert the defenders in Saltville of 
their presence; therefore, Toland raided Wytheville instead, where he was killed. Two months 
later a second Union force ventured within 35 miles of Saltville but retreated after a brief 
skirmish. In November 1863, Brig. Gen. Averell embarked on a raid against the V&T Railroad. 
When he reached Pocahontas County he encountered a Confederate brigade under Brig. Gen. 
John Echols. In a battle at Droop Mountain, Averell defeated the southern force, but when he 
reunited with a second Union column under Brig. Gen. Alfred Napoleon Duffié the following 
day in Lewisburg, they recognized their troops were in no condition to continue the raid and 
retreated back to Union lines.  15
In May 1864, Averell attempted a second raid against Saltville, this time with Gen. 
Crook. As Crook destroyed the Long Bridge over the New River at Central, Averell headed to 
Saltville but once again failed in his objective when he learned that Confederate Gen. John Hunt 
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Morgan was in charge of the defense there. Averell, too, turned his attention on Wytheville, but 
Morgan caught up to him north of the town and forced the Union troops to retreat before they 
could inflict damage on the area. After the inconclusive Crook-Averell Raid, the Union army did 
not attempt another raid into the area for five months, when Brig. Gen. Stephen Burbridge once 
again headed for Saltville. He made it to Smyth County where a makeshift force delayed him at 
Clinch Mountain. Burbridge attacked Confederate troops outside of Saltville and retreated 
without accomplishing his objective after two days of fighting. He left his wounded on the field, 
where southern soldiers and the guerrillas who had joined them reportedly systematically 
murdered several hundred of Burbridge’s black soldiers. The clear southern victory kept the salt 
works safe for another couple of months.  16
A final Union raid under Maj. Gen. Stoneman in December 1864 resulted in the Second 
Battle of Saltville. After the Confederate defenders were forced to retreat when they ran out of 
ammunition, Union forces were finally able to disable the salt works. Stoneman’s raiders also 
destroyed key lead mines, leadworks, and salt ponds around Marion. Despite the measures his 
men took, they failed to permanently destroy the works. Southerners were able to rescue several 
furnaces and continue limited salt production until the following spring, when Stoneman retuned 
and completely destroyed the mines.  17
As cavalry raiders and partisans conducted their actions, other bands across western 
Virginia also formed to meet the enemy. These guerrilla bands never received official recognition 
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from established governments. They engaged in the most crude type of warfare of all fighters 
who fought for military aims, but they viewed themselves as essential to the cause. As one 
historian noted, “Had conventional armies never entered this border region, its people would still 
have waged a guerrilla war against each other.” The Moccasin Rangers were the most notorious 
of this group, and they kept the Little Kanawha Valley loyal to the Confederacy long after West 
Virginia was admitted into the Union as a loyal state. They mustered at the beginning of the war 
as a band of about 200 men under the leadership of Perry Connolly, and they quickly became a 
target for Union soldiers. Originally a home guard unit, some of the more cautious leaders 
resigned when the group began terrorizing defenseless Unionists. The company then divided, 
although both groups kept the name and remained fierce foes. The name soon became a general 
term for all Confederate guerrillas in western Virginia, although some bands retained it as their 
official label. The Rangers who stayed with Connolly developed a murderous streak and saw 
civilian Unionists equal targets to Union troops. Some members of the group used the 
opportunity to settle old scores against their Unionist neighbors, which shows how even within 
the same band of guerrillas, different motivations for fighting overlapped, making guerrilla 
warfare a truly chaotic entity.  18
Those whom the Moccasin Rangers captured received a fierce and swift end. A 
correspondent from Lewisburg in Greenbrier County reported in March 1862 that “woe be upon 
[Union soldiers] if they fall into their clutches,” since the Moccasin Rangers took no prisoners, 
but instead took “them into the woods and turn them loose, so to say.” One contemporary 
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described Connolly as “the most cruel and bloodthirsty of all guerrilla Captains…[who was] 
revengeful and never forgot an insult.” Connolly’s equally aggressive girlfriend, Nancy Hart, 
soon joined and rode with him at the head of the band. They made rules together and enforced 
them, and soon their Moccasins became an efficient spy and scout operation. In the late fall 
1861, Union soldiers captured Hart, who played innocent and was soon released. She passed on 
to Connolly all she had learned about the Union army while in prison, and he relayed it to the 
Confederate army. As that year came to an end, some Moccasin Rangers remained in the Little 
Kanawha Valley, while Connolly and Hart ventured into the neighboring counties of Braxton, 
Webster, Nicholas, and Summers. By that winter the Moccasins had secured control of Calhoun 
County and destroyed all of the Union mail that was intended for Calhoun and Roane Counties. 
Because many of the locals gave them little sympathy, they began looting for survival. They 
knew that while they considered themselves Confederate soldiers, the Union considered them 
outlaws and would shoot them if caught.  19
Capt. John Baggs organized a Unionist home guard named the Snake Hunters in August 
1861 to challenge the Moccasins. They were from the same mountain stock as the Moccasins, 
daring with a thorough knowledge of the local terrain and a great familiarity with weapons. The 
Union army also recruited a company from Parkersburg to track down the Moccasins, and in 
early 1862 that company captured several ranger leaders, executing many and putting the others 
on trial where they received long prison terms. They soon tracked down Connolly, beat him to 
death with their rifle butts and confiscated the livestock of the family where he was found. For 
good measure they burned the family’s house, as well. Hart had not been in camp at the time, and 
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her subsequent actions can only be traced by legend, which claims she continued her 
bushwhacking ways through the end of the war.  20
While Connolly and Hart gained infamy in the central region of western Virginia, 
notorious Confederate guerrilla Champ Ferguson made his presence felt in the western and 
southernmost counties. Although he spent much of the war in the mountains of Kentucky and 
Tennessee, he freely crossed the Virginia state line on several occasions to carry out his 
operations. He joined Confederate troops for the defense of Smyth County during the First Battle 
of Saltville. When the Confederates began killing the wounded Union raiders that had been left 
on the battlefield, Ferguson claimed that he personally killed fourteen of them before the ranking 
Confederate general in the area, John Breckinridge, heard about the atrocities and ordered that 
the massacre stop. Ferguson boasted that he killed over 100 Union soldiers and Unionists during 
the war, but his actions did not always win him the support of the Confederacy. In early 1865, 
Confederate authorities imprisoned him for two months in Wytheville, Virginia, accusing him of 
murdering a government official. However, they released him after the charge could not be 
proven. After the war, Federal government officials tried Ferguson for war crimes, found guilty, 
and sentenced to hang. His execution on October 20, 1865 in Nashville, Tennessee, made him 
one of only two Confederates to be convicted and executed for war crimes. The other was Capt. 
Henry Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville prison in Georgia.  21
Although some individual guerrillas rose to infamy in western Virginia, many guerrilla 
bands that fought to assist a political cause never had a single, standout leader, and in some areas 
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the war was localized to the extreme. Pendleton County, for example, experienced its own civil 
war. The county’s weak civil power left room for private grudges to grow into physical clashes in 
a divided community. The tension led to bushwhacking, burning, and pillaging, and some 
residents found it safer to sleep hidden in the woods than in a house. A band of southern 
guerrillas called the Dixie Boys formed in response to the establishment of the Swamp Dragons, 
which secessionists scoffed at as nothing more than a “band of Union land pirates.” The Swamp 
Dragons were a home guard unit that were, in effect, Federal auxiliaries. At the beginning of the 
war they engaged both the Dixie Boys and Confederate troops. A Confederate soldier reported in 
a letter on January 10, 1862 that the Dragons and Dixie Boys had gotten into a fight the day 
before. Eight Dragons and two Dixie Boys were killed, with three wounded. That action put the 
Confederate troops in the area on guard. Three days later, after the Dragons killed a southern 
guide, a Confederate unit attacked them and killed two, wounding eight. The Dragons continued 
to operate in the county, even after it was securely under Union control. In early 1864 southern 
newspapers reported that they robbed and treated secessionists in Hardy and Pendleton Counties 
harshly, and that they continued to engage pro-Confederate bands in skirmishes.  22
Other home guards joined raiders, rangers, and some guerrillas in participating in 
irregular warfare for primarily defensive purposes, as well. These guards, which contributed to 
the overall military strategy when possible, mobilized most frequently as local militias for the 
first line of defense for counties throughout western Virginia. Both the Union and Confederate 
governments organized home guards in the areas under their control, but the two sides had 
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different missions. Union guerrillas were typically called home guards, while the Confederate 
home guards largely left guerrilla warfare to the partisans and functioned primarily as a civilian 
guard against depredations by enemy soldiers. Confederate home guards usually only mustered 
for police duty or when emergencies arose near their homes, similar to the modern National 
Guard; Union home guards typically remained in bands and operated offensively when no need 
for defensive measures existed. Many home guards remained active through the duration of the 
war, although in early 1864 the government of newly-formed West Virginia discussed disbanding 
the guards for budgetary reasons. However, fear that removal of the Union home guards would 
make Unionists feel unsafe and flee areas that held strong secessionist sentiment caused the 
government to never implement the idea. West Virginia’s control in those areas was already 
shaky and a Unionist exodus would spell disaster for the new state.  23
In 1862, the Confederate Virginia Government in Richmond passed the Home Guard Act 
to provide organized defenses for towns in Virginia, help increase the state’s military power, and 
control local slave populations. The Act stipulated that the Guards could not operate outside of 
the state or stay on duty for more than 30 days at a time. They had to furnish their own guns, but 
the state agreed to provide food and ammunition. Many of the participants were too young or old 
to fight in the regular army, although partially disabled veterans and soldiers convalescing or on 
leave occasionally lent a hand in an emergency. The Washington County Home Guard remained 
alert for potential threats to come from Tennessee, while the one in Scott County kept pickets 
along the Big Sandy River to sound the alert against any invading forces.  24
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Union home guards, on the other hand, embraced their guerrilla duties. Confederate Col. 
Jenkins, himself a participant in irregular warfare, called the Buckhannon Home Guard a bunch 
of “Lincolnite bushwhackers,” while a Confederate soldier claimed that all Union home guards 
were simply comprised of “Union men provided with arms and equipments by Lincoln.” Killen’s 
Home Guard in Wise County became the most feared group of Union soldiers in western 
Virginia, operating in a predominantly Unionist area of the Confederate-controlled southern 
portion of the state. Alf Killen and his men sought to control the area and steal supplies. They 
killed their first victim in summer 1863, after they stole his horse and then ambushed him when 
they learned he was pursuing them to get his valuable property back. Around that same time they 
also imprisoned a secessionist for his views, although they were forced to release him when his 
Unionist brother intervened and threatened to have Killen shot. In June they bushwhacked men 
from the Confederate 7th Cavalry who were going through the area searching for deserters and 
threatening Unionists. Killen’s power was broken at Cranesnest when he planned a surprise 
attack on 200 Confederate soldiers camped nearby. Secessionist civilians, however, alerted the 
troops, which permitted them to carry out their own surprise attack against the Home Guard. 
Although this was the largest military clash in the Sandy Basin during the war, accounts vary as 
to whether it occurred in November 1863 or 1864.  25
While cavalry raiders conducted their raids under official orders, partisans, guerrillas, and 
home guards were involved in irregular warfare by choice. Because they chose involvement in 
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the guerrilla war over enlisting in the organized military, their motivations and goals were unique 
among fighters who fought for a political cause. They were motivated by a desire to defend their 
homes and families, and to stay close to home while they contributed to the larger cause, the 
triumph of the Union or the Confederacy, on their own terms. A diarist in the Kanawha Valley 
illustrated this sentiment when he recorded in his diary on July 13, 1861 that as Federal troops 
moved up the Kanawha River, the secessionists ran “with their guns to bushwhack them.” On the 
Union’s first raid into southwestern Virginia in summer 1863, citizens grew concerned that the 
soldiers would destroy all of their grain, and many fired on the advancing raiders. The Union 
raiders, however, easily dispersed the bushwhackers.  26
Concerns over local defense grew as lawlessness spread and guerrillas who were not 
concerned with national aims began to grow more prevalent. A Tazewell County resident 
informed the Confederate War Department that a military force was necessary to protect the 
county and “chastis[e] the Union bands who have become very daring, insolent, and 
troublesome.” By the end of 1862, Confederate Gen. John B. Floyd, who had fallen from favor 
after several unsuccessful commands, returned to his native southwest Virginia to put together a 
militia for the defense of the area. His local connections and his promise that he was raising 
solely a defensive company rallied many remote mountaineers to his cause, several of whom had 
resisted the draft and refused to join any other company. Called the Virginia State Line, the 
company remained in existence answering only to the Adjunct General and Governor of the 
Commonwealth, until the Partisan Ranger Act was revoked in 1864, when it was dissolved.  27
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These military-strategy guerrillas desired to contribute to a national cause on their own 
terms while remaining close to home. Some Confederate guerrillas trailed the Confederate army 
and acted as a rear guard, or operated as scouts to guide the army through territory they knew. 
One Confederate soldier described these friendly “Bush-Whackers” as “dressed in bark-dyed 
apparel with their long rifles and deer-skin pouches. Well may the Yankees fear them for they 
rarely draw a bead and pull a trigger without bringing a pigeon.” Guerrillas on both sides often 
fired from the bush on advancing opposing armies, or attacked small foraging parties who were 
separate from the main body. One Confederate soldier wrote from a camp outside of Pocahontas 
County in November 1861 that they had little to do except for catching “a union man every now 
and then.” He mentioned that one soldier had gotten shot by a Union guerrilla a few weeks 
previously, and they had all despaired of his life, but that the wounded man was then up and 
walking around. Another southerner described the challenges the army faced when scouting in 
the mountains, where unbroken forests offered places of concealment where bushwhackers fired 
on the troops from both sides. Soldiers who were forced to lag behind the main column worried 
for their lives.  28
Stories abound of western Virginia mountaineers attempting to fight the war and 
contribute to national objectives on their own terms. One concerns Union troops who occupied 
the Cumberland Gap in the summer of 1864. A small group of soldiers entered Lee County, 
Virginia, to bathe in a nearby river. On their way back they visited some farm houses to become 
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acquainted with the locals. While the rest of the company returned to camp, two of the men 
lingered at one house. Although they followed their comrades only a half an hour later, 
bushwhackers ambushed them. Knowing they would be shot if they surrendered, the men began 
blindly shooting into the bush. They managed to kill the bushwhacker leader, but one Union 
soldier was killed after being shot 11 times. The other miraculously survived five wounds when 
friendly residents offered medical care after the bushwhackers had left him for dead.  29
In September 1861 a Confederate soldier complained that Union guerrillas made western 
Virginia “more dreaded than any other portions of the state.” Two months later, Confederate 
picket guards in Greenbrier County were shot at by a “Union man and a very little boy.” The 
soldiers captured the two civilians and sent them to a Confederate prison in Staunton. The 
involvement of a boy young enough to receive the epithet “very little” reveals how extensively 
the populace was involved in guerrilla conflict. In Wyoming County in May 1862 a band of 
bushwhackers led by George Morgan killed a Union lieutenant who was scouting six miles in 
advance of his company. After they shot him in the eye, immediately killing him, they stole his 
sword, revolver, watch, and coat, and then turned his pockets inside out to ensure they had not 
missed any valuables. Those same bushwhackers occasionally joined a Confederate cavalry unit 
that summer and skirmished with the Union troops stationed in the area.  30
In December of that year, five Unionist bushwhackers in Wise County attempted to 
assassinate Confederate Maj. Samuel Salyer, who was at home on leave for a few days. Salyer’s 
son, a lieutenant in the 50th Va. Regiment, had fortunately stopped at his father’s house on a 
!47
 The Columbus Gazette, July 15, 1864, 2.29
 John A. Garnett to William Gray, September 30, 1862, William Gray Papers, VHS; Aaron Sheehan-Dean, 30
Why Confederates Fought, Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2007), 42; Lt. Matters to Col. Lightburn Correspondence, May 10, 1862, Letters Received, 1861-1863, 
District of Kanawha, Army of Occupation of West Virginia, RG 393, NARA.
military errand that evening, and his presence saved his father’s life. Both Salyers sustained 
wounds, but they killed one bushwhacker and managed to scare off the rest. These attacks 
against isolated military personnel continued in western Virginia until the end of the war 
wherever organized troops were present.  31
While these guerrillas were motivated by a desire to impact the larger war while 
remaining close to home, some were also driven by less noble sentiments. Partisans were only 
required to turn over captured munitions to the army and were permitted to keep whatever else 
they captured; therefore, some fought to gain wealth through official means. The maxim “to the 
victors go the spoil” applied to these partisans, and they evenly divided captured food, household 
goods, gold, or silver. In this way, they captured what they needed without having to rely on 
Confederate coffers for sustenance. This lure of profit attracted many men to the life of a 
partisan. The freedom to keep all they captured led to some humorous moments, as one member 
of the Virginia State Line quipped after a raid against a Union boat loaded with army supplies, 
that the entire cavalry force, garbed in captured Union uniforms, had not only “relieved [the 
state] of a vast expense,” but were “more durably clad than it is in the power of the Southern 
Confederacy to accomplish.”  32
Although few scholars view these guerrillas as legitimate fighting men, the participants 
themselves believed they were. Those assisting the southern cause saw themselves as 
Confederate soldiers, and their Unionist counterparts considered themselves a necessary partner 
to the Union army. While their goals differed according to the opportunities that existed in their 
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areas of operation, generally guerrillas motivated by a desire to contribute to a political or 
military cause pursued a variety of aims; they attacked military targets, tried to slow down 
invading armies, attacked civilians who disagreed with them politically, and tried to either ensure 
West Virginia statehood or take actions to disrupt the new state from forming, depending on their 
political perspective. 
For those who attacked military targets, railroads held the main appeal. From Harpers 
Ferry to the Little Kanawha Valley, Confederate guerrillas maintained a constant threat to the 
B&O Railroad, the primary transportation source the Union had to move supplies to their troops 
fighting in the Western and Trans-Mississippi theaters. Guerrillas burned the bridge at Harpers 
Ferry five times during the war, and each time it took Union engineers several weeks to construct 
a makeshift replacement so that the railroad could resume its normal operations. Other bridges 
along the Main Stem remained under continual harassment, financially straining the B&O 
Company and forcing them to raise their rates for transporting government supplies to 
compensate for the destruction. Guerrillas also loosened railroad ties in attempts to derail trains. 
Several bands, including McNeill’s Rangers, became very effective in their attacks on railroads.  33
For Union guerrillas and cavalry raiders, the V&T Railroad presented a compelling 
target. The line ran from Lynchburg to Chattanooga, transporting Confederate troops and 
supplies to the western theater. Two bridges in particular held the potential to cripple the railroad: 
the “Long Bridge” at Radford over the New River and the “High Bridge” west of Wytheville 
over Reed Creek. Whenever Union raiding parties entered the area to attack the salt or lead 
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mines, they always tried to disrupt the railroad in some way while they were in the area.  34
Confederate guerrillas who lived along the Ohio River terrorized Union river boats. After 
some fired on and disabled the Ben Franklin and Captain Jack in the Belleville area in Wood 
County, the Ohio River Pilots Association threatened to suspend all river traffic south of Marietta 
for the safety of their pilots. The U.S. Government accelerated gunboat assembly in response, to 
form a fleet that could offer protection to boats transporting supplies. Union troops also patrolled 
the river. However, guerrillas continually harassed them. While the presence of troops 
discouraged guerrilla attacks against steamboats, it could never stop them completely.  35
Guerrillas also tried to frustrate army movements whenever an army passed through a 
guerrilla-controlled area. This prompted many to try to attack invading armies, but only against 
soldiers in small groups, separate from the main body. In small numbers, guerrillas could be very 
effective. When the 2nd Kentucky Regiment (USA) conducted a campaign in western Virginia in 
March 1862, the Louisville Daily Journal reported that a “great many” men were killed “by the 
infernal bushwhackers.” When federal troops tried to conduct a raid against the V&T in April 
1862, inclement weather stalled them in Mercer County for two days, and they used the time to 
try to rid themselves of guerrillas in the area. The guerrillas were so persistent that the Union 
commander, future President Rutherford B. Hayes, had to keep his cavalry at the rear of his 
column to keep them at bay. That same month soldiers from the 30th Ohio Infantry were camped 
in Fayette County at McCoys Mill (present day Glen Jean), when bushwhackers attacked their 
pickets one night. One Union soldier wrote to his wife that 48 buckshot and two slugs had hit 
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their shanty but fortunately had missed the occupants within, “quite the narrow escape.”  36
Two months later Confederate partisans remained active in the county. They captured a 
dozen soldiers along Loup Creek, but before they could carry out their plan to burn the 
wharfboat, dawn came and alerted the Union soldiers on the other side of the river of their 
presence. As the guerrillas fled, they had to leave most of their captives and horses, but they did 
manage to take 15 mules from a nearby Union train. One soldier in the 91st Ohio Volunteer 
Infantry noted the guerrillas “are unusually active, all around us, and are showing any amount of 
daring.”  37
Confederate guerrillas remained active against organized forces, even as the Union army 
took more firm control of the counties in the newly formed West Virginia. At the first Battle of 
Saltville, Union Gen. Burbridge failed to receive orders to retreat because the guerrilla activity in 
his rear was so effective. Two other Union regiments had received and followed the orders, 
which meant that Burbridge faced the Confederate defenders alone the following day without the 
help he had anticipated. Confederate Col. Clarence Prentice, the son of the Unionist editor of the 
Louisville Daily Journal, was captured and then exchanged in May 1863 after his father’s 
influence helped expedite his release. Prentice formed a guerrilla band and spent the remainder 
of the war in western Virginia, bushwhacking small groups of federal soldiers, home guards, or 
Unionist citizens while avoiding outright fights with them.  38
George W. Braggs, a Union soldier stationed in southern West Virginia for the last year of 
the war, kept a journal that was filled with accounts of bushwhacker attacks and little else. In 
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May 1864 he wrote outside of Salt Sulphur Springs, “Fired on by bushwhackers. No one was 
hurt, captured one of them.” The following May the story remained similar. He recorded, “Left 
camp at 8 oclock and marched to Union, 4 miles. Reported our regiment shot bushwhacker 
captured last night.” Three days later he followed that up with “Left camp at 8 oclock and 
marched about 17 miles, crossing the Greenbrier River at Alderson's Ferry. One of Co. A, 36th 
killed by bushwhacker.”  June held much of the same for Braggs:  39
June 1: Left camp at 6 oclock and marched to White Sulphur Springs, 14 miles. 
Bushwhackers fired into advance, wounding two men. Warm. Our brigade in advance. !
June 3: Marched 16 miles on road to Warm Springs. Waded Jackson's River at 
Woodward's Tavern. No rebels seen except few bushwhackers. One of Co. A killed rebel 
bushwhacker after we got into camp. !
June 23: Left camp at 4 oclock and marched 22 miles to Sweet Springs, crossed three 
ranges of mountains; bushwhackers fired into train. !
June 25: Left camp at 9 A. M. marched to Meadow Bluffs, 24 miles, got into camp at 
daylight. Our advance ran some bushwhackers out of Lewisburg. Out of rations since 
yesterday.  40!
While Union troops dealt with Confederate guerrillas, Confederate troops faced equally 
determined Union irregular fighters. Thomas Gore, from Company D of the 15th Mississippi, 
was camped in the Cumberland Gap before the Battle of Wildcat Mountain in October 1861, and 
he later wrote that rumors ran rampant in camp about local Union bushwhackers. One of his 
comrades was shot in the nose by a bushwhacker with a squirrel gun. W. J. McMurray of the 
Confederate 20th Tennessee also reported a rather humorous encounter with a supposed 
bushwhacker the night before that battle. His company was awakened by a shot, and, being green 
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troops easily frightened and thinking they were under attack, began a disorderly retreat down the 
mountain. The officer in charge managed to halt what would have become a humiliating retreat 
before any of them ever faced a single Union soldier. Eventually they discovered the shot had 
been fired by one of their own pickets at a supposed bushwhacker near the camp. The picket had 
killed a mountaineer in blue jeans who had a squirrel gun with him, but whether a single 
bushwhacker was trying to engage an entire company of Confederate troops or not could never 
be determined.  41
 Confederate soldier Micajah Woods spent most of the war stationed in western and 
southwestern Virginia, and recorded many encounters with bushwhackers. After a December 
1862 raid into Kentucky, he wrote to his father “We had no general engagement, but what was 
far worse; scarcely a day passed that the skulking bush-whackers [Union home guards] did not 
attack some portion of the column.” Woods’ experience against union guerrillas only grew, as he 
soon joined the Virginia State Line and spent a year fighting them almost exclusively. As the war 
wound down and the Confederacy slipped into a dire existence, resistance from Union guerrillas 
continued. In Lee County, some Confederate soldiers met a band of 30-40 bushwhackers and 
skirmished near Harlan Court House in March 1865. The soldiers were forced to retreat after 
they exhausted all of the ammunition, unable to drive the bushwhackers away because they only 
had four rounds.  42
Although Union guerrillas such as the Swamp Dragons in Pendleton County attacked 
secessionist civilians, the civilian targets in western Virginia remained primarily Unionists. These 
!53
 McKnight, Contested Borderland, 35.41
 Micajah Woods to My Dear Father, December 16, 1862, Micajah Woods Papers, UVA; McKnight, Contested 42
Borderland, 117, 225.
became targets for Confederate guerrillas as they attempted to undermine local support for the 
occupying Union army. By mid-1862, guerrilla warfare had injured Union morale, and within 
months Unionists were vocally complaining about the amount of property that guerrillas had 
stolen or destroyed throughout the region. The guerrillas seemingly prowled at will. To disrupt 
local governments, they destroyed or took control of post offices and courthouses, threatened to 
attack courts of law, and waylaid sheriffs and tax collectors. Irregular bands considered 
themselves arbiters of justice who alone could restore order by forcing their enemies to submit or 
flee. Lee County housed a band of Confederate guerrillas who boasted they never took any 
prisoners when they encountered Unionists, but killed those they captured on the spot. For many 
civilians in western Virginia, the war remained bloody and brutal until the very end.  43
Many Confederate guerrillas hoped that the threat of violence against citizens would 
cause support for West Virginia’s statehood to falter. By August 1862, guerrillas had seriously 
affected the federal government’s ability to maintain control over the central part of the region, 
the area that is now southern West Virginia. With the general war going poorly for the Union in 
early 1863 and the seeming invincibility of Confederate guerrillas, many Unionists had lost faith 
in the Wheeling-based Restored Government of Virginia, the entity that made the statehood of 
West Virginia constitutional by bestowing its consent for the new state. Guerrillas attacked 
county governments, hoping to prevent the impending split of Virginia and then later to make the 
authority of the new state of West Virginia ineffective. Because their actions ushered in anarchy 
in many areas, their impact had a greater political effect than a military one. During the war, 
Unionists never effectively controlled more than half of the counties of West Virginia. However, 
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some Unionist politicians used images of a violent guerrilla war to argue that only a new state 
would effectively bring peace to the region. This meant the Confederate guerrillas’ actions were 
only partially effective, since their opponents used them for political gain. Additionally, any 
involvement Unionist guerrillas had may have worked to their political advantage.  44
With guerrilla warfare becoming so prevalent in the area, governments on both sides of 
the conflict took steps to address it early in the war. Guerrillas required special attention from the 
established governments, and the response of these governments grew over time as they 
struggled to adapt to the nature of the irregular war. On March 18, 1862, Confederate Virginia 
Governor John Letcher created the Virginia State Rangers, making Virginia the first state with a 
statewide system to regulate guerrilla bands and try to adopt guerrilla warfare as an official 
military policy. Letcher believed these bands would provide local defense and give his 
government the opportunity to try to regulate the guerrilla bands already in existence. He also 
hoped they would prevent the Union from being able to pacify western Virginia. He recognized 
the legitimacy of ten bands, including George Down’s Moccasin Rangers and John Spriggs’ 
Braxton County Rangers, and offered them legal protection in exchange for the bands submitting 
to his orders and conforming to civilized warfare.  45
Letcher authorized Gen. Imboden to raise a regiment of partisans in western Virginia. 
Within two months, Imboden reported that “Three of my companies are now rendering important 
service in Pendleton and Randolph Counties in breaking up Peirpont’s militia musters and 
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capturing notorious Union men.” He then expressed confidence that the commitment to irregular 
warfare would prove beneficial, writing, “the Federal troops have nearly all been withdrawn 
from the Northwest and the bogus State government is left to take care of itself. Peirpoint has 
issued a proclamation calling out his militia. Half the people will refuse to obey his call, and are 
represented as ready to join me as soon as I can appear amongst them with arms to put in their 
hands.”  46
Following Letcher’s lead, the Confederate War Department issued General Orders No. 30 
on April 28, 1862 that included a portion that was commonly called the Partisan Ranger Act. 
This made partisan warfare legal across the Confederacy and authorized the Confederate 
President to commission officers to form bands of partisan rangers. These rangers received the 
same pay, rations, and quarters, and faced the same regulations as other soldiers. Additionally, 
they were reimbursed for any arms or munitions they stole from the enemy and delivered to the 
quartermaster. Typically, they were allowed to retain other captured items, making the position 
lucrative for those engaged. The Act prohibited the formation of any corps without going through 
proper military channels. It was initially met with popular approval across the Confederacy, and 
troops of Rangers were organized to maintain control and harass enemy supply lines. Although 
the public believed the Act showed an expanded commitment to guerrilla warfare, it was in 
actuality an attempt to regulate the fighting that was already occurring. The Act did not spread 
irregular warfare geographically, but it did intensify it and cause an ever growing confusing 
guerrilla system.  47
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Even with the initial successes that occurred under the Partisan Ranger Act, problems 
arose. While the Act was passed to regulate irregular warfare, illegal bands of guerrillas 
continued to operate. Many of the companies in the South that claimed to be operating under the 
authority of the Act were not on the list that Richmond officially recognized. Another problem 
the Confederate leaders immediately faced was that men began to use partisan organizations to 
avoid conscription. A national conscription act had been passed concurrently with the Partisan 
Ranger Act, and many believed that they could choose to become a ranger rather than join the 
army. This seriously impeded recruiting for the regular army and prompted the Confederate 
Congress to pass legislation on July 31, 1862 prohibiting conscripted men to enroll in ranger 
companies and setting the age requirement for rangers to thirty-five and older.  48
Despite this additional measure, correspondence to the Confederate government as early 
as August 1862 contained recommendations by governors and military officials that partisan 
bands be absorbed into the regular army. Discipline and order within partisan groups were rarely 
maintained, until, as one governor wrote to Jefferson Davis, the organizations came “to be 
regarded as more formidable and destructive to our own people than to the enemy.” One farmer 
from western Virginia agreed with that assessment, and wrote angrily to Jefferson Davis after 
two ranger companies had taken his hay and pastured their horses on his property that “there 
must be a screw loose somewhere in the management of this Warr or otherwise private property 
would be respected.” He also noted that if “this reckless sistem of destroying property” 
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continued, the Confederacy would become “a great desert of woful waste.”  49
The presence of partisan groups also encouraged desertion, and many soldiers longed for 
the potential riches and adventure that the regular army could not provide. A Confederate soldier 
in Greenbrier County wrote to his wife in 1863 that a band of partisans operating around the 
New River “are having a merry time and if it were not such a desolate country where they are, I 
could wish for the sake of a little excitement to be with them.” For Confederate soldiers from 
western Virginia, the position held an enhanced appeal since it also offered them the chance to 
fight the enemy close to their homes, which were behind enemy lines. As desertion rates from 
western Virginia counties rose with the lingering war, some deserters offered their services to 
local partisan bands. Although Confederate officials prohibited partisan leaders to allow deserters 
to join their bands, the Confederacy’s inability to control these fighters meant their direction 
often went unheeded.  50
On January 11, 1864, Confederate Brig. Gen. Thomas Rosser wrote a letter requesting 
that partisans be outlawed. Jeb Stuart forwarded the letter to Robert E. Lee, acknowledging how 
detrimental such bodies had become. Lee forwarded the correspondence to the War Department, 
and on February 14 the House of Representatives abolished the Act and ordered the partisan 
groups be merged with regular commands. On April 21, 1864, Secretary of War James Seddon 
modified the revoked orders to allow McNeill’s Rangers to continue their operations in western 
Virginia under the sanction of the Confederate government. He also permitted John Mosby’s 
band in northern Virginia to remain intact, noting that the two commands had been able to 
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maintain efficient command and discipline, and that their actions greatly benefitted the 
Confederate cause. The following January Jubal Early requested that Lee ask for those 
exemptions to be revoked, since they were causing “dissatisfaction and disorganization” within 
the regular troops, but the Secretary of War refused the request. While all other partisan bands 
had been outlawed on paper, the deteriorating state of the Confederacy allowed many partisans to 
continue to operate as they had in the past.  51
Although they officially recognized and sanctioned some irregular fighters who fought 
for their cause, Confederate soldiers took harsh measures against Union guerrillas when they 
encountered them in western Virginia. By 1862, Confederate soldiers routinely tried Unionists 
who shot at Confederate pickets as guerrillas and executed them. During the Jones-Imboden 
Raid, Jones commanded his raiders to respect the regular Union soldiers, but added in regards to 
the Union home guards that he did not care “what they said to the damned bushwhackers.”  52
Union commanders shared a similar approach to Confederate officials. Since they 
retained control of most of western Virginia and its secessionist guerrillas during the war, they 
implemented several different measures to try to find an effective response to irregular fighters. 
Protecting the B&O was their greatest concern and the toughest antiguerrilla assignment in 
Virginia, since the railroad provided a vital lifeline to the western theater. Early in the war they 
assigned patrols to “protect [the railroad] from the incendiaryism of the disunionists volunteer 
companies forming and preperations [they] are making in every corner for a long hot and bloody 
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contest.”  53
Because residents near the railroad were so often victims of vandalism, Maj. Gen. 
William S. Rosecrans declared in August 1861 that a special military district would encompass 
the railroad and all of the military posts along it throughout all western Virginia to Parkersburg. 
The following month Brig. Gen. Benjamin Kelley, a former freight agent for the B&O, issued 
Gen. Order No. 7 that promised full protection to civilians living along the railroad. He hoped his 
proclamation would quell the uneasiness in the area, but the frequency of the attacks made 
people doubt the Union could effectively protect them from guerrillas. Kelley eventually had to 
move his headquarters to Parkersburg to tackle the guerrilla problem full time.  54
To safeguard the railroad and the civilians living alongside it, the Union built a chain of 
fortified blockhouses at the railroad’s most vulnerable points. Blockhouses were not a new 
method of defense for Americans, who had employed them in strategically important locations 
along immigration routes and on the frontier. Those, however, had been designed to withstand 
attacks from large, organized armies, while the smaller ones along the B&O were built 
specifically to defend against irregular fighters and small raids. Union officials in western 
Virginia also introduced armored locomotives and heavily armed engines to patrol the rails.  55
While the methods the Union implemented to protect the B&O were a passive response 
to the guerrilla problem, commanders simultaneously turned to active antiguerrilla measures, as 
well. They established counterguerrilla units and called on loyal citizens to rise up and help 
pacify irregular Confederate fighters. Their methods in dealing with captured Confederate 
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guerrillas grew harsher as the war continued, and many Union soldiers became frustrated at their 
lack of success in controlling the region. When these active measures only proved to be partially 
effective, the Union also began to incorporate retributive measures against the civilian population 
who supported irregulars. 
While the Union had actively implemented small unit patrolling at the beginning of the 
war in its antiguerrilla campaign, it soon turned to specialized antiguerrilla units when the 
patrolling failed. These units hunted down irregular fighters and fought them on their own terms, 
successfully engaging untrained guerrillas but often struggling against more skilled partisans. 
Units such as the Loudon County Rangers and Captain Richard Blazer’s cavalry detachment 
were mustered just to hunt down irregulars, while others in the area were prepared to face both 
conventional and unconventional troops. Other counterguerrilla units, such as Company C of the 
11th (West) Virginia Infantry who was assigned to engage the Moccasin Rangers, were made up 
entirely of Unionist civilian volunteers. Union troops also allowed Unionist guerrillas to arrest 
suspected enemies, and some tried to stalk common meeting places for guerrillas, hoping to 
catch them unawares.  56
From the earliest part of the war, district commanders tried to mobilize all citizens to 
assist in tackling the guerrilla problem. In May 1861, when he first saw secessionists beginning 
to muster, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan issued a proclamation to western Virginians urging 
unity. When his call for unity failed and secessionists remained devoted to their cause, he 
implemented the first of many different antiguerrilla policies western Virginia experienced. On 
June 23 he vowed to deal with irregular fighters to the severest rules of military law, a practice 
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many Union soldiers enthusiastically employed. As the war went on, their response to irregular 
fighters became harsher as brutal guerrillas who were not concerned about assisting military 
strategy grew more prevalent and Union commanders failed to distinguish the difference 
between guerrillas in their response.  57
In 1861, Union Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, the fourth most senior general in the army, 
wrote International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 
partially in response to the guerrilla warfare that plagued the state of Missouri. When he took 
command in Missouri, he quickly realized the inadequacy of his predecessor’s methods in 
fighting guerrillas. According to his taxonomy of war, he claimed the conflict was both a 
revolution by virtue of its aims and a “national war” that offered protection for troops in 
organized armies. Guerrillas, however, were considered criminals and not entitled to any rights 
of war; therefore, they were not afforded the status of prisoners of war when they were captured, 
and could be imprisoned or punished as rebels. Other Union commanders throughout the 
Confederacy, including those in western Virginia, followed Halleck’s example when dealing with 
irregular fighters.  58
As early as September 1861, Union newspapers contained accounts of deaths of captured 
Confederate guerrillas occurring under suspicious circumstances. One relayed a story of a 
western Virginia regiment, guarding telegraph workmen, who captured an old man and his two 
sons. After they learned that evidence pointed to the three men being a part of a guerrilla band, 
the old man and one son were killed by either a “visitation of God” or as “justifiable homicide.” 
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Soldiers felt justified in responding in a lethal manner to all irregular fighters after “concealed 
enemies” began to “crack away” at them with squirrel guns from elevated land. One Union 
soldier complained that the overhanging rocks and hills offered more protection than the army’s 
breastworks, and that “an open foe can always be met with equal weapons, but our brave 
volunteers, ignorant of the country, fight against the odds through the hills, ravines, and passes of 
Western Virginia. They trudge along unmolesting, and are shot down in their tracks.” He felt the 
guerrillas’ approach left them no other option but to respond harshly. He concluded, “it is 
horrible warfare, but what are we to do?”  59
After taking command of the new Mountain Department of Virginia, Tennessee, and 
Kentucky on March 28, 1862, Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont ordered the village of Addison to be 
burned after he learned that it was a rendezvous for guerrillas. He later admitted the “lesson 
inflicted upon the guerrillas in this instance was severe.” It had, however, “induced their leader 
to send in a letter offering terms of compromise.” Success with these harsher measures 
encouraged him to continue to implement them, and he had several captured guerrillas given a 
“full and fair trial by military commission,” and then “promptly executed by hanging.” He 
claimed the “effect was to correct a mistaken belief in immunity for their crimes, and to render 
more secure interior points and roads, as well as loyal inhabitants of the military districts.” He 
ordered two guerrillas hanged in Roane and Braxton Counties in retaliation for a group of 
guerrillas killing one of his soldiers. His goal was to “exterminate” every guerrilla in western 
Virginia, but he was sidetracked from his objective when Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley 
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Campaign forced him to divert most of his sources to meet the threat there.  60
When Capt. John S. Sprigg was captured in May 1862, one month after the Virginia state 
government recognized the Braxton County Rangers to be a part of the Virginia State Rangers, 
his case sparked a reassessment of how the Union should deal with irregular fighters who were 
sanctioned to fight by the established Confederate government. Since Sprigg did not fight in a 
uniform, he could have been treated as an outlaw under Halleck’s definition of permissible 
responses. Confederate and some Union officials argued, however, that the authority the state of 
Virginia gave him to operate entitled him to be treated as a prisoner of war. In September 1862, 
Confederate Maj. Gen. Thomas Hindman corresponded with Union Maj. Gen. William T. 
Sherman asking that authorized Confederate irregular fighters be extended protection upon 
capture under the organized rules of warfare. Sherman disregarded the request, responding, 
Now, whether the guerrillas or partisan rangers, without uniform, without 
organization except on paper, wandering about the country plundering friend and 
foe, firing on unarmed boats filled with women and children and on small parties 
of soldiers, always from ambush, or where they have every advantage, are entitled 
to the protection and amenities of civilized warfare is a question which I think you 
would settle very quickly in the abstract. In practice we will promptly 
acknowledge the well-established rights of war to parties in uniform, but many 
gentlemen of the South have beseeched me to protect the people against the acts 
and inevitable result of this war of ununiformed bands, who, when dispersed, 
mingle with the people and draw on them the consequences of their individual 
acts. You know full well that it is to the interest of the people of the South that we 
should not disperse our troops as guerrillas; but at that game your guerrillas would 
meet their equals, and the world would be shocked by the acts of atrocity resulting 
from such warfare. We endeavor to act in large masses, and must insist that the 
troops of the Confederacy, who claim the peculiar rights of belligerents, should be 
known by their dress, so as to be distinguished from the inhabitants.  61!
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To make this differentiation official policy and to address the Confederacy’s passage of 
the Partisan Ranger Act, the Union army passed General Order No. 100, also known as the 
Lieber Code, on April 24, 1863.  The order showed that the Union believed the Ranger Act was 62
an open call for guerrilla warfare and needed to address it in an official capacity. It protected 
partisan rangers while concurrently allowing those who engaged in warfare out of uniform to be 
shot upon capture. It was, however, purposefully vague and allowed soldiers to apply the rules at 
they saw fit. Union soldiers could, therefore, implement conciliatory or more harsh measures 
against guerrillas depending on their mood. The code saw the soldier/civilian relationship as 
reciprocal in nature and permitted the army to adopt stern measures against them, as well, if they 
used armed resistance against the army or supported guerrillas. The frustration Union soldiers 
felt from chasing an illusive enemy led many of them to begin to engage in punitive measures 
against civilians.  63
Halleck had permitted retributive methods in International Law, and the Lieber Code 
seemed to encourage it. Halleck had thought it best to punish the actual perpetrators when 
possible, but believed communities could be held responsible for guerrilla activities committed 
near them. Commanders began to hold prominent local secessionists responsible for guerrilla 
activity, and some, in retaliation against bushwhackers, simply arrested any handy secessionists, 
especially if weapons were present. In August 1861, Rosecrans issued a proclamation to the loyal 
citizens of western Virginia demanding civilians assist in putting a stop to the guerrilla war, and 
vowed those who failed to suppress local violence would be treated as “accessaries to the crime.” 
In his proclamation he blamed the plight of the loyal citizens of western Virginia on the 
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“Richmond junta” who refused to allow them to remain citizens of the United States. Worse, he 
claimed, these “conspirators” had, “in violation of the laws of nations and humanity, …
proclaimed that private citizens may and ought to make war.” He appealed to their conscience to 
make them see their personal responsibility in combating the guerrillas who fought in response to 
Richmond’s call. He concluded, 
You are the vast majority of the people. If the principle of self-government is to 
be respected, you have a right to stand in the position you have assumed, faithful 
to the constitution and laws of Virginia as they were before the ordinance of 
secession… !
To put an end to the savage war waged by individuals, who without warrant of 
military authority lurk in the bushes and waylay messengers or shoot sentries, I 
shall be obliged to hold the neighborhood in which these outrages are committed 
responsible…unless they raise the hue and cry and pursue the offenders… !
Unarmed and peaceful citizens shall be protected, the rights of private property 
respected, and only those who are found enemies of the Government of the United 
States and peace of Western Virginia will be disturbed. Of these I shall require 
absolute certainty that they will do no mischief.  64!
When the Union army moved through the Little Kanawha Valley in the fall 1861, they 
arrested many of the leading secessionists in the area and imprisoned them in Charleston. In 
April 1862, a Hardy County resident noted the Union’s increased intolerance for secessionists, 
writing in her diary “they were so inraged that some of our Soldiers are bush whacking them” 
that they “have catched every one of the Men John & Culdize & all made them take the Oath of 
Illegince contrary to their wishes.”  65
When Maj. Gen. John Pope took command of the new Army of Virginia in mid-July 
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1862, he issued orders before he left Washington on the same day he assumed power that the 
army would live off the land and that the local population would be responsible for curbing 
sabotage and guerrilla activity. Although he had not personally assessed the problems in the area, 
he felt they constituted a stern, immediate warning, and hoped his actions would restore order to 
the area. However, he, like his predecessors, was never able to successfully bring guerrilla 
warfare in western Virginia under control, despite the retributive measures he implemented.  66
In late July 1862, three Confederate rangers in Jackson County stole groceries, and in 
retaliation Union officials had the houses of the rangers burned. Later that week a squad of 
cavalrymen set out to track the rangers down after receiving reports of other “outrages” they 
committed. A force of 60 rangers opened fire on the soldiers and killed one. After the cavalrymen 
were unable to capture any of the rangers, the Union forces burned the house of a violent 
secessionist in retaliation. They also burned the house of one ranger’s father, who admitted he 
had fed the rangers and would not hesitate to do so again. Not satisfied with those efforts, the 
following day a different cavalry squad set out to search for the rangers again, and once their 
efforts also failed, they burned two more secessionists’ houses and captured men known to be 
guerrillas, although little proof existed that they had been part of the band who attacked the 
soldiers the previous day.  67
In areas where secessionist sentiment created potential difficulties, Union officials at 
times forced many pro-Southern residents to leave the area. In a letter from Mercer County in 
November 1861, a mountaineer who had experienced such treatment wrote sarcastically to his 
cousin, “Have you seen in the newspapers how the horrid Yankees politely requested us to leave 
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the futile valley of the Kanawha and the Union loving people that dwell therein—and how with 
equal politeness we did leave rather than quarrel about it?” At times, however, Union soldiers 
could not effectively tell friend from foe. They quickly learned the seemingly friendly farmers 
could in reality be a part of an ambush, and some secessionists willingly took the oath of 
allegiance to avoid suspicion yet continued to engage in irregular warfare against the Union 
without hesitancy. Many Union soldiers believed that no mountaineer could be won over with 
kindness. As the war progressed, many soldiers vowed they would take no more guerrillas 
prisoners and only rested after seeing guerrillas come to quick deaths if they got too close to the 
army.  68
In April 1863, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside issued a death penalty from the Department 
of Ohio that applied to all western Virginians living behind Union lines. He declared that all 
citizens who “commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies or 
traitors, and if convicted will suffer death.” This order encompassed anyone who wrote or carried 
secret correspondence, who tried to recruit for the Confederate army or pass through Union lines 
to join the Confederates, who were in the Confederate service, or who gave any information to 
the southern army. He then added that it also included “All persons within our lines who harbor, 
protect, conceal, feed, clothe, or in any way aid the enemies of our country.” Anyone found 
guilty could expect swift action and no sympathy. Burnside’s order concluded, “the habit of 
declaring sympathies for the enemy will no longer be tolerated in this department. Persons 
committing such offenses will at once be arrested with a view of being tried as above stated, or 
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sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends.”  69
These harsh measures lasted through the war and in places were effective. The Union 
army was never, however, able to fully control guerrilla activity or establish firm control in 
western Virginia during the war. Even in 1865, the Union army was still conducting its 
antiguerrilla campaign, executing captured partisans, conducting wholesale destruction of towns 
that were supposedly infested with guerrillas, forcing evacuations of civilians from areas that 
partisans received support from, and holding local secessionists accountable for any damage 
guerrillas did to army supplies or to loyal citizens’ property. As late as April 1865, Union 
commanders were still discussing the most effective punishments to implement against disloyal 
citizens. Despite employing passive, active, and retributive methods against irregular fighters 
since the beginning of the war, Union commanders could not obliterate guerrilla conflict in 
western Virginia and faced continual harassment from guerrillas fighting with the desire to assist 
the Confederacy’s military strategy until the Confederate government dissolved.  70
Because they remained a noticeable presence until the end and continued to pursue their 
goals, these guerrillas who fought for political causes achieved a degree of effectiveness. On a 
small scale their effectiveness was limited, since small groups of men were unable to do any 
notable damage against the large armies that moved through the area. While guerrillas could 
successfully drive back pickets, strong scouting parties could force them to flee. Additionally, 
whereas armies had the strength to destroy towns and could operate openly, guerrillas could only 
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fire sporadic shots from the bush in retaliation. As a whole, however, Confederate guerrillas 
forced the Union to station over 40,000 troops in the area until the end of the war to keep the 
new state of West Virginia loyal, long after northern commanders ceased to believe the area held 
value as an invasion route into the rest of Virginia. In this way, then, these guerrillas offered 
valuable service to the Confederacy by keeping so many Union troops from the front lines of the 
major military campaigns. Similarly, Unionist guerrillas assisted the Union army in keeping 
secessionist guerrillas ineffective in controlling the largely Unionist population of northwestern 
Virginia, allowing the support that portion of the state offered to West Virginia’s new statehood 
to ensure the state’s survival.  71
This effectiveness was evident from the beginning. During the early years of the war, 
Confederate guerrilla bands had frustrated Union efforts to mount larger military operations in 
western Virginia by tying down large numbers of troops and forcing the Federals to scatter their 
command. At the beginning of 1862, the Union army still did not understand the seriousness of 
the situation, and many commanders expressed the belief that a quick and effective solution 
existed for the guerrilla problem. Union newspapers also ran editorials claiming that the southern 
civilians were “sick to death” of guerrillas and that their intolerance would prompt them to take 
up arms to put a stop to it. Both of these responses showed that northern commanders and 
civilians failed to grasp the nuances of the guerrilla warfare that occurred during the Civil War, 
and by failing to distinguish between the guerrillas who fought for political and military causes 
and those who fought for more personal gains, their response was never fully effective. Civilians 
living in western Virginia and throughout the Confederacy may have been “sick to death” of the 
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bushwhackers who used the lawlessness of the era for personal advancement, but many remained 
supportive of the guerrillas who fought for the same cause they supported. Expecting civilians to 
help fight politically-minded guerrillas, then, was unrealistic.  72
As 1862 came to a close, Union commanders were beginning to recognize how difficult it 
would be to stop guerrilla warfare. In official communication to Union Virginia Governor 
Francis Pierpont, Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy despaired that large armies were useless in 
western Virginia. He complained, “They cannot catch guerrillas in the mountains any more than 
a cow can catch fleas.” He recommended the army establish a system of Union guerrillas to put 
down the Confederate guerrillas, an idea never fully implemented, although the Union army did 
rely on the home guards and Unionist irregular fighters to help stabilize the area.  73
By November 1864 the Union army was still reporting the capture of large numbers of 
enemy guerrillas, and in February 1865 a large cavalry scouting party near Moorefield, West 
Virginia, skirmished with a band of guerrillas and captured over twenty of them. The 
psychological toll of fighting a phantom enemy with no clear route to victory grew on the Union 
soldiers, and one referred to the war they were fighting in western Virginia as more “savage and 
brutal” than the war his comrades were fighting against the organized Confederate army. After 
the 23rd Ohio Infantry returned to West Virginia following their involvement in Philip Sheridan’s 
Valley Campaign, its men conducted daily expeditions, comprised of 10-100 men, chasing 
guerrillas, engaging bands that were so large at times they appeared to be more a part of the 
!71
 Sutherland, Savage Conflict, 92; New York Times, April 24, 1862, 12; Louisville Daily Journal, November 1, 72
1862, 2.
 Sutherland, Savage Conflict, 162; R. H. Milroy to Pierpont, October 27, 1862, Francis H. Pierpont Executive 73
MSS, LVA, quoted in Richard Orr Curry, A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead 
Movement in West Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1964), 75.
Confederate army than guerrilla companies.  74
As raiders, partisans, and guerrillas became involved in irregular warfare for political and 
military reasons, their actions became both defensive and offensive. They concurrently desired to 
defend their communities while contributing to larger, national causes in a more independent 
manner than the organized army allowed. Through attacking railroads, slowing down army 
advances, attacking enemy civilians to undermine support for enemy troops, or influencing the 
establishment of the state of West Virginia, these Union and Confederate guerrillas remained 
involved in the war through the end. As the established government took steps to control their 
own guerrillas and implement active, passive, and retributive responses against enemy guerrillas, 
the penalty for being caught conducting irregular warfare became more brutal and potentially 
lethal as the war lingered. Despite the danger participating in irregular warfare held, guerrillas in 
western Virginia continued conducting it for military and political purposes and contributed to 
the chaotic nature of the area until the Civil War came to an end.  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CHAPTER II 
Bandits, Outlawry, and Terror: Guerrillas Motivated by Personal Advancement !
Guerrillas rendering military service had the potential to be a valuable tool for the 
organized armies, but virtually from the beginning of the war some also operated in a more 
lawless realm, and the value of the system broke down accordingly. Some operated openly while 
others remained anonymous, and their motivations and goals were all self-centered. The 
mountaineers’ very nature was inherently individual, undisciplined, and suspicious, which made 
bushwhacking a natural type of warfare for them. They mustered and disbanded as they pleased, 
usually operating in small bands or family clans who took on names such as the “One Arm” 
Berry Gang or the Black Striped Company. This type of guerrilla warfare turned neighbor against 
neighbor and caused the breakdown of authority on the homefront. As the conflict dragged on, 
the mountains became full of these bushwhackers and marauders who acted out of greed, power, 
revenge, or plain spite. Intimidation and terror became their aim, and the psychological threat 
they established created an atmosphere of rumors and dread.	

Both the Union and Confederacy adopted policies to kill these guerrillas on sight as they 
struggled to answer the threat and establish security in the regions their armies controlled. 
Ultimately, the responsibility to confront these outlaws fell to their victims, the local residents 
whom they successfully terrorized throughout the conflict. Their presence forced the Union 
Army to keep valuable troops and resources in the area to ensure loyalty in the face of such 
danger, while those who operated in Confederate-controlled counties caused many secessionists 
to lose their trust in the ability of the government to effectively govern. This lawless form of 
warfare was so prevalent that those in the Appalachian South later referred to the era as “the time 
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of the Bushwhackers.” 	
1
The instability of the borderlands created opportunity for bushwhackers, since the 
breakdown of law and order resulted in a culture of fear on which they could prey. As national 
events led to the outbreak of war, western Virginia became rife with rumors. In May 1861, one 
diarist wrote that “everything is in confusion…War! is all we talk about. …I am very sorry to see 
such preparations for I know we will suffer if two Armies are in Va.” Two months later Flavius 
Ashburn, a preacher who rode a circuit through Virginia’s mid-western counties, lamented that 
“because iniquity abounds the love of many is waxing cold. Difficulty in our nation—difficulty 
in churches and difficulties in families have become almost universal.” As the armies infiltrated 
the area and conflict broke out, the fear grew more palpable. Throughout that year and the next, 
Ashburn noted on his journeys that “there are great fears entertained at this time,” we “hear so 
many rumors that it is difficult to discern what is true,” and “West Virginia is thrown into great 
agitation, fear + uneasiness filling the minds of nearly all. Some are leaving home and fleeing 
from the Rebels for safety while others are seeking protection among them.” In February 1862, 
Rebecca Van Meter, a Hardy County resident, wrote that she had not been able to attend an 
acquaintance’s funeral, because she and her family were “afraid even to go to the Church to hold 
a little prayer for fear of loosing all of the horses we have.” 	
2
With the loss of law and order came a breakdown of morality. Roadside robberies became 
common occurrences, as did public drunkenness and black market activities. One western 
Virginia newspaper bluntly stated “every man in this community is swindling everybody else,” 
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and crimes of all types rose. Personal fights led to deaths, and civil authority broke down in the 
lawlessness. Out of this atmosphere bands of renegades rose to power. Local citizens referred to 
them by a plethora of terms, but “bushwhackers,” “marauders,” “horse thieves,” “desperadoes,” 
and “bandits” received the most use. 	
3
Some deserters from the organized forces joined these marauder bands, roaming about 
the countryside wreaking havoc. These were usually deserters without local ties who fled to the 
western Virginia mountains seeking the nearest shelter from those who pursued them to take 
them back to the army and put them on trial. Most local deserters who made their way back 
home deserted to help protect their families, although some did sink into outlawry as the war 
dragged on.	

Bill Parsons, who operated in and around Roane County, became one of the most 
notorious bushwhackers in western Virginia. His nickname, “Devil Bill,” reflected his reputation, 
and one Union soldier described him as “filthy in appearance, and, like the rest of his class, has 
low instincts, and is as ferocious as a hyena.” He was rumored to have eleven wives, including 
one who was his own daughter. Wilson Moore of Barboursville also caused his neighbors grief, 
as he wreaked havoc around Cabell County until some Federal soldiers captured him in March 
1864. 	
4
Some women became infamous guerrillas, as well. Mary Jane Green, originally from 
Braxton County, roamed from Wood County to Clarksburg, and sometimes as far away as the 
Kanawha Valley, cutting telegraph wires and engaging in other guerrilla occupations. She was 
arrested in August 1861 and sent to Atheneum Prison in Wheeling, where she caused such a 
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disruption that the Union authorities there decided she was less worrisome to them at home 
cutting their telegraph lines than she was in prison. If she was not asleep, she threw loud, 
boisterous tantrums to keep everyone awake, and ultimately interfered with the orderly operation 
of the institution to such an extent that Union officials paid to send her away. She did not make it 
home before she was rearrested for leaving the train to cut a telegraph wire, and she was thrown 
back into a cell at Atheneum, bound head to toe for the safety of her captors. One well-meaning 
guard tried to calm her, and once she had quieted down he ill-advisedly released her of her 
bonds. She immediately hit him in the chest with a nearby brick, breaking several of his ribs. She 
was eventually sent to City Point, Virginia, an official exchange point for the Union and 
Confederate armies, and disappeared from the record books after that. Presumably she spent the 
remainder of the war as she had started it, wrecking havoc in Braxton County. 	
5
Most bushwhackers remained below the political fray, refusing to identify with either 
side in the conflict, which caused soldiers in both armies to hate the sight of them. Many formed 
opinions of western Virginians from their conception of bushwhackers that reflected a class bias 
evolved into a sort of pseudo-racism. One Union soldier, writing home to his family in Ohio, 
gave an unflattering account of the bushwhackers:	

Imagine a stolid, vicious-looking countenance, an ungainly figure, and an 
awkward if not graceful, spinal curve in the dorsal region, acquired by laziness 
and indifference to maintaining an erect posture; a garb of the coarsest texture of 
homespun linen or linsey-woolsey, tattered and torn, and so covered with dirt as 
not to enable one to guess its original color; a dilapidated, rimless hat or cap of 
some wild animal covering his head, which had not been combed for months; his 
feet covered with moccasins, and a rifle by his side, a powder-horn and shot-
pouch slung around his neck, and you have the beau ideal of a Western Virginia 
bushwhacker. Thus equipped, he sallies forth with the stealth of a panther, and lies 
in wait for a straggling soldier, courier, or loyal citizen, to whom the only warning 
given of his presence, is the sharp click of his deadly rifle. He kills for the sake of 
killing, and plunders for the love of gain. …They do not stop at pillage, for oft-
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times is their track marked with blood. The leaders of some of these bands have 
acquired great notoriety by their cold-blooded brutality and adroitness at theft…. 	
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The Confederates had scarcely better things to say, with one soldier describing western 
Virginia as an “uncouth, & miserable region, a region composed of nothing but inhospitable 
peaks & desolate crags, unfit for the habitation of man or beast, & if per se unworthy of a 
struggle or a drop of blood to retain them.” The inhabitants were “ignorant, depraved in their 
ideas of life, living from hand to mouth, inhabiting shabby log huts, unchinked & without 
chimneys, they almost inspire you with disgust for the whole race. I dare that say no spot in all 
the sunny south is more remote from civilization & refinement….” He concluded, “like all 
mountain people they are clannish & suspicious of strangers, & strong in their predudices & 
preferences.”  He later continued his unfavorable description with another equally bleak account 7
in a letter to his father:	

No person reared in the full light of our Eastern Virginia civilization can form a 
remote conception of the condition of the Counties through which we passed and 
their inhabitants. To subdue the people, the houses of the greater portion of the 
Southern men have been committed to flames, and their families thrown out into 
the dreary world, homeless, destitute and penniless. Neighbor against neighbor, 
—the roads are waylaid, and in many communities the men have not slept in their 
own houses for months past, but have pursued a course of life termed “laying out” 
in the gorges of the mountains, watching for opportunities to slay some solitary 
political or personal opponent. Language fails me in expressing my intense 
disgust and abhorrence of the main body of the population of this region—
ignorant, filthy, malignant, and semi-savage in their nature, the war has called 
forth their worst passions. 	
8!
These negative descriptions of the region that abound in soldiers’ letters home drew an 
inaccurate description of who the bushwhackers really were. In historian Kenneth Noe’s study on 
the age, class, and kin of western Virginia’s bushwhackers, he consulted the prisoner lists the 
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Union army kept from the area and compared those to the 1860 census records. His findings 
were surprising. Many of the bushwhackers were much older than the average soldier, with an 
average age of 34 among the sample he collected. The youngest captured bushwhacker on record 
was 16, and the oldest 64. He also discovered that many were from the landholding class and 
some even enjoyed social standing in their community, which meant that the guerrilla war in 
western Virginia was not a class war. Noe concluded that the importance of kin and 
neighborhood shaped and unified the bushwhacker bands more than any other factor. In his 
sample, nearly all of the gangs operated in their home county, and none farther than two counties 
away. 	
9
Since bushwhacker gangs rarely left the area where they were raised, their victims and 
neighbors could usually identify them by name. Jane Bennett, a Harrison County resident, 
recorded in her diary in June 1864 that a band of guerrillas had raided the neighborhood that day 
and stolen horses, cattle, meat, and “everything else they could carry.” Several of the residents 
followed them to get their stolen property back, and tragically one of the townspeople was shot 
by a Union soldier who mistook him for a member of the bushwhacker gang. Bennett lamented 
that the event was “unfortunate,” since “Mr. Anderson is a splendid citizen.” Most tellingly, 
however, she proceeded to name two of the bushwhackers, noting that the previous Thursday 
“Bill Pierson and Bill Callahan shot Frank Meeks, but he is still living today.” Further east in 
Hardy County, the same phenomenon occurred. Rebecca Van Meter recorded in her diary that a 
bushwhacker had been caught by the Union army, but “none of us asked who it was, for fear of 
being suspected of knowing something.” Sure enough, the bushwhacker “turned out to be Mr T. 
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Athy,” well known to everyone in the neighborhood. 	
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Such familiarity was widespread. Nancy Hunt wrote a series of letters from Fayette 
County to family in the north, and she dutifully relayed the neighborhood news. In December 
1862, she wrote, “A company of guerrillas headed by Bill Taylor came into our store and took 
possession in the name of the southern confederacy and intended to rob the store of everything, 
and did take about $100 worth of goods, but was prevented from taking more by the arrival of A. 
Forsythe who together with Sam Tyree, Rob Frazier and Bob Nichol stopped them.” She later 
concluded that he was not operating under any governmental approval, but “it was just a Bill 
Taylor raid.” A Union officer “sent up a scout to arrest them but could not find them. I guess they 
did not try very hard.” The following fall she mentioned new bands that had formed. “The Rebs 
have organized a new company in the County. Young Sam Tyree is captain and John Halstead is 
lieutenant. They call themselves independent. They are in here almost constantly and have done 
us much damage. …Then they went to stealing horses and have taken a great many out of here 
but some have got theirs back. This is not the worst of it. They have done some bushwhacking.” 
She goes on to recount other guerrilla activity, specifically mentioning several of those involved 
by name:	

Riley Ramsey is captain of a company, I do not know what they call themselves. 
He has a commission from the governor of this state, perhaps militia or 
homeguards. They scout around in this and Nicholas county. One day a part of his 
Company were hauling rations from Gauley Bridge and when near Mr. Crist place 
they were fired into from the brush. Sam Tyree himself killed Austin Edes. Riley’s 
son was slightly wounded. Then both parties ran. The day before Riley killed one 
of Tyree’s men and wounded 2 or 3. I never heard of Riley bushwhacking. He 
gives them a chance for their lives. 	
11!
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The Union army struggled the entire war to maintain control over the portion of Virginia 
they had occupied since near the beginning of hostilities. They were more successful in urban 
areas than in the more rural ones, where guerrilla bands roamed harassing their neighbors. The 
rural areas remained turbulent through the end, because the Union soldiers remained too busy 
fighting the guerrillas who attacked military targets to do much about bushwhackers or bandits. 
The problem persisted across the entire portion of the state, from Hardy and Pendleton counties 
in the east to Cabell and Wayne in the west. As far north as Harrison County, locals complained 
about the presence of large bands of bushwhackers, and from Lee County to Carroll County in 
the south, remaining authorities struggled to combat the rampant lawlessness. 	
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At the end of November 1861, the Wheeling Intelligencer ran an editorial discussing the 
extent of the problem. While no Confederate troops remained north of Charleston, Federal troops 
did not have the area contained. The paper noted that Webster, Braxton, Gilmer, Calhoun, Roane, 
Jackson, and Wirt counties had had large numbers of secession votes the previous Spring, and “it 
would not be far from the truth to say that there are as many armed marauders there as there was 
secession voters.” The reason so many “marauders” congregated there was that “renegades from 
Marion, Harrison, and Taylor and other counties…have fled to these obscure counties for plunder 
and protection.” The problem persisted despite the Union’s attempt to dispatch hundreds to 
thousands of troops at various times to bring the counties under control. The Unionist paper 
continued to complain,	

But what have they done? Just about enough to exasperate the rebels, and make 
them more like children of the devil than they were before. There has been…more 
property stolen and destroyed within the last six weeks than at any previous time. 
Some rebels have been killed, and a few more have been taken prisoner and sent 
off; others have been required to take the oath, and others have voluntarily taken it 
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when an armed force was in the midst; but with few exceptions they might as well 
have sworn on an almanac, to believe the “conjectures of the weather,” as to have 
sworn them on the Bible to be true to their country…They understand the 
movements of our troops perfectly, and all they have to do on their approach to a 
certain place where they will rendezvous, is to withdraw for a few miles and hide 
in some obscure place, and they are safe. There is good reason to believe that 
there are at least one thousand rebels in the seven counties mentioned divided in 
squads from one dozen to one hundred, and engaged in stealing everything they 
can get from a horse, down to the frock from a childs back and the beads from its 
neck. …There is a scope of country from Pocohontas to the Ohio River, a distance 
of 150 miles in length, and about 75 in width, which is almost entirely under their 
control. 	
!
Then, astutely recognizing how the different types of guerrilla warfare overlapped each other, the 
editorial concluded, “While some are murdering and stealing others are conveying the property 
to the rebel army.” 	
13
While some of the different types of guerrillas’ actions overlapped, the motivators behind 
them were unique. Those involved in the bushwhacker or marauder war operated on a meaner 
societal level than those who employed guerrilla tactics to assist the national war effort. The 
bushwhackers’ actions often appeared to be no more than banditry or murder, but some of their 
mayhem had a purpose. They often targeted their neighbors who had sided against them in the 
war or waged family feuds that had nothing to do with any broader issues. Differentiating 
between the two types of guerrillas could be challenging, and the opportunity for partisans to be 
a strategic military force for the Confederacy often led that government to turn a blind eye to all 
types of guerrilla fighting. Conversely, the Union army often treated captured partisans as they 
did bushwhackers, also failing to properly grasp the nuances in the guerrilla war. 	
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Many of the guerrillas involved for personal advancement carried out their actions for no 
greater purpose than to gain power or wealth. Their greed is evident from accounts their victims 
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left, and their raids became a normal part of life to the mountaineers. One letter writer from 
Tazewell County in February 1865 claimed that “there never has been such a time for rogerry 
robing and every other kind of low down meanness as has been practiced in the last years.” The 
mayhem worsened with the war, as “it has been four years since the war commenced, but the last 
year is a head of all. Five or ten armed men will go through a neighborhood enter the houses at 
late hours of the night and rob them of everything that was valuable and perhaps take every bite 
their children had to eat[.] some that you know was engaged in it.” 	
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Other sources from throughout the region for the duration of the war verify that claim. In 
February 1862, Union troops stationed in Braxton County captured men from Ben Haymond’s 
“gang out outlaws,” who for several months “had been guilty of shooting soldiers and citizens as 
they passed on the road from behind rocks and trees, robbing, plundering, and horse stealing, 
rape, and every crime and enormity that a man can commit almost.” The previous summer they 
had drawn the ire of the occupying troops when they killed a young soldier from the Ohio 17th 
with a scythe. The lad had been seized with a “fit” when he was out scouting, and his comrades 
had left him at a farmhouse. After he recovered he set out to rejoin his regiment, and he stopped 
at a house belonging to one of the outlaws to ask for something to eat. The men were all out 
mowing, and the woman there gave him food and then sent word that “there was one of the 
damned abolitionists; come and kill him!” They hurried into the house and chopped him to death 
with their scythes. After their arrest, some of the band were charged with murder and sentenced 
to hang, while others were imprisoned and sentenced to hard labor for the duration of the war. 	
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In October 1862, Rowsy Peyton was killed in his native Montgomery County. He was a 
man “noted for his merriment,” who was particularly outspoken against deserters. Some thought 
a band of deserters killed him for that reason, but since his body had been dragged off the road, 
his watch taken, and his pockets all turned out, most agreed a band of robbers was to blame. He 
had been going to purchase cattle for himself and his brothers, carrying a large amount of cash. 
In that same area between the summers of 1862-1863, Nathaniel Menefee carried out robberies, 
alternately claiming a commission from the Confederate government and a Kentucky militia 
commission to avoid blame. He stole untold numbers of livestock and goods, claimed on behalf 
of a government that never received them. He was later captured and court marshaled, and after 
his old quartermaster testified against him at his trial, Menefee hunted him down and shot him at 
his mother’s funeral. 	
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Counties bordering Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina often had to deal with 
bushwhacker raids from those states. On March 30, 1863, five men from the Tiger Rifles who 
operated out of Blountville, Tennessee, rode through Scott County, Virginia, robbing and 
intimidating. They wounded one Virginian and killed another during robbery attempts. In June of 
that year Washington County suffered a similar raid from marauders from the eastern Tennessee 
and western North Carolina mountains. The Abingdon Virginian referred to these men as “Tory 
bushwhackers,” noting their more Unionist sympathies. While no Virginians died at their hands, 
they did steal over $1,000 from various residents and tried to destroy some property. 	
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The counties north of Charleston also saw their share of guerrilla warfare. In January 
1864, residents in the Kanawha Valley petitioned the Union army to provide more protection for 
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them from the “hordes of guerrillas, who infest the mountains and pounce upon us when and 
while we are unable to protect ourselves in any degree.” The guerrillas stole “money, bedclothes, 
wearing apparel, even down to ladies dresses and children’s shoes and stockings. Some families 
have been reduced to want in this way. They have even taken the last knife and fork in some 
instances.” The residents feared they would next steal livestock, as many bushwhackers had 
started to do in neighboring Braxton County. They requested one or two companies be stationed 
along the roads to watch and guard the passes the guerrillas used. In return, the citizens promised 
to continue to show their loyalty to the United States government. 	
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These bushwhackers represented danger to a vulnerable population, especially in the 
southern portion of the state, which the Confederate army had all but completely abandoned by 
the end of the war. George Robertson’s father decided to move his family from Saltville to North 
Carolina after the Confederates lost control there. To try to protect his family, he brought along a 
wagonload of salt in hopes that he could use it to buy off any bushwhackers they encountered 
along the way. Whether or not that would have worked remains unknown, since the family 
managed to avoid guerrillas, but the effort demonstrates the type of measures western Virginians 
took to cope with the reality of bushwhackers, especially in regions where the military had a 
limited presence. 	
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Not all bushwhackers participated in the guerrilla war out of greed or a desire to gain 
control over their neighbors. Clan warfare meant many operated for revenge. Sandy Basin 
resident Jasper Sutherland, who sent his memoirs to his grandson years after the war, recollected 
“people had grudges against some neighbor. So they got together to steal and destroy the 
property of absent soldiers, and even kill those whom they particularly hated.” In a letter to Sarah 
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Anderson, James McClure Scott recounted the story of a western Virginian named Coons, who 
confronted three soldiers from Ohio, demanding to know if one of them was the man who had 
killed his father. When he received an affirmative response, he used his carbine to kill the man. 
Murder was not the only occurrence that offered the occasion for revenge. Peter B. Rightor was a 
well-to-do farmer in his mid-fifties, who had been an outspoken secessionist before the war. His 
Unionist neighbors took exception to his views, and when the Union army marched through the 
neighborhood in June 1861, someone burned Rightor’s house. Rightor spent the rest of the war 
bushwhacking, living only for revenge. 	
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As the guerrilla war descended toward outright outlawry as the war progressed, some 
bushwhackers became motivated to join out of spite, simply because the opportunity presented 
itself. Army deserters, genuine outlaws, bullies, and thieves used the collapse of law and order to 
pillage, loot, destroy, and murder. Unlike those bushwhackers who used their identities to exert 
influence over their neighbors and gain local power, many who bushwhacked for spite often did 
so anonymously without any apparent reason. A Harrison County resident recorded a short entry 
in her diary in May 1863 that simply read, “A big frost. Most everything killed. Some unknown 
person shot and killed Press Moss' horse today. The only one he had.” For a time, Lewis County 
had no sheriff, law enforcement officers, or laws, and one citizen recollected after the war that 
unknown parties killed several people. The blame was laid on the military, but “in reality done 
by persons for personal spite, taking advantage of turmoil then existing and no effort was made 
to apprehend the perpetrators.” Porter W. Arnold at Jacksonville became one of those 
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“lamentable occurrences,” when he was killed without anyone being able to figure out why. 	
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The New River Valley became prey to several of these operations. In Spring 1862, James 
Wiley was attacked at his home on Flat Top mountain, but was able to chase the band away with 
the aid of his young son Milton. A short time later he and his son were attacked again by another 
band and killed. On August 8, 1864, Albert B. Calfee and his younger brother John C. Calfee 
were traveling with Elisha Heptinstall from Mercer County to Raleigh County. They were fired 
on by one of these bands and Heptinstall and John were killed. About the same time, Jacob 
Harper was attacked at his house in Raleigh County. He was taken prisoner, dragged into the 
woods, and shot. His neighbors recollected that he was a plain, honest, peaceable citizen who 
never harmed anyone. The Louisville Daily Journal reported in December 1864 that two former 
residents of Rockbridge County had fled their homes to avoid conscription, and made it 75 miles 
west before they were set upon by bushwhackers. One was killed and the other was severely 
wounded, but he managed to flee to the woods and elude his pursuers. The men who fired on 
them did not know who they were nor what their intentions were, but saw the opportunity to kill 
two men and tried to take advantage of it. 	
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Whether they were motivated by greed, revenge, or spite, the bushwhackers all aimed to 
intimidate and spread terror in order to be able to operate more easily. This singular goal created 
an atmosphere of fear in western Virginia that empowered bushwhackers and put them in a 
position of control. As historian Daniel Sutherland has noted, “Unfortunately, the best method of 
achieving the goal of terror was, likewise, terror.” Having the capability to strike anywhere at 
any time for any reason allowed the bushwhackers to achieve their goal. Examples of this 
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abound. In Harrison County, Jane Bennett recorded in December 1861, “William was shot at 
today while standing in our yard. The bullet passed though the skirt of his coat. We found tracks 
of the bushwhacker at the upper side of the orchard, but they led into the road, and we could 
follow them no farther.” In the Kanawha Valley a young diarist who knew his attackers wrote, 
“Old Bob Thompson came riding up and asked Ma how many minutes she wanted to get things 
out of the house. he found out we didnot care and then he said he was not going to burn.” 	
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In Washington County nearby malcontents sent waves of terror through the residents, 
prompting a group of citizens in Abingdon to send a letter to General Breckinridge, the 
commander of the Confederate troops in the area, asking for protection. They stated that the 
bushwhackers had “robbed the houses of several citizens living in the valley, took away eight 
horses, shot at several, and killed Fayette Marks.” They had threatened to return and burn 
Abingdon, as well as kill several others. “The citizens on the south side of the country…are in 
dread nightly of a repetition of another raid by the gang, and the loss of more property and the 
loss of some of their lives.” By the end of 1864, citizens throughout western Virginia lived in 
fear of raids by organized forces and in terror of the local bushwhacker bands. 	
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Marauders success in creating an atmosphere of terror allowed them to produce a 
psychological threat made them more effective. This impact gave bushwhackers the opportunity 
to achieve complete dominance over an area, allowing them to operate with the least possible 
personal risk. Because bushwhackers had proved that they could be anywhere, civilians thought 
they seemed to be everywhere. With outside news sources cut off, rumors became rampant and 
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mistrust spread. One writer from Fayette County had to retract a previous diary entry after she 
learned more facts about an event. “What I wrote about the soldier and his wife being 
bushwhacked is generally believed by the soldiers to be false. They think he shot himself and the 
woman with him was not his wife.” Similarly, one from Monroe County recorded, “Last week 
there was a rumor that 500 negros with 50 white men at there head were marching…in this 
direction. The home guard all turned out, + were in hourly expectation of meeting with the 
enemy when Dr. Oley returned home after a ride of 60 miles to inform them the report was 
without the least foundation.” With a combined lack of law enforcement and environment of 
terror, civilians never knew what to believe or who to trust. 	
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With the goal of establishing security and order in the areas they controlled militarily, 
both the Confederacy and the Union tried to respond to the threat of bushwhackers, although 
their failure to discern between the different goals motivating guerrillas reduced the effectiveness 
of their measures. They both alternated between threatening to carry out retributive measures 
against the civilians to stop the bushwhacking and pleading with the people to assist them in 
stopping it. They burned homes of suspected bushwhackers and even tortured their families to 
try to gain information. As the war wore on, soldiers often took to killing anyone suspected of 
bushwhacking on sight without giving them the chance to surrender, sometimes under official 
orders and sometimes acting on their own. While the bushwhackers’ viciousness was already 
present, this behavior only encouraged them in their lethal aims, since capture meant certain 
death.	

In January 1862, Col. Edward Siber of the 27th Ohio Infantry unsuccessfully tried to 
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track down the Black Striped Company, which had been terrorizing Guyandotte Valley citizens. 
Although he failed in his objective, he did take the time while he was there to burn numerous 
farmhouses, the courthouse, and other public structures in the town of Logan, on the grounds that 
they had sheltered the Confederate cavalry at one point. By that point most Union soldiers 
advocated for fierce retaliation against the guerrilla problem, and that mindset justified the harsh 
treatment of not only the irregular fighters, but also of the local population, as illustrated by the 
events at Logan. 	
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When George Crook became a Union commander in western Virginia early in the war, he 
approached the guerrilla problem with antebellum methods he had learned while fighting Indian 
tribes. In his autobiography he wrote that “Their suppression became a military necessity, as they 
caused us to detach much of our active force for escorts, and even then no one was safe. It was 
impossible for them to be caught after shooting into a body of men, no difference as to its size. 
The question was how to get rid of them.” To do so, he sent suitable officers throughout the 
country to learn it and take special note of the bushwhackers’ haunts and eventually begin to 
capture them. This method, however, had its weak points. The accused bushwhackers served 
short prison terms, then immediately returned to their former occupation. Crook’s men developed 
a less than honest way of countering that, tracking them down again and dealing more harshly 
with them. Apparently, “some of the captured guerrillas slipped and broke their necks after they 
were caught, while others were accidentally killed by premature discharge of a weapon, or 
perhaps the prisoner fell into the river and drowned.” Whatever the nature of these “accidents,” 
Crook wrote, “they never brought back any more prisoners.” 	
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This solution of dealing with bushwhackers spread. A sergeant in the 178th Pennsylvania 
Infantry wrote in May 1863 that a great stir occurred in camp when someone shot at a 
bushwhacker. While no one could ascertain for sure whether it was a bushwhacker or not, he 
darkly noted that “if it was a bushwhacker he knew it was death if they got him,” because a 
“reward was given to a soldier hoo caught a bushwhacker dead or a live.” The following year in 
Fayette County, Union soldiers hanged 10 bushwhackers along the road with notes pinned on 
them that read, “this is the fate of all bushwhackers.” 	
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If the threat of certain death caused the guerrilla war to grow more vicious, the Union 
army remained steadfast in their efforts to establish peace in the region. Threats to citizens’ 
security made their loyalty waver, and threatened the success of the new state of West Virginia. 
While the statehood movement was still gaining support, the Union army struggled to maintain 
loyalty. On October 30, 1861, Col. Conuly Posh reported to Gen. Cox that he had arrested eight 
citizens in the area around Charleston, and arrested some “Sesesh” of influence along the river. 
He hoped the attempt would “cure…that kind of warfare in this vicinity.” In January 1862 Col. 
Toland wrote to Cox, requesting a federal force be sent to “demolish” the “great mass of 
marauders” in the central counties of western Virginia who “sally forth and commit their 
depredations…then fall back.” In August 1862 a similar request was made in Hardy County, 
where the Federal troops stationed men along every main road, looking for bushwhackers. 	
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That same month, Capt. Cunningham received orders to scour the country along the New 
River to “disperse any band of Bushwhackers that might infest that region, seizing their property, 
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and if their houses are used as places of rendezvous, to destroy them.” He failed to apprehend 
Phillip Thermond’s band, which had been his main target, but the following week he returned to 
the area and went to the house of William Therman, who he had learned was a member of the 
band and who opened his house as a rendezvous point for them. He had his men seize all the 
movable property that would benefit the army, then removed the family from the house and 
burned it to the ground. He also burned five outbuildings, “any of which with some labor might 
have been turned into dwelling houses or places of resort.” 	
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Because partisan bands relied on widespread civilian aid in order to survive, using 
punitive methods against civilians who assisted them was a sensible way to combat them. The 
failure in the official policy to distinguish between guerrillas’ different motivations, however, 
brought unnecessary hardship on many civilians, since punitive efforts when dealing with 
bushwhackers were senseless. Bushwhackers did subsist off of the general populace, but the 
civilians were their involuntary victims, not willing providers. When the army’s methods to 
punish bushwhackers included punishing citizens for the bushwhackers’ actions, they often lost a 
chance to gain loyalty in the area. In May 1862, a Hardy County resident complained “The 
Yankeys at town had just sent off Mr Gilkinson, Sam W. Mechem, & Mr Alfred Taylor to 
Wheeling because our people had bushwhacked them at Wardensville, it makes them so mad 
they are not in the sences, they think by taking our inocent Men they will stop it, but I hope they 
will have a rough road to travel yet before they get quite into Richmond.” That practice became 
more and more common as their attempts to counteract guerrillas proved fruitless. In July 1862, 
Col. Lightburn requested a company of men to put down those who were growing bolder with 
the threat of a Jenkins raid to the area. In response to his request, he was instructed,	
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…and let it be everywhere understood distinctly that the secessionists of the 
neighborhood will be held responsible for mischief done by guerrillas…. Arrest them 
promptly and keep them confined at Charleston till they can give good security for their 
behavior. Activity, energy and if need be severity must be used to make them understand 
through the whole [Kanawha] valley that it is best for all dissenters…to keep quiet. 	
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In February 1863, the Senate of the Restored Government of Virginia considered a bill to 
carry out even more retributive responses on civilians. One newspaper editorial called it a 
“barbarous and savage bill,” recognizing the danger that such methods posed to keeping the 
populace loyal. Defenders argued the bill was necessary to stop the frequent guerrilla raids, but 
critics worried that they would essentially be meeting “raids with raids.” The bill held 
secessionists or those with suspected southern leanings responsible and liable for all of the 
property of Unionists destroyed or lost in guerrilla raids and robberies. It also allowed for 
civilians to be arrested and held as hostages, a measure that potentially gave pause to cavalry 
raiders. Against the atrocities conducted by spiteful bushwhackers, however, such threats 
achieved little, since those guerrillas little cared what impact their actions had against civilians. 
During the debate, neither the bills’ critics nor advocates recognized guerrillas’ different 
motivations, once again illustrating a major weakness in the Union’s attempts to deal with the 
problem. 	
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Despite their best attempts, the measures the Union army implemented failed to stop the 
growing numbers of bushwhackers. In August 1864, Maj. Gen. Kelley received correspondence 
from Col. Wilkinson that contained a bleak outlook. Wilkinson reported guerrillas infested all 
counties south of Clarksburg, “robbing houses, stores, and stealing horses.” Although he had 
been ordered to protect the railroad and the country, he stated the command was “utterly 
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impracticable,” since he had only 39 men under his command. He worried that even a small band 
could successfully cut off Union correspondence or attack the railroad, and requested 
reinforcements. His superior promised to send him more men soon, but the number of troops the 
Union army would have had to commit to fully police the area and restore order was more than 
they were willing or able to pull from the front lines. 	
34
Similar to their Union counterparts, the Confederate authorities also tried to take what 
measures they could against guerrillas in the areas they controlled militarily. At the beginning of 
the war, when their fortunes looked bright and their forces advanced through the western portion 
of Virginia, they took an active role in trying to thwart the building lawlessness. As far north as 
Harrison County in December 1861, a diarist recorded one such attempt. She wrote that two 
companies of cavalry under Captains Sprigg and Tuning passed through searching for Bill 
Pierson and his company of guerrillas, who had been on a rampage in Braxton County and fled, 
after murdering three men on Oil Creek, when the Confederates started chasing them. 
Confederate attempts to track down bushwhackers stalled when southern troops were pushed 
south and later forced out of western Virginia almost completely. Their deteriorating fortunes as 
the war progressed left them with more pressing matters that demanded their attention. 	
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With neither army able to effectively protect civilians from the bandits and bushwhackers 
that so terrorized them, the responsibility to counter these bands fell to the civilians themselves. 
Because the Union army equated spiteful bushwhackers to partisan fighters, they pressured 
civilians to resist them. When Rosecrans issued his declaration to the loyal citizens of western 
Virginia in August 1861, he addressed the spiteful, self-serving guerrillas as well as the partisan 
fighters, although he was probably mentally equating the two while experience had taught his 
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audience to differentiate between them. After outlining the problems guerrillas were causing, he 
placed the responsibility of ending the guerrilla war on the people:	

…Peaceful citizens, unarmed travelers, and single soldiers have been shot down, 
and even the wounded and defenseless have been killed…. You have no other 
alternative left you but to unite as one man in the defense of your homes, for the 
restoration of law and order, or be subjugated or driven from the State…	
!
My mission among you is that of a fellow-citizen, charged by the Government to 
expel the arbitrary force which domineered over you, to restore that law and order 
of which you have been robbed, and to maintain your right to govern yourselves 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States…	
!
Citizens of Western Virginia, your fate is mainly in your own hands. 	
!
If you allow yourselves to be trampled under foot by hordes of disturbers. 
plunderers, and murderers, your land will become a desolation. If you stand firm 
for law and order and maintain your rights, you may dwell together peacefully 
and happily as in former days. 	
36!
To ensure their safety, many citizens did fight back against bushwhacker bands to the best 
of their ability. In Tucker County, the citizens passed anti-guerrilla resolutions in the spring of 
1862 that were typical of measures other counties took. They resolved that in “the view of recent 
raids of guerrillas,” they pledged “mutual aid and protection” to each other and to “frown upon 
all persons engaged in this diabolical work.” They continued that they would all refuse them any 
aid, and if necessary “united to resist their incursions for murder and plunder by force of arms.” 
They placed the duty on each resident to “always be on the alert to gather information 
concerning guerrillas, and to promptly transmit such intelligence to his neighbors.” They 
concluded that they would work to mutually recover stolen property or any citizens who might 
be taken prisoner. Further, the resolves stipulated that any citizen who refused to agree to them 
would be “deemed a common enemy of the common cause and undeserving our confidence and 
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protection….” 	
37
Although civilians began to take steps to address the guerrilla threat, some in the Union 
army believed those measures were halfhearted. In April 1862, Col. George Luch reported from 
Summersville that a company had set out that morning in Webster County with the goal of 
eliminating a bushwhacker band. He believed the mission would fail, because troops were not 
able to sneak up on them, and when they knew troops were coming “they disintegrate and hide in 
the mountains until all danger is over, when they again reassemble for fresh depredations.” He 
also believed that their home base was in Greenbrier County and Lewisburg, and that they 
forayed into Webster County from there. He expressed his wish for the army to invade 
Lewisburg and from there be able to clean out towns in Webster County. Although he advocated 
for this, he also acknowledged that as long as Federal troops were in the area the people looked 
to them to protect them, and wondered that if the troops were to leave it the people may “depend 
on themselves for defense, and in fact they could very soon put down these bushwhackers if they 
would try….” 	
38
The Louisville Daily Journal noted in November 1862 that these bushwhacker bands 
were present in all of the states across the Confederacy, highlighting those in Missouri and 
western Virginia. It predicted that “rebel and loyal citizens” were ready to unite and take up arms 
to put them down. While the promise of such unity probably stretched the truth, it is telling how 
problematic the bushwhackers were becoming that a Union newspaper suggested it. Things did 
not improve with the progression of the war, and by December 1864, West Virginia Governor A. 
I. Boreman, admitting the government had failed to cope with guerrillas, called on West Virginia 
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citizens to take justice into their own hands and form vigilante groups to battle the 
bushwhackers. Although the proclamation had been to West Virginia citizens, civilians in Wise 
County, Virginia, recognized that was their only option, too, since the Confederate government 
could not even offer them token protection in the final months of the war. One marauder band 
took up residence there in the early months of 1865. The members did not claim loyalty to either 
side of the national conflict, but they did begin to engage in stealing what little the mountaineers 
had left after four years of civil war. They caused trouble for awhile, until a group of citizens 
joined together to bushwhack the bushwhackers, which ended the threat. 	
39
While some citizens, such as those in Wise County, were able to successfully stop 
bushwhackers, marauder bands continued to roam around western Virginia throughout the war 
and into the months after the organized armies began to surrender. The effectiveness of these 
guerrillas is difficult to evaluate, since terror was essentially their only goal and they were 
motivated for personal advancement. How much personal success they found varied according to 
the individual bushwhacker or band, but as a whole they did certainly effectively terrorize the 
region. A Lewis County Unionist recollected after the war that, “it was not the regular Southern 
army we were afraid of, but of the guerrillas…They were the bandits of the South and though 
they claimed sympathy with secession, they were not of the army and most of the depredations 
that were committed in our section, were done by them, and of them we lived in terror.” 	
40
While they successfully terrorized the entire region, their occupation could be lethal, 
potentially negating on a personal level any success they as a group achieved. Newspapers often 
recounted the deaths of bushwhackers, especially when they came at the hands of the army. 
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These began early in the war and continued through the end, sometimes generally referring to 
“the hanging of two guerrillas” and other times providing specific names, as the Macon Daily 
Telegraph did in November 1864 when it reported “…Burleson, the notorious leader of the band 
of bushwhackers and thieves infesting Scott County, Va., was killed yesterday by some scouts of 
Col. D.H. Smith, in the Many Sinks country.” 	
41
In addition to creating a psychological threat, the pervading presence of bushwhackers 
played a similar role as the partisan guerrillas in keeping extra Union troops in West Virginia. 
Union military correspondence acknowledged this result, and often commanders expressed the 
wish that they could have even more troops to assist in the effort. Lt. Col. Russell reported from 
Charleston in June 1862 that he had led an expedition down the Guyandotte River to make 
contact with the “loyal people” and “assure them of our protection whenever it became 
necessary.” He learned that there was a bushwhacker band operating around Mud River and he 
put reliable Unionists in charge of looking after them and reporting on their actions until the 
army knew their location better and could “attend to them.” Concurrent with his mission was one 
led by Capt. Smith to Hearts Creek, where Russell had ordered him to surround as many houses 
as possible before daylight since bushwhackers were in the habit of “coming in to their houses 
during the night and leaving again about daylight.” While those efforts were unsuccessful, the 
excursions had resulted in many of the locals arriving each day to take the oath of allegiance. 	
42
Union Major Lot Bowen, stationed in Lewis County, pleaded with his superior that 
additional forces be sent to the area, because he could sense the citizens’ loyalty being shaken, 
and they were blaming the Union government for their vulnerability against “thieves and 
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robbers.” He asked for two additional companies from the Third Virginia Cavalry to patrol over 
60 miles of land. Bowen’s entreats on behalf of the citizens there were because he believed “no 
section of the county has turned out more soldiers than the one above referred to, and, 
furthermore, West Virginia has no better sons of which to boast than those living in this section.” 
Union officials were able to keep the counties in West Virginia loyal for the most part and helped 
ensure the success of the new state, but they had to deploy many more forces to the region than 
they would have liked in order to do so. 	
43
The prevailing existence of bushwhackers in Confederate-controlled Virginia caused a 
weakening in the loyalty to the central government of those citizens, too. Citizens in the boarding 
counties of Johnson County, Tennessee, and Washington County, Virginia both sent petitions to 
Gen. Breckinridge in November 1864 pleading with him to send troops to wipe out several bands 
of bushwhackers who lived in the mountains of Johnson County and frequently raided both 
areas. Several of the groups were made up of Union deserters who threatened to destroy every 
southern family they encountered. The Confederacy tried to help when it was able, as illustrated 
by Colonel Vandeventer’s attempts in Lee County to use 150 well-mounted men and organize 
more militia and local forces to strike back at bushwhackers in that county and in the others in 
southwestern Virginia. Its lack of manpower on the front lines, however, meant the government 
could spare no troops to combat mauraders. The Confederacy’s failure to provide enough troops 
to assure the citizens they would not be brutally murdered in the night meant many in those 
counties shifted their loyalties from a national government to their family clan, although as a 
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whole southwestern Virginians remained committed to a Confederate victory. 	
44
Bushwhacker or marauder bands did require attention from both sides, but their presence 
and actions more than likely had no bearing on the war’s result. Unlike their partisan 
counterparts who politically sided with one of the national powers, they rarely bothered to take a 
side, allowing them to make anyone a potential victim. As they pursued power, wealth, or 
revenge and terrorized out of spite, they created a level of lawlessness within the counties of 
western Virginia that neither national government was able to adequately answer. These 
bushwhackers took advantage of the instability of a civil war to live by their own laws, laws that 
led to their personal advancement at the expense of their communities and neighbors. Because 
many of their victims knew the names and identities of those who harmed them, the bitter local 
divides the war created lasted long after the Confederacy fell. Many bitter family feuds started in 
the 1860s during the Civil War and lasted well into the 20th century. Those who sought to fulfill 
their own selfish gains ultimately only assured the tragedy of war would linger for their progeny.  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CHAPTER III 
A True People’s War: Guerrillas Involved for Self-Preservation !
As the partisan war turned increasingly toward lawlessness and the Confederate 
government instituted a draft, many mountaineers in western Virginia became involved in the 
guerrilla war for a vastly different reason from their marauder counterparts: they had no other 
choice for self-preservation. With the official measures for confronting and controlling the 
mayhem encountering limited success, some were forced to hide in the hills and steal for 
sustenance or else face harassment and probable death at the hands of their enemies. These 
guerrillas’ motivations and goals were all centered around survival, and their effectiveness was 
directly linked to whether or not they made it through the conflict alive. Deserters, draft-evaders, 
or men who lived in areas controlled by those with differing political beliefs found no safety at 
home. Entire populations of civilians also took up arms when necessary to defend themselves 
and their towns against organized troops or destructive bands of bushwhackers. 	

However their involvement manifested itself, some of these participants’ most immediate 
concern was to remain concealed from those who wished to harm them, while nearly all desired 
to be near enough to their families to provide for them and defend them. The Federal and 
Confederate governments took various approaches to address those guerrillas with defensive 
motivations, but the responsibility to counter them ultimately rested with the general populace. 
In a rare instance in Floyd County, Virginia, men who joined together in self-defense were able 
to overthrow the local government and create a haven for Unionists and Confederate deserters, 
but the overall effectiveness of this group was mixed. The ability to remain out of harm’s way 
varied according to the support of their families, the sympathy of the civilians, and the dedication 
of the pursuers, and many were unable to remain safely hidden through the end of the war.	

Deserters from both the Union and Confederate armies fled to mountainous regions for 
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safety and concealment. For those involved in the large organized campaigns in the eastern 
section of the state, western Virginia offered the nearest haven for concealment. Southwestern 
Virginia became a prime area for deserters, and Floyd and Montgomery counties grew to become 
favorited refuges. Desertion of men from the area became higher, too, as the borderland became 
more turbulent and their families became endangered. As these deserters made their way back to 
their native counties, accounts show that some of them invited deserters from out of the state to 
join them, offering safety in numbers and the possibility of provisions once they reached 
sympathetic areas. Danger of arrest and court-martial kept these locals from returning to their 
homes, but they would find an obscure spot nearby and stay there to provide for and protect their 
families as they were able. This also allowed their families the opportunity to take them food, 
care for their needs, and provide warnings when pursuers came into the area. 	
1
Confederate deserters from heavy Unionist portions of western Virginia at times viewed 
their actions as an expression of protest against the Confederacy and its policies. Virginia troops 
in the Confederate army saw a highpoint of desertions in 1862 during the rigors of the Maryland 
campaign, but the Federal army was not immune to the problem that year, either. Joseph Addison 
Waddell recorded in his diary in August 1862 that he spoke with a dozen Federal deserters in 
Augusta County, Virginia, who were on their way to seek refuge in the Blue Ridge Mountains to 
escape a pursuit by the cavalry. Ten of the men were from western Virginia while the other two 
were from northern states. The deserters, Waddell noted, “said there was great dissatisfaction in 
the Yankee army, many of the soldiers having deserted and many more intending to do so the 
first opportunity.” As long as they were in the Shenandoah Valley the local bushwhackers 
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“guarded” them, although Waddell did not specify if that was for the deserters’ benefit or for the 
safety of local civilians. 	
2
Desertion peaked for Virginia troops early in the war, but it remained an ongoing problem 
for the regular army. Deserters continued to congregate in western Virginia throughout the war. 
Some, typically those from outside of the state, fell to banditry and lawlessness and joined 
bushwhacker bands out of spite or for personal advancement. Many native Virginian deserters, 
however, participated in the guerrilla war only out of necessity for survival. They were often 
joined by local draft-evaders who were forced to flee their homes to avoid being drafted into the 
Confederate army. Unwilling to leave their families to find safety behind Union lines, they 
attempted to avoid conscription officers without actually leaving the area by never being at home 
when they came. Some draft-evaders in heavy Unionist areas banded together to actively fight 
those Confederates who attempted to enforce the conscription laws. One notable example was 
the Swamp Dragons of Pendleton County, which the Boston Herald sympathetically called an 
“organized band of armed citizens” who resisted conscription and attacked rebel scouting parties 
whenever the opportunity presented itself. One southern soldier disdainfully referred to them as 
nothing more than a “band of Union land pirates” who avoided their duty. Many Confederate 
soldiers used the word “scouted” to refer to the Unionists who camped out in the woods to avoid 
conscription; civilians, meanwhile, often applied the derogatory term to bands of out-of-state 
stragglers and deserters who robbed and plundered freely through the region. 	
3
Deserters and draft-evaders who escaped to the hills in self-defense relied on sympathetic 
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neighbors and relatives for subsistence and help in avoiding the law enforcement officers and 
military personnel who sought to track them down. However, these same neighbors and relatives 
at times became the reason other residents were forced to flee their homes to protect their lives. 
Some guerrilla bands formed to restore order to their community by forcing the “enemy” to flee 
or submit by keeping wrongheaded neighbors in check. Regardless of the sentiments of their 
county or surrounding areas, Confederate sympathizers who found themselves in Unionists 
neighborhoods or loyalists who lived where secessionists dominated could not express their 
opinions in safety. One Union man in Pocahontas County recorded in his diary that “many of the 
secessionists in this neighborhood through shame or fear now profess to be union men and many 
of them have been taken up and compelled to take the oath of allegiance to the federal 
government.” An 1862 report from a Confederate camp in Lewis County mentioned Union 
scouts in that area who guided Yankees through the county, and specifically highlighted a man 
named Gibson who was “notorious through all that section for the persecution of [his] loyal 
neighbors.” A secessionist resident of Hardy County expressed her disgust of the “Union Men & 
Yankees” who were “carrying a high hand over us, stealing & lying.” She concluded that the 
“Union Men west of us seem to be our worst enemies.” 	
4
Unionists also suffered the same fate as their secessionist counterparts when they were in 
the minority. One young boy in the Kanawha Valley recorded in his diary in July 1861 that the 
secessionists in the area were mad because his father would not join the Confederate army. That 
October he wrote that a party of guerrillas under the “notorious Hernden” had passed by, and 
“two came for Pa but he had gone to Winfield. Ma sent Ben to meet him to tell him not to come 
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home.” The following day he added that the “rebels went to Winfield. Eleven came by and 
Searched the house for Pa, but he had gone to Charleston.” By February 1862, the young writer’s 
father was permanently staying away from home, and the family knew if he did not do so “the 
rebels will take him to Richmond as prisoner.” Others faced being reported to Confederate 
authorities by neighbors. In Russell County, in the fall of 1862, Robert Barker turned in several 
of his neighbors for having “Unionists tendencies.” Despite Unionists attempts at retribution, 
Barker continued to regularly report them for their political beliefs. 	
5
Other western Virginia residents opted for various reasons to “lay out” or “scout” for 
their safety. A man named Critess in Hardy County had his barn burned in January 1862. He lost 
some grain and his gears, but his wife had the presence of mind to run and let two calves out 
before the flames overtook them. His loyalist neighbors “had a pick at him” because his sons 
were enlisted in the Confederate army. However, many Unionists in the borderland were forced 
to sleep outside and lie low for awhile whenever the Confederates gained control of their area to 
avoid being arrested for disloyalty. With the political turbulence that came with areas switching 
hands several times throughout the war, living and sleeping in the wilderness away from home 
became a prudent decision many western Virginians had to make. 	
6
Whether a deserter, draft-evader, or civilian looking to avoid political opponents, the 
guerrillas who hid in the mountains were motivated by self preservation—willing to do anything 
to avoid capture and remain alive. Many deserters in Montgomery County took shelter in 
abandoned coal mines during the harsh mountainous winters, despite the dangers the mines held. 
North of Abingdon in Washington County, a band of deserters even defeated a group of 
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Confederate soldiers on Clinch Mountain, successfully countering those sent to capture them. 
Often runaways from the same district banded together and fought those pursuing them with 
guerrilla-style combat tactics. The responsibility to catch deserters usually fell to home guards, 
which usually consisted of those too young or old to enlist in the regular army. Thus, they often 
could not mount much of a response against seasoned veteran deserters. 	
7
Sometimes those who were former soldiers chose to proactively take steps to ensure their 
survival and began to hunt down those who wished to do them harm. In June 1862, John R. 
Payton, who was recruiting for General John Buchanan Floyd in Roanoke County, was shot from 
his horse while attempting to arrest deserters on Bent Mountain. John Coles had been a witness 
to the murder, and within a few days he saw his house burnt down in an effort to keep him quiet. 
By August 1863, county magistrates reported that the Sisson gang, the most notorious in the area, 
had captured two home guard captains. 	
8
Numbers of men did not always ensure safety, however. Margaret Hale of Wise County 
recalled after the war that to keep from being enlisted, two of her uncles had joined a band of 
men that roamed around and robbed the community for provisions. A resident out looking for his 
sheep one day found them, and a crowd of people from town went out and killed them all. In the 
winter of 1864-1865, a small band of Confederate deserters in Sandy Basin took refuge around 
Alley’s Creek. Four of the men had resided nearby before enlisting, while the fifth was an 
outsider who had deserted from the Union army. Dave Smith, a local resident who led the 
crusade to round up deserters in the area, killed a relative of two from the small band when the 
relative refused to give up the band’s hiding place. Enraged, the deserters went after Smith and 
shot him while he was standing on his front porch. A stray bullet took off the hand of his small 
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son who was standing near him. Smith’s comrades redoubled their efforts to find the deserters 
and soon tracked the band down, killing all five men. 	
9
For those who did find success in banding together, some went even further and looked to 
gain political control of an area in order to ensure long-term survival. A Unionist group known as 
the Heroes of America began in the mountains of western North Carolina and by 1863 it had 
spread north into Virginia. It became most established in Floyd, Giles, Montgomery, Pulaski, 
Scott, Washington, and Wythe counties, and even penetrated into two Confederate regiments, the 
Twenty-second Virginia Infantry and the Fifty-fourth Virginia Infantry. While the group’s 
influence grew into 1864 and included prominent members of these communities, the protective 
organization could do little to alleviate the general war weariness brought on by hardships and 
bushwhacker gangs that had gripped the area by then. Pitched battles between them and 
Confederate troops attracted the attention of the War Department, and showed that divisions 
within the Confederacy had strengthened over time. 	
10
While the men who sought refuge in the mountains looked out first for survival, several 
other motivations kept them there. Those who fled to avoid the conscription laws did so in order 
to be able to maintain their own independence and not be forced to fight against their will. Some 
supported the Confederate cause but had no desire to leave the area to fight for it, while others 
disagreed with secession altogether. Mountaineers could rally around the idea of fighting for the 
right to be left alone, but they balked at being forced to fight for that right. The draft caused 
higher levels of desertion, since it got men into the army, but was not effective in keeping them 
there. Forced conscriptions became more frequent by 1863, and the practice caused great anger 
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and resentment among Unionists. Many formerly neutral civilians became Unionists after their 
breadwinner was forcibly removed and placed in the Confederate army. In February 1864, Mr. 
Ramsdell wrote a letter from Gauley, West Virginia, expressing his disgust over the practice. He 
lamented, “The Rebs are still ranting through Wayne & Cabell, conscripting—gathering horses, 
etc. but this has long since ceased to be a wonder & now only seems to deepen the disgust (of 
many that would otherwise not be Union Men) for the government that enlists most of the able 
bodied men and then leaves the Women and children to be over run by the enemy.” 	
11
A few months earlier, when troops from Wise County marched into Holly Creek in the 
Sandy Basin to enlist men into Confederate service, the locals hastily armed themselves and 
drove the soldiers away. The Unionists of the area scouted throughout the district to avoid 
conscription, and they visited friendly homes after dark to eat. They ate “standing with their hats 
on” so they were ready to run if the “officers came.” Many of the Unionist draft-evaders 
organized home guards in self-defense, and the ensuing guerrilla war over the conscription laws 
in the Sandy Basin and along the Virginia/Kentucky boarder left no room for civilians to be 
neutral. The excitement and fear grew to such an extent in Sand Lick that Primitive Baptist 
Church suspended services for nearly a year, even though the congregation contained no 
Unionists. 	
12
Other guerrillas began scouting because they wanted to fight on their own terms and not 
under the order of any officer, especially “outsiders” who had never been to the area until the 
army sent them there. Many of the western Virginia soldiers who deserted did not consider 
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themselves deserters. In their mind and in the stories they told to their progeny they remained 
loyal Confederate soldiers. When they left the army they did so under circumstances they found 
legitimate, whether they went “on furlough” without permission when their families needed their 
presence at home or if they felt the terms they had signed up under had expired. These men 
would rally and gather the members of their old division who had also deserted to fight if their 
region was invaded, because in their minds they remained part of the Confederate army. To them, 
however, the Confederacy was their community. Some who left their company without leave to 
attend to matters at home returned later on their own volition once their families no longer 
needed them. The army sometimes turned a blind eye to these occurrences once the missing 
soldier returned, while other times men such as John Combs, who was charged with desertion for 
leaving his company on July 22, 1862 even though he returned on his own accord twenty-two 
days later, were prosecuted to try to discourage the behavior. 	
13
Traditions of local militias contributed to this independent attitude. Militias mustered 
when emergencies arose, and its members could come and go freely and return to civilian life 
after the emergency was over. This tradition had been rooted in American life since the 
Revolution. At the beginning of the Civil War many of the volunteers enlisted with this mindset 
and remained more civilian than military. Men who had work that needed to be done at home 
could not understand why they had to remain in camp between engagements. Joseph E. Johnston 
claimed that this attitude had cost the South more men after Manassas than the Federal Army had 
lost by defeat. This was a comparable mindset the soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia had 
who refused to cross the Virginia/Maryland border with Robert E. Lee when he led his army 
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north in the fall of 1862, claiming they signed up to defend their homeland and not stage an 
invasion. The mentality caused high desertion numbers in companies from western Virginia after 
that area of the state fell to Union control. Many of the men wanted to return home when their 
communities were threatened, and it made no sense to them to help counter a different invasion 
when their own homes were in the hands of the enemy. 	
14
Other mountaineers combined their militia mentality with their concern over local 
matters when they enlisted in the army. In March 1862, a Union soldier reported a conversation 
he heard between two “well-known” secessionists in Charleston. As they discussed Wise’s retreat 
from the Valley, one asked the other how he had successfully abandoned the Confederate forces. 
The deserter replied that when he joined Wise’s artillery, he did so on the condition that he would 
not go “above Gauley or below Buffalo.” Once the retreat took him beyond the specified region, 
he and another man—who had joined under the same condition—refused to go any further. Their 
Captain told them “they would have to run off as Wise would not let them go.” The two men 
found refuge with a Unionist named Hamilton, who was sympathetic to their plight. Hamilton 
hid them in the woods and brought them food until they had the chance to make their way 
home. 	
15
While most of the deserters who returned to their homes became involved in the guerrilla 
war to defend themselves and their families under this militia mindset, they were not the only 
scouters motivated to fight on their own terms. Many of the mountaineers who had to leave their 
homes under pressure from their neighbors opted not to flee from their counties, but were driven 
by the desire to be nearby to protect their loved ones. The impact of the war on both loyalist and 
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secessionist civilians eventually affected every aspect of life, and kin-centric mountaineers were 
loath to separate from their families with such hardships present. The movements of organized 
troops in western Virginia during the early portion of the war destroyed roads that were already 
rough due to the mountainous terrain and made travel for civilians throughout the war difficult 
or, in some cases, impossible. By October 1861 one Confederate soldier serving in Fayette 
County wrote to his wife that the roads were in such poor condition that the teams trying to move 
the army equipment were “reduced by starvation” from the effort. After the war, Unionists 
petitioned Congress to “adopt such measures as may seem best” to repay the loyal West Virginia 
citizens who suffered harm from the Union army during the war. One item they highlighted in 
their petition was how many of their roads and bridges the Federals had harmed “as means of 
safety.” These measures had resulted in leaving their “principal roads impassable.” The state of 
the roads made the cost of travel increase sharply, bringing further hardship to civilians. One 
soldier trying to make his way across the area on furlough found that it cost more money than he 
made in a month to travel on ferries and other conventional means along standard routes. He 
resolved to walk back to camp, because to take the stagecoach would have cost him more than he 
had. 	
16
While travel was difficult, the poor roads resulted in delays in the postal system, as well. 
Being separated from loved ones, then, became even more difficult without any reliable means to 
communicate with them and another reason why many mountaineers tried to remain as close to 
home as possible, even under adverse circumstances. As early as August 1861 a soldier in 
Lewisburg wrote to his wife, “I have been very uneasy about you for fear you may have heard 
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some false reports about us while the mails were cut off.” Two months later he wrote of the 
“irregularity of the mails” and hoped she had received his correspondence, “as I fear you have 
been uneasy about me of late.” Another soldier recorded in his diary in September that year that 
they had not had access to mail for at least ten days, and he did not have the “slightest idea” of 
when he would be able to mail his letters. He later expressed his frustration with how difficult it 
was to get news of what was happening in the east without a reliable delivery system. After a 
May 17, 1862 Confederate raid in northwestern Virginia, a minister noted that the mail had “all 
but stopped” to that region and he was not sure when it would start again. The problem persisted 
after the regular troops stopped their major campaigns in the area. In March 1864, a traveler 
through western Virginia complained that the area experienced about a ten-day delay in their 
postal service, and with the deteriorating authority of the Confederate government over the next 
year, the delays grew worse. 	
17
The disruption of war also affected an already poor school system. Over five years after 
the conclusion of the war, Romney, West Virginia, the county seat of Hampshire County and the 
state’s oldest town, was still struggling to maintain a school for its residents. Further south in 
Lewis County, all of the county’s schools closed during the war, and with an elusive peace, 
families grew concerned over the effect a lack of schooling would have on their children. 	
18
Civilians also experienced economic hardships, since war disrupted trade and shipping 
became unreliable in the borderlands where both sides struggled to maintain control. Men who 
“laid out” near their homes tried to contribute to their family’s income and continue the family 
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trade as best as they could, but safety concerns limited how effective their attempts could be. In 
southwestern Virginia, where the Confederate government maintained control through the 
duration of the war, government policies contributed to the economic suffering and intensified 
Unionist sentiment among the populace. 	
19
The lingering presence of the Union and Confederate armies had an even greater negative 
impact on civilian life than any of these other hardships. Both armies purposefully brought 
suffering on those who disagreed with their government, but even sympathetic civilians had 
cause to worry when the army came through. In Lewis County, store owners complained that 
every store suffered during Confederate raids—their shelves were cleared of provisions and rare 
payments were only made in Confederate currency. A Unionist in the Kanawha Valley grumbled 
about the antics of the southern soldiers when they occupied the Valley, recounting “they stole 
one poor Union mans horse while one of his children was dying; he is left in a bad condition. he 
only had one horse and a large family. …I can’t mention all of the other meanness they have 
done indeed I almost blush to see Virginians do so but what better can we expect of Persons that 
open rebel against our Government.” 	
20
One Confederate soldier admitted to his family that even though they often had no rations 
issued to them, they never went hungry, especially when they were in counties full of Union 
sympathizers. He derisively wrote that they “had little respect for the orchards or potato patches 
of Virginians who had denied their country.”  Another soldier acknowledged in late 1862 on a 21
raid through western Virginia into eastern Kentucky how common stealing had become for the 
remaining Confederate forces in the area:	
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In this Expedition we captured from the Union men…150 cattle, and about the 
same number of horses, and brought them off. It was rather an unceremonious 
way of acting, but without “leave or license”, we deprived every Union man of his 
last horse and ox, leaving only the milch cows…but unfeeling as this seems it is 
but gentle retaliation for the treatment of loyal Southerners by our enemies. We 
burnt no houses,—we murdered no unfortunate captive,—practices as familiar to 
the Yankees as eating their daily means in this region. 	
22!
In addition to stealing, armies also destroyed property they could not take with them. As 
the Confederate cavalry raided towns along the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in May 1862, a 
resident recorded that “reliable reports” reached him that “several parts of West Virginia have 
been destroyed within the last few days by the rebels.” Whether those reports accurately reflected 
reality or not, the fear that such reports brought remained with civilians. A couple of days later 
that same resident wrote, “Some…are thrown into great consternation in consequence of what 
has been and may yet be done by the rebel army.” 	
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As the statehood movement for West Virginia gained momentum, the presence of the 
Confederate army in the area did little to create sympathy for the southern government. A 
Unionist in Charleston wrote to his brother that “In some of the counties east from here—say 
Fayette, Greenbrier, Raleigh, Nicholas and others—[the rebels] have ate everything that they 
could get hold of. They ate all the corn when it was yet green in the rosneers [roasting ears] and 
all the wheat, potatoes, cattle and hogs. So that the people there will have to leave or starve this 
winter.” He then expressed his opinion that it would be useless for the Confederacy to try to hold 
on to western Virginia. A southern soldier even admitted in a letter to his father that the 
Confederate Army brought hardships on the people. As the army headed into the mountains from 
the Shenandoah Valley, he wrote that “there are a set of thieves about our army which should by 
all means be restricted and punished. They take chickens, turkeys, pigs & vegitables without 
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leave or license. Many horses also have been stolen. The people will have to endure these things 
wherever the army goes, for in every large body of men there are rogues and rascals.” 	
24
Some members of the Confederate army even went as far as to kill those residents who 
sided with the Union. In 1861 near Abingdon in southwestern Virginia, Captain Vincent Witcher 
learned that Reubin Thomas, a civilian, was rumored to entertain Unionist feelings and provide 
assistance to those he agreed with. Witcher, who did not hide his hope to resign from the 
organized army and raise a guerrilla band, took a small group of men in civilian clothing to 
Thomas’s house where they pretended to be a group of Unionists. Thomas gave them 
information he had on the Union army and offered what help he could provide. Witcher then 
revealed his true identity and ordered his men to shoot Thomas. When they refused to kill a man 
in cold blood, Witcher drew his gun and completed the order himself. Stories and rumors of 
stories like Reubin Thomas’s helped to create an atmosphere of fear throughout the entire region 
and made many mountaineers loathed to leave their families alone, even when their safety 
dictated they do so. 	
25
The Confederate Army was not alone in contributing to the upheaval of civilian life. The 
Federal Army also left destruction and poverty in its wake. Two sisters corresponding with their 
aunt in September 1861 shared accounts of how Union occupation had affected extended family 
members. Eliza Ann Wood wrote that “Cousin Mary is very much distressed because she cannot 
get home she says that she might just as well go home and be killed by the Northerns as to stay 
from home so long she says she will dy if she dont get home. The Northerns have been at their 
house and have destroyed every thing that they had.” On the other side of the same letter, her 
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sister Mary Jane added, “Cousin Joe Morris family seven in all are still here— They are deprived 
of home + clothes almost—Didnt bring anything with them. The Yankees have everything they 
had even to knives + spoons.” 	
26
Rebecca Van Meter wrote in her diary in February 1862 that her family was afraid to 
leave the house because they had no way of knowing when the Yankees might pass through and 
destroy everything. As it was, the last time they had passed though, they had only left the family 
with one horse “to go to church with.” In late 1862, the Confederacy’s Assistant Secretary of War 
wrote to Brigadier General Humphrey Marshall, then in charge of troops in southwestern 
Virginia, that citizens had notified him that Union soldiers “turn cattle and horses (such is the 
information) upon the pastures of the farmers of the country without even asking permission. 
They take grain and forage wherever they find it without measuring or weighing it, and fix their 
own prices upon it. In a country covered with timber they burn the rails which inclose the 
farms.” He recommended that any enemy soldier captured in such acts lose recognition as a 
soldier and the right to be treated as a prisoner of war. 	
27
Such threats did little to alleviate the destruction. Jane Bennett, a resident of Harrison 
County in the solidly Unionist northern part of the state, recorded in her diary in August 1863 
that “The Yankees came today and burned our home. They also took 100 head of cattle, 13 
horses, and 50 head of sheep.” In April 1864 the family once again fell prey to Union soldiers. 
Bennett’s short entry relates that “A regiment of Yankee soldiers came here last night. Stayed all 
night, and left this morning for Beverly. They were a grand set of rascals, stealing everything that 
was loose, even to robbing the henroosts.” 	
28
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The Union army also participated in the destruction of property that residents 
remembered long after the war ended. Even small, seemingly unimportant occurrences were 
passed down to later generations. A newspaper collecting recollections of the war in Lewis 
County related that “While he was stationed there during early part of war, Rutherford B. Hayes 
at one time and in some manner killed a valuable dog which belonged to a Er. Ralston. This 
aroused some feeling among locals.” In their postwar petition to Congress for compensation in 
1866, West Virginia loyalists noted that “even the ordinary pursuits indispensable to their 
comfort and existence” had been interrupted by the Union army, and that “…many…churches, 
court houses, not to mention private property have been injured and destroyed.” 	
29
In November 1863, Confederate soldier Micajah Woods wrote to his father about their 
relatives in the town of Lewisburg. He related that the last he heard all were safe, but that after 
the Union army occupied the town “they burnt the Southern Methodist Church and several large 
houses on Main Street which had been devoted to government purposes. I learned that two or 
three private residences were also burned but whose they were I have not heard.” Tazewell 
County suffered a worse fate by the end of the war. A former resident wrote to his family that it 
was much changed from his childhood, and that he was sorry to see it such a “lonesome and 
dreary looking place.” 	
30
Those towns that avoided destruction or theft of property often still suffered from a hit to 
their food supply. Farmers in the Valley of the Kanawha lost most of their grain without 
reimbursement in 1862 when the Union Army marched through and never received any 
reimbursement. As Confederate troops followed the Union Army east from the mountains, 
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Micajah Woods relayed a sad picture to his mother:	

It demands an abler pen than mine to narrate the misfortune & troubles which 
people on the road have had to endure. When the Yankees held the country before, 
the people fared tolerably well, but on this trip horses & farms indiscriminately 
have been laid to waste. Neither men nor women have been spared. All corn, all 
flour, all vegitables, everything that could be eaten or carried away has been 
taken. Ladies have been insulted wherever found, their houses entered, sideboards 
& drawers robbed before their eyes. Even the steel knives & forks have been 
seized en masse. Fortunately the suffering has been limited chiefly to the road. 	
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In Fayetteville, the Federal Army was not harsh to Confederate sympathizers as long as 
they remained at home and were guarded in what they said and did. After Confederates 
attempted to retake the town in 1864, Union officials ordered that the secessionists either take the 
Oath of Allegiance or be faced with imprisonment. They also burned the grist-mills, which made 
life for the residents much harder after that. To turn their grain into flour they had to rely on a 
primitive and time consuming hand-mill. 	
32
Some civilians did suffer imprisonment at the hands of the Union Army. In Moorefield in 
August 1863 a resident recorded how an engagement between Union Cavalry and Confederate 
guerrillas had resulted in capture of several secessionist citizens. Just as the actions of the 
Confederate army strengthened unionism in the areas that experienced them, so the actions of the 
Union Army in counties filled with secessionist sentiment helped to solidify southern support. 
Many secessionists believed the violation of private property by the army was a sign of what life 
would be like if the Confederacy lost the war. These experiences created a deep hatred and sense 
of injustice in the minds of many southerners and contributed to a lingering loyalty to the 
Confederacy that otherwise may have waned much sooner. 	
33
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While the challenges of travel on poor roads, delays in the postal system, economic 
difficulties, and the presence of organized armies created an environment that caused many 
scouters to wish to remain as close to home as possible, their loved ones often experienced 
additional hardships because of their presence. Home guards often had the responsibility to catch 
deserters or draft-evaders, but the guard members’ extreme youth or age put them at a 
disadvantage against trained men. Many guards, therefore, turned to a more accessible and less 
threatening target: the men’s families. Because scouters had a difficult time subsisting off the 
land without the help of their families, those attempting to track them down looked to end that 
support through whatever means necessary. They burned homes, killed livestock, and stole 
valuables. They also arrested or punished suspected perpetrators without sufficient evidence; 
therefore, merely being related to a scouter left civilians open to attack, regardless of whether or 
not that relation offered any help. 	
34
In the face of these growing challenges, some families chose to flee to a more stable 
environment. Many resisted this at first, not wanting to be thought of as “cowards,” unable to 
fight, who ran to “troops for protection.” Those who did flee often had to leave all of their 
possessions behind. Sympathetic to their plight, some citizens offered the opportunity for these 
refugees to spend the night in their homes. Those with Unionist sympathies typically fled north, 
while those who held secessionist views took a southern route; however, the direction was often 
ultimately dictated by the location of friends or relatives who offered shelter. As residents fled, 
soldiers began to discuss what to do with their abandoned property. A Union soldier in Monroe 
County believed that Unionists in the area should benefit materially when their neighbors fled to 
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the Confederacy, and often that was the course Union officials took. 	
35
Many Unionists in the southern counties of western Virginia experienced the same urge 
to flee as their secessionist counterparts in the northern counties. One Unionist in the Kanawha 
Valley recorded in her diary that as the Confederate Army moved into the valley in September 
1862, Union families began to move down the river. Once the Confederates began to press men 
of fighting age into the service, several of her neighbors opted to go to Ohio to escape them. A 
Confederate soldier echoed that observation in a letter to his sister, noting, “some 
neighbourhoods in this country is entirely deserted as they left their corn and evry thing and went 
off with the yankeys when the yankeys retreated from Charleston….” In Fayette County that 
same year, Laban Gwinn, his wife Mary Jane, and their two children became Union refugees 
who moved to Indiana for the duration of the war. His military passes show the effort families 
who crossed state lines had to go through to ensure safe passage. Gwinn’s first pass allowed the 
family to ride on government boats to reach Ohio, while the second permitted them to pass 
through Union lines into Indiana. The family returned to Fayette County at the end of the war, 
but many other refugees never had the opportunity to return to their old homes. 	
36
Unionists in the Sandy Basin especially found that to be the case. They were a visible 
minority at the beginning of the war, so their community took steps to enforce conformity. One 
vocal Unionist had to sell out and leave the area under pressure from his neighbors, while 
another joined the Confederate militia rather than risk retaliation for his views. Many Unionists 
who did not conform were whipped, arrested, and imprisoned. Unionists in neighboring 
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Kentucky sent word that those loyal to the Union were welcome there, and many Unionist 
families in the Sandy Basin accepted the offer. Sandy Basin’s town of Open Fork saw a minor 
exodus of Unionists to Kentucky, due mainly to the efforts of two woman: Peggy Yates Hale and 
her sister-in-law, Polly Taylor Yates. Peggy’s husband, Jim, and his brother deserted a local 
regiment and fled to Kentucky with two other local deserters. When the Confederates threatened 
Peggy and her family for Jim’s desertion, she led her family, her father’s family, and her father-
in-law’s family to safety to Kentucky. When more men from Jim’s regiment deserted and hid out 
in the woods near their community, Zeke Counts, the man who had initially raised the company, 
went after them. He arrested one, Ike Blair, but Blair escaped. After being shot by one of 
Counts’s friends and surviving his wound, Blair took his brothers to the woods for safety. In 
retaliation for the desertions, Counts and other Confederate sympathizers terrorized and robbed 
the Blairs, Taylors, Hales, and Yateses who remained in the area. Polly Taylor Yates returned 
from Kentucky for her widowed sister, but found she was suspected of being a spy. She was 
safely hidden by some Hales, and she she eventually led another small migration of Taylors, 
Hales, and Wrights to Kentucky. By late 1863, the Unionists around Open Fork were all cowed, 
in hiding, or safely across the Kentucky state line. 	
37
Not all those who were threatened had the chance or desire to flee, however. When the 
opportunity presented itself, some civilians chose to fight. Not all who made that choice were in 
a guerrilla band or forced to live in the hills; therefore, the guerrilla conflict in western Virginia 
was a “People’s War” in its most literal definition. Old Virginian and mountain traditions of 
independence and pride were largely responsible for this attitude, as exemplified by a Mrs. 
Holmes who lived near Wyoming Court House. One soldier who met her described her modest 
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house as something “One would never suppose…was the domicile of the one of the smartest, 
most intelligent & intellectual woman of all the land.” Although she was “clothed in linen” and 
without sugar or coffee, “destitute of all luxuries & many conveniences, she exhibited such 
independence of character that I could but rightly admire her.” He spoke of her “determination 
never to seek refugee from the Yankees, but to stand her ground & act the Va. lady of old, proud 
to show what she could submit to for liberty & independence.” 	
38
That same spirit, manifested in other civilians, led to notable occurrences throughout 
western Virginia. In the days following the attack on Fort Sumter, a Maryland resident wrote to a 
friend that 1,500 secessionists at Shephardstown, Virginia, a few miles north of Harpers Ferry, 
gathered and began “guarding the bridge wich crosses the Potomac to prevent government troops 
from crossing…thare are too thousand at harpers ferry and have pipes all inn the bridge full of 
powder ready to set a mach to it as soon as goverment tryes to cross[.] it is clear hell you may de 
pend the families are…taking all the strangers the come a cross that cant tell whare the are 
going…” While the Marylander may have exaggerated the details, his account shows the 
willingness of the citizens in those towns to defend themselves, which accurately reflects other 
experiences that occurred throughout western Virginia for the duration of the war. 	
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Cabell County citizens in Guyandotte, part of present day Huntington, West Virginia, 
demonstrated this when their town became the target of a Confederate raid in November 1861. 
Cabell County was a secessionist hotspot and reluctant host of a Union recruit camp. Many 
Unionists saw their property and livestock stolen as retaliation against their beliefs, and some 
were forced to cross the river into Kentucky or flee further into Ohio for safety. The surprise 
Confederate attack on the camp on November 10 caught the Union troops and recruits off guard. 
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As they fled through the streets in disarray, many contemporary accounts recounted that several 
local citizens shot at them. Some even claimed that the Guyandotte citizens had foreknowledge 
of the attack and had furnished intelligence to the Confederate cavalry on the eve of the raid. The 
citizens of Guyandotte became the victims of one of the war’s earliest acts of retaliatory 
destruction when Union troops burned the town for their suspected collaboration with the 
Confederate raiders and their reputation for being strong secessionists. 	
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In June 1863 residents in Washington County stood together to protect their town from a 
band of twenty-five “tory” raiders from eastern Tennessee. Editors of the Abingdon Virginian 
commended nearly 100 locals for their quick response in countering the raiding party and forcing 
their retreat. The newspaper quoted a local citizen as saying “it was truly refreshing to see the 
zeal manifested by the old white-headed men, when volunteers were called for…the young men 
who could stand tamely by must be destitute of manliness indeed, or else…a tory.” 	
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Civilian heroics also emerged in Wytheville in Wythe County the following month. The 
Union army raided the town to burn it, which enraged citizens to action. A Union officer later 
remembered, “As the soldiers, citizens, and even the women fired from their houses, both public 
and private, we burned the town to ashes.” The civilian resistance, however, forced the Union 
troops to retreat. The women of the town then intervened to stop a massacre of the Union 
soldiers that had became trapped in the town, ensuring the men were taken as prisoners of war 
instead. When Powell, the highest ranking Union officer in the town, became the focal point of 
the citizens’ anger, the women conspired to hide him safely in the Kincannon Hotel until he 
could be transferred to prison. The Union raiders retreated through nearby Tazewell County, 
where they met with additional resistance. At the mouth of Cove Creek, a small number of 
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Confederate soldiers and Tazewell citizens charged the Union rear guard, killing several soldiers 
and capturing a number of men and horses. Later that day, a Federal officer on the retreat stopped 
by a house in Tazewell and requested dinner, which resident Mattie Hendrick willingly offered. 
When he set his carbine down to eat, she confiscated the rifle and held him prisoner until a squad 
of Confederate soldiers came and arrested him. 	
42
In August 1863, a Federal raiding party crossing through Tazewell County was thwarted 
by another heroic woman. When the raiders stopped to water their horses, they were discovered 
by Patsy Hall. The men had been hoping to cross the countryside undetected, but decided they 
had nothing to fear from a woman. They made her take an oath that she would not give their 
presence away, and she submitted without complaint. She, however, did not consider the oath 
binding, and once they had moved on she notified the Tazewell Troopers, the area’s home guard, 
about their presence. The guard followed the raiders and alerted the citizens of nearby Marion. 
Twenty citizens armed themselves and hunted down the Union raiders near Chatham Hill, where 
they scattered the band and captured a couple of prisoners. 	
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While many citizens were willing to take up arms when necessary and thereby became a 
small part of the People’s War, many scouters who lay out near their homes were motivated to 
remain near their families to survive, fight when and how they thought best, and help protect 
their towns and counties during turbulent times. The goals of these guerrillas closely matched the 
sentiments that motivated them. They aspired to remain near their families, stay hidden from 
pursuers, and protect their homes from the region’s upheaval.	

Those who sought their family’s safety had to rely on what tools they had available to try 
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to ensure it. Two escaped slaves who made their way to Union lines in January 1862 reported 
that on their way through Lewisburg, they encountered 5-12 men guarding the road, armed with 
nothing more than old squirrel rifles and old muskets. Scouters sometimes had to rely on others 
to look out for the well-being of their family when times of trouble forced them to leave their 
homes. A Kanawha Valley diarist, whose Unionist father was forced to flee when the 
Confederates occupied the Valley, expressed his sadness in April 1862 that his father could not 
be home and had to stay in a “very dangerous country.” In September of that year he recorded 
that a company of “Rebels” were rumored to be marching toward the Valley again, and that many 
Union men “were running off into the woods.” His father sent six men to check on his family to 
see if the rebels had disturbed them. He concluded his entry with “He is so uneasy about us. Oh, 
I wish the detestable rebels would stay away….” 	
44
The scouters whose main goal was to remain safe from pursuers at times faced a difficult 
task in the face of determined conscription officers or those assigned to track down deserters. 
While these efforts to capture scouters often failed, some succeeded; therefore, many guerrillas 
took a pro-active approach to discourage pursuers. Citizens who reported deserters’ activities 
often found their homes mysteriously burned or they themselves maimed or killed by a 
particularly vindictive scouter. In some areas, poorer members of the community who were 
forced to scout for holding political beliefs contrary to those of the community were often 
tracked down and forced to leave if they tried to remain in the area. However, some scouters 
could get away with only token compliance if they had important family connections. A Sandy 
Basin resident named Pres Mullins spent the war hiding on Cumberland Mountain just miles 
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from his house. His position and his neighbors’ protection secured his safety, although his 
Unionists views did not permit him to live openly at home in his secessionist community. As the 
war progressed, he began sheltering two poorer Unionist neighbors, ensuring their safety through 
the end of the conflict. At the conclusion of the war he calmly returned home and paid his 
Confederate neighbors for the beef he had stolen from them. For the rest of his life he treated the 
whole thing as a joke. As Mullins’s story illustrates, those with the support of some of the locals 
were often able to more successfully scout than those without many connections. 	
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When mountaineers felt their home or community was threatened, some took daring steps 
to counter that. In the fall of 1861, when word reached Fayetteville that Federal troops were 
approaching, two men armed only with rifles hid in the woods just off the road west of the town. 
When the advance guard reached the spot, the two men sprung from their hiding place and 
apprehended two soldiers who were slightly in front of the others. The civilians hurried their 
prisoners through the woods to a neighbor’s house, where they kept them until they could safely 
take them south to the Confederate lines as prisoners of war. 	
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Although many mountaineers were forced to hide out in the areas around their homes for 
self-preservation with defensive goals, the official authorities in Richmond and Washington 
rarely distinguished between these guerrillas and the more destructive marauders who terrorized 
the land for personal advancement. To complicate things even further, two different state capitals 
claimed jurisdiction over the same territory. The governments in Richmond and Wheeling 
arrested civilians over alleged political offenses under the accusation of treason. When militarily 
in control of the area, both governments apprehended noncombatants and imprisoned them, 
forcing them to take the oath of allegiance to secure their release. This practice added to the 
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confusion surrounding the governments’ policies concerning these scouters. 	
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The Union policy regarding the more defensively-minded guerrillas included keeping 
troops in western Virginia to offer protection and keep the populace loyal, and encouraging 
citizens to rise up and protect themselves. In December 1861 Governor Pierpont approved a 
request from General Cox to allow a Unionist in Logan County to raise a volunteer company “to 
protect the vicinity from marauders and enemies of this government [the Restored Government 
of Virginia] and the U.S. government.” The army also did what it could to thwart any 
secessionist attempt to follow the same advice. On July 25, 1862, General Cox received a notice 
from Colonel Lightborn that discussed disarming the citizens of Charleston. “It is reported here 
that the Secessionists here or those who sympathize with them are armed. I have thought it best 
to take possession of every arm if this meets your approval. Will do so tomorrow if we are not 
attacked tonight.” 	
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General Rosecrans’s proclamation to the “Loyal Citizens of Western Virginia” in August 
1861 included warnings against guerrillas driven by all three types of motivators. To combat 
those whose primary goal was self-preservation, he urged both action and cooperation:	

I…earnestly exhort you to take the most prompt and vigorous measures to put a 
stop to neighborhood and private wars. You must remember that the laws are 
suspended in Eastern Virginia, which has transferred itself to the Southern 
Confederacy. The old constitution and laws of Virginia are only in force in 
Western Virginia. These laws you must maintain.	
!
Let every citizen, without reference to past political opinions, unite with his 
neighbors to keep these laws in operation, and thus prevent the country from 
being desolated by plunder and violence, whether committed in the name of 
secessionism or Unionism.	
!
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…Put a stop to needless arrests and the spread of malicious reports. Let each town 
and district choose five of its most reliable and energetic citizens a committee of 
public safety, to act in concert with the civic and military authorities and be 
responsible for the preservation of peace and good order. 	
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By early 1862, the Union army relied on loyal citizens to control western Virginia. Union 
bands, such as the Mountain Marksmen, knew the habits of guerrillas and were as familiar with 
the terrain as those they were tracking. Whole communities pledged to put down “guerrillaism, 
in all its phases” and requested permission to to use guerrilla tactics to do so. Whether or not the 
permission was granted, they became involved in bushwhacking both Confederate troops and 
their secessionist neighbors with Union encouragement. 	
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 The Confederate government also passed legislation to address disloyalty, which 
supported secessionists’ efforts against Unionists in the areas the South controlled, and it took 
steps to capture deserters. These efforts were more impactful to these types of guerrillas in 
western Virginia than steps the Union army took against desertion, since most deserters in the 
area who primarily resorted to a guerrilla lifestyle for self-preservation were from the 
Confederate army. Communities in Confederate-controlled areas often petitioned the government 
for assistance against deserters and Unionists, and in southwestern Virginia Confederate 
authorities continually persecuted them. By late 1864, citizens from Roanoke and Floyd counties 
felt threatened enough by the growing numbers of these deserter groups that they asked for 
additional militia support to counter them. 	
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As the war progressed, many communities helped counter desertion by not welcoming 
deserters as freely, and some churches even excommunicated members who had left the army 
without official approval. Some organized troops from western Virginia had been effective early 
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in the war at tracking down runaways, since, as one soldier noted, “…they think when they get 
home over in the mountains they are safe, [but] I know the roads and trails as they call them as 
well as [they do]….” With the Confederacy’s declining fortunes on the battlefields and its focus 
shifting away from large engagements in western Virginia, the area relied more heavily on militia 
and civilians to respond to deserters. In Franklin County a deserter band formed whose members 
subsisted on local farms to survive. Aggravated by their actions, a group of civilians from 
Franklin Court House tracked two of their members to a cave eight miles outside of town, and 
fired fifty-one rounds at them to ensure they could not possibly survive the encounter. To hunt 
down the rest of the band, which lived along the Franklin and Floyd county line, the conscription 
officer for the county placed guards at the passes to the “fort” they had built and enlisted the help 
of the Floyd County home guard. The trap was successful and the Floyd Guard captured 60-70 
guerrillas at the loss of two of their own men killed and four wounded. The following month 
many of the jailed deserters were freed by their armed comrades, led by Darius E. Williams, a 
deserter from the 24th Virginia Infantry, and the community took steps to ensure the deserters 
would not take retaliatory attempts against them. Rachel Turner hid corn in the walls and ceiling 
of her home to safeguard her food, while David Goodykoontz and his family made portholes in 
their home that would allow them to shoot at gang members should they attack. 	
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With the measures both governments took to address the existence of these guerrillas, 
their high commands also strove to win the trust of the citizens these policies affected. At the 
beginning of engagements in 1861, Robert E. Lee sent a note to F. M. Boykin in which he 
reminded the Major that the objective of holding the roads was to benefit the states of Maryland 
!128
 James W. Silver, Confederate Morale and Church Propaganda (New York: Norton, 1967), 75; Joseph 52
Hubbard Wilson Letter, January 15, 1862, Joseph Hubbard Wilson Papers, VHS; Blair, Private War, 92; Dotson, 
“Grave and Scandalous,” 412.
and Virginia, not the citizens. However, he added, “you will also endeavor to give quiet & 
security to the inhabitants of the country.” Assistant Adjutant-General Halpine in the Union army 
echoed that same sentiment three years later when he called Major General Stahel’s attention to 
the conduct of some of the soldiers in his command who engaged in unauthorized pillaging. He 
called these actions “dangerous to the commands” in a country “infested by guerrillas parties,” 
and told the Major General to take steps to ensure these “wanton outrages and injuries [not] be 
inflicted upon any people” so that the army could keep the people’s trust. 	
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Determining the effectiveness of this group of guerrillas motivated by self-preservation is 
challenging, since their goals were mostly defensive in nature. One clear success occurred in 
Floyd County, where deserters banded together and overthrew the Confederate authority and 
established a Unionist stronghold. The area had become known as “Sisson’s Kingdom” after a 
large Unionist family that lived there. Many members had enlisted in the Confederate army and 
then deserted, and other family members and friends openly defied attempts by the southern 
authorities to capture them, providing warnings and information to their kin about deserter 
hunters. In October 1862 Rebecca Blackwell sent her eight-year-old son Isaac to blow a horn 
whenever home guards entered the area as a warning to her older son, Abraham, to allow him to 
escape capture. While age kept Isaac Blackwell safe from punishment, other children were not so 
fortunate. In the fall of 1864, Aley Kinsey warned her son-in-law Robert Huff that the deserter 
hunters were closing in on him, and she was promptly arrested along with her nine-year-old son 
for her actions. 	
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The Floyd County deserters lived in bands for protection and sustenance and attacked 
conscription officers that came through the county. The strength of the Heroes of America 
increased in the county during the winter of 1863-1864, and by the next fall most of the area’s 
deserters had joined the secret Unionist society and began to vie for political control of the 
county. When southern sympathizers tried to take on this group, a guerrilla conflict began that 
plunged the county into anarchy. The Confederate government sent reserves under the command 
of Lieutenant John S. Wise to capture or drive out as many deserters as he could. He complained 
that the deserters’ relatives openly hindered his troops’ efforts, and his soldiers were only able to 
capture a few dozen men. The residents’ firm commitment to their families caused many of them 
to turn against the Confederacy, ultimately assuring the removal of the county as a productive 
portion of the Confederate homefront. 	
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While Floyd County’s deserters managed to overcome their Confederate pursuers with 
the assistance of family members and the county’s Unionist population, the success of other 
runaways, conscription evaders, or civilians fleeing vindictive political opponents varied widely. 
Some were able to survive the war and offer some assistance to their families while they were 
hiding out. Others were captured, driven from the state, or killed by their pursuers. While 
independent resistance movements were usually futile, success could sometimes be achieved in 
numbers. By May 1864 the Union had discovered it was impossible to secure the conquered 
territory in western Virginia, and when the Federals tried to establish pro-Union local 
governments, “rebel banditti” rose up against loyal citizens, forcing them to flee to the mountains 
to avoid capture or death. 	
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In the turbulent borderland region of western Virginia, neither Unionists nor secessionists 
had surety that they could get through the conflict unscathed, and those who were forced to flee 
their homes or found they could not safely return to them had no guarantee that turning to 
defensive tactics in the mountains would ensure survival. Their involvement in the guerrilla war 
overshadowed their unique and less sinister motivations and goals, and unfairly connected them 
to the guerrillas who were motivated by greed or vengeance. While some did devolve to that 
level, the government, the military, and the general population failed to distinguish between the 
different characteristics that shaped their involvement as a whole. Many communities in western 
Virginia were torn apart and their social structure weakened by ideological differences, but the 
basic impact of the war in Appalachia Virginia was a tightening of family loyalty, since kinship 
often dictated whether a resident sought to assist or impede a deserter, draft-evader, or civilian 
who held minority political views. The strong bound of kinship was indicative of mountaineers 
throughout the region and was not confined to just the area that remained loyal to Virginia or the 
group of counties that split into West Virginia. While national and state matters concerned those 
who lived in the region, family ties dictated action.  57
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CONCLUSION 
In December 1862, eager Richmond patrons crowded into a theater to watch the first 
original drama staged in the Confederate States of America. The Guerrillas, written by James 
Dabney McCabe Jr., portrayed Union General John C. Frémont’s campaign against a band of 
guerrillas operating in the mountains of western Virginia.  A second, fictional, Union officer, the 
principle antagonist, embarked on a futile chase of Arthur Douglas, the captain of the guerrillas, 
who outwitted his opponents at every turn. Enraged by their failures, the federals turned their 
revenge on civilians. They made lewd advances toward young maidens, hung innocent citizens, 
and burned houses on their violent rampage. At the end of the play, Douglas and his men 
ultimately emerged victorious, and the southern hero boasted the Confederates’ foes “shall rue 
the hour they encounter the Guerrillas.” 	
1
Wartime culture and entertainment reflected the turbulence of the era. Unsurprisingly, the 
play focused on irregular warfare and not organized troops or campaigns because, for many in 
the Confederacy, that was the war. What Frémont and other Union officials failed to grasp, 
however, was that guerrillas did not all fight for the same reasons. By failing to identify different 
motivations, the Union was never able to effectively answer western Virginia guerrillas whether 
they fought for political and military purposes, personal advancement, or self-preservation. 	

Evaluating guerrillas by motivation offers a clearer interpretation of the complexity of 
western Virginia’s guerrilla warfare than the traditional categorical breakdown of raiders, 
partisans, and guerrillas provides in at least four ways. First, it helps to differentiate between 
guerrillas involved in irregular warfare against outside invaders and those who participated 
primarily against their own neighbors. Next, it also provides answers for why irregular warfare 
!132
 Sutherland, Savage Conflict, 162-163.1
grew so common in the mountainous region. Third, considering irregular warfare from the 
guerrillas’ point of view explains why civilians assisted some guerrillas when they were 
victimized by others. Finally, such an approach correlates naturally to the way the irregular war 
in western Virginia progressed. At the beginning of the war, most guerrillas fought for a cause, 
answering the Union or Confederacy’s invasion into the area based on the partisan heritage they 
received from their forefathers in the American Revolution. That heritage lent itself to the ideals 
of democracy, individualism, and independence. This independent nature of fighting eventually 
grew out of control and deteriorated, although guerrillas who fought for a political cause never 
completely disappeared. The escalating lawlessness and violence corresponded with 
governments shifting their attention away from western Virginia and provided a suitable 
environment for guerrillas who fought for personal advancement. As the area deteriorated into 
anarchy, many civilians were forced to take measures to protect themselves, sometimes 
implementing guerrilla warfare in order to effectively do so. 	
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Evaluating guerrillas in western Virginia according to motivation shows irregular warfare 
in that region had two distinct characteristics. First, it had direct origins in the American 
Revolution and in the militia mindset of the earliest Scotch-Irish settlers to the backcountry of 
Colonial America. This heritage made irregular warfare—both against invaders and between 
neighbors—natural responses for western Virginians of all ages. Second, guerrilla warfare 
developed out of a kin-centric mentality for mountaineers who placed more importance on 
community or local concerns than on state or national ones. Family relationships and pronounced 
localism drove guerrillas more than economics or geography. The creation of the state of West 
Virginia was the most successful example of mountaineers extolling local concerns above all 
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others, although not all of the residents who lived within the new state’s borders were supportive 
of its statehood movement.	

During the American Revolution, western Virginia differed from the rest of the 
backcountry for its notable lack of violence. This occurred because the extension of Virginia 
political institutions brought the region security before that stability existed in other mountain 
settlements. It is notable, then, that when western Virginia suffered from a breakdown in security 
after Virginia seceded from the Union in 1861, the region experienced the most immediate 
breakdown of law and order of any state in the Confederacy, since the Union army invaded it 
first. Federal officials, however, believed the war would be a short one and therefore did not 
initially try to establish civilian government in the region. Because of this, the area experienced 
the same type of violence and exploitation the other backcountries had experienced in the 
Revolution. For the descendants of Scotch-Irish settlers, the lack of a stable government offered 
the opportunity to exercise independence, for better or for worse. 	
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The Scotch-Irish heritage also instilled in mountaineers the importance of kin. Western 
Virginians had inherited a warrior ethic and family system from early backcountry settlers and 
their anarchic environment. From the beginnings of settlement westward of the Blue Ridge 
Mountains in Virginia, intense localism caused entire communities to unite behind prominent 
leaders, which explains why different areas within the same region held vastly differing views by 
the mid-nineteenth century. This localism also resulted in a self-sufficient mindset, which 
manifested itself during the war in various ways. For example, many communities showed an 
unwillingness to let their “boys” in the army rely on government or outside help for their 
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provisions; rather, they conducted their own campaigns to raise the food and supplies the soldiers 
needed. Guerrillas who hoped to assist a political cause also displayed this localism, because 
they enlisted in the guerrilla war—rather than the regular army—to protect their homes first and 
benefit their cause second. Many western Virginians saw guerrilla warfare as a masculine 
phenomenon that allowed them to defend their honor against the degrading tyranny of foreign 
rule. Guerrillaism became a direct response to protect homes and families from enemy control. 
Although raiders and partisans often conducted raids to strike where the enemy was weakest, 
guerrillas and bushwhackers remained predominantly local phenomena. Out of all of the 
bushwhackers the Union army captured in the central portion of western Virginia from 
1861-1862, nearly all were arrested in the counties that the 1860 census recorded they resided, 
and none were captured more than two counties away. 	
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Unlike the common Confederate soldier or younger bushwhackers in the western theater, 
western Virginia’s guerrillas had an average age in the mid-30s. This meant the guerrilla war was 
not reserved only for the young and strong. Conducting guerrilla warfare required a fiercely 
independent mentality, something mountaineers of all ages possessed. Guerrillas came from all 
classes of society, including many who were middle-class—prosperous, educated, and respected 
community leaders who had a personal stake in the war. Although national causes were 
important to many of them, local concerns were more so. Intense partisan warfare defined the 
mountaineers’ Civil War experience, and was the result of local, state, and national competition 
for loyalty. 	
5
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Local ties were evident in all western Virginians involved in guerrilla warfare. For those 
who fought for political purposes or for self-preservation, commitment to family guided their 
choices. For those who fought for self-advancement, the enticement of establishing local power 
played into the spite or vengeance that motivated them to become involved. Mountaineers 
supported a cause as long as it appealed to their sense of familial duty, but if more secure means 
of safeguarding their families arose, many did not hesitate to shift their allegiance. Because this 
mentality was present in Partisans Rangers, their support was often more troublesome to the 
Confederacy than it was beneficial; they often engaged in small guerrilla skirmishes to save their 
hometowns and did not keep their focus on fighting to support the Confederacy. Some guerrillas, 
including Anderson “Devil Anse” Hatfield and many who fought in the Sandy River Valley, 
deserted from the regular army specifically to return home and fight a local civil war. Due to the 
intense local nature of guerrilla warfare, the bloodshed that occurred was rarely random or 
impersonal, and the fighting was rooted in defending neighborhoods and family. 	
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While political convictions divided communities and sections of western Virginia, 
kinship and family ties made the guerrilla war between neighbors take on many elements of clan 
warfare. This made many try to settle accounts and dispense justice more quickly. Historian 
Kenneth Noe sums up the characteristics of guerrilla warfare in West Virginia this way:	

Support for the Confederacy or the Union at least during the war’s ‘original’ 
phase in West Virginia, and perhaps in all of Appalachia, was much less a class 
uprising or a nihilistic thirst for violence than it was the expression of many 
different communities and their complex local kin ties, reciprocal patron-client 
relationships, economic structures, political leadership, fears, and neighborhood 
concerns, all arrayed against a political, cultural, and ideological backdrop of 
revolutionary heritage, republican ideology, sectional crisis, and Civil War that 
involved them as much as any other Americans. …Only the closer presence of the 
enemy, in nearby families and neighborhoods as well as occupying garrisons, 
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made their civil war an increasingly brutal neighborhood affair. 	
7!
The creation of the state of West Virginia marked the triumph of local concerns above all 
others. Those who lived in the northwestern portion of the state exerted their influence to create a 
political entity that was geared more toward their interests than they received from the state 
government in Richmond. Some Virginians from across the state supported the division of 
Virginia, as one eastern Virginian soldier recorded in his diary, “Although Western Virginia 
abounds in the grandest…scenery, I am perpetually disgusted with the [common people] and 
think we would be benefitted and not injured by a division of the state.” Another soldier 
expressed surprise at the aversion residents in the northern portion of western Virginia showed 
the Confederate army, recording as he passed through Taylor County, “at that place we were 
saluted by no welcome smiles; no waving or handkerchiefs, but sullen derisive countenances told 
us plainly that we were in the enemy’s country.” In her recollections after the war, a West 
Virginia civilian expressed surprise that Virginia had remained unified for as long as it had. She 
wrote, “Our interest were so unlike the geographical lines so distinctly marked and the tastes, 
habits, and characters of the people so very different, they never should have remained so long 
together.” Many western Virginians who had no desire to secede from the Union believed that 
any complaints they had were directed more toward the eastern slaveholding portion of Virginia 
than against their nonslaveholding neighboring states, especially in areas whose economies 
matched that sentiment, as well. 	
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Not all Virginians were amiable to the idea, though. Some expressed disagreement with a 
state division, at times vehemently. A loyal congressman from western Virginia, who argued 
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against Virginia’s secession from the Union, also argued against his district’s secession from 
Virginia. He insisted that eastern and western Virginia had no separate interests and predicted 
that a split would only result in lawlessness and anarchy. He pleaded in a letter to one of his 
constituents, “let us remain one and united, so that when the union shall be reconstructed, we 
shall be once more a band of brothers.” When western Virginian and former Virginia governor 
Henry Wise heard that the unprecedented act of West Virginia statehood would occur, he crudely 
exploded that West Virginia’s statehood was “the bastard offspring of political rape.” 	
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The threat of regions or communities breaking away from Virginia, however, did not first 
emerge during the Civil War. Areas of western Virginia had voiced such sentiment leading up to 
the 1850 constitutional convention, when state leaders finally took their grievances seriously and 
tried to rectify them. Smaller areas also resorted to such threats. Lunenburg County, in Southside 
Virginia, threatened to break off from the state in 1861 if Virginia did not join the Confederacy. 
However, West Virginia was the first to successfully turn the threat into reality, and its success set 
a precedence. Following its lead, Unionists in Floyd County tried to organize their own state 
when they took control of the county late in the war. They even went so far as to elect their own 
governor. Other loyal areas in Appalachia, encouraged by West Virginia’s success, also tried to 
declare their independence from the Confederacy and from their state, most notably in North 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia. No other attempt permanently succeeded, though, because 
none had the military backing of the Union that West Virginia enjoyed. 	
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The area of northwestern Virginia that the Union controlled militarily was economically 
!138
 Joseph Eggleston Segar, Letter to a Friend in Virginia, in Vindication of His Course in Declining to Follow 9
His State into Secession (Washington, D.C.: William H. Moore, Printer, 1862), 5, quoted in Wakelyn, “Politics of 
Violence,” 71; Joseph Alliene Brown, The Memoirs of a Confederate Solider (Abingdon, VA: The Forum Press, 
1940), 6, quoted in McKinney, Fayette County, 186.
 Reynolds, “A Pragmatic Loyalty,” 64; Sean Michael O’Brien, Mountain Partisans: Guerrilla Warfare in the 10
Southern Appalachians, 1861-1865 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 176; Rice, West Virginia, 132.
tied to the free states surrounding it, while southwestern Virginia’s economy was connected to 
the rest of Virginia. However, no clear boundary marked where that shift occurred. Charleston is 
the traditional dividing point, but that has its limitations. Charleston itself had a large secessionist 
population, and in September 1862, a pro-Confederate newspaper named The Guerrilla began 
publication there. Additionally, many counties north of Charleston retained large areas of 
secessionist sentiment. Hardy, Harrison, Lewis, Gilmer, Calhoun, Braxton, and Roane Counties 
all had large populations of secessionists through the end of the war. In Wood County, as well, 
most of the rural areas remained loyal to Virginia and offered a secure living spot with close 
access to the B&O for armed guerrilla groups. Many of the southern counties of West Virginia 
remained staunchly sympathetic to the Confederacy’s stance on states’ rights until the end of the 
war, even though the area remained under Federal control. Conversely, in southwestern Virginia, 
enthusiasm for secession and support for the Confederacy, once so strong in most of the area, 
waned as the Union conducted destructive raids between 1863-1865 into the area, tearing it apart 
with internal tensions. 	
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Since no clear dividing line between sympathies existed, several proposals were made 
during the debates over West Virginia statehood as to where the state’s boundary lines would lie. 
A proposal in December 1862 recommended as many as 71 counties be a part of the new state, 
but 45 of those were loyal to the Confederacy and lay outside of Union control. After ten days of 
debate over the issue, a settlement was reached. Forty-five counties were included 
unconditionally in the new state, and six more northeastern ones would be added if voters there 
ratified the constitution. Five of those six did end up ratifying the constitution, but under 
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questionable circumstances. In Hardy County the affirmative vote was 76-0, whereas Pendleton 
County reported a final tally of 181-0.  The vote in Hampshire was 75-9, in Morgan 362-0, in 
Berkeley 665-2, and in Jefferson 238-3. Three months later a proposal was made to include 
fourteen additional counties, but it was quickly discarded. Those counties would have 
complicated the legality of slavery in the new state, and their inclusion would have likely caused 
the statehood bill to fail. The final boundaries the statehood bill proposed were geographically 
rather than politically based, and many counties, especially in the southern portion of the state 
still under Confederate control, never had the chance to hold a vote on the measure. After 
Abraham Lincoln signed the statehood bill in December 1862 and it took effect in June 1863, 
southwestern Virginia, an area previously united by political and economic measures, was 
permanently split by a new state line. 	
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As the division within western Virginia clearly demonstrates, the stereotype of a Union 
Appalachia during the Civil War is decidedly a myth. While many Unionists did live in 
Confederate-controlled areas, the idea of a solid Union bloc through the heart of the Confederacy 
is the result of popular journalists and novelists who paid increasing attention to Unionism in that 
area in the decades following the war until it eventually became the dominant theme there. 
Reality stands in stark contrast to the myth, as evidenced by the Union leaders who attempted to 
use the mountain regions as bases for their military operations throughout the war but found both 
politically and logistically the mountain people proved less hospitable and cooperative than they 
expected. As the war progressed, many mountaineers grew resentful at any outside interventions
—northern or southern. This sentiment that lent to the ferocity of the guerrilla warfare in the 
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area. 	
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To bring further chaos to the area, political affiliations often fell across a wide spectrum, 
and were not confined into neat categories of Unionists or secessionists. Some in western 
Virginia who wished to remain loyal to the Union sought division from Virginia, but other 
Unionists desired to keep the state unified. Conversely, most who supported the Confederate 
cause remained loyal to Virginia, but others saw the opportunity to apply the ideology of 
secession to state politics and secure independence for a portion of Virginia that had been 
politically stifled by powerful eastern landowners. In areas where sentiments were strongly and 
publicly divided, local inhabitants became subject to arrest when the opposing army took control. 
As armies passed through, they released civilians who were sympathetic to their cause and 
imprisoned any suspected of siding with the enemy. The course was reversed as soon as the other 
army moved through the area, however, which contributed to the instability in several areas of 
western Virginia. 	
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The end of the war brought some stability back to the region, and some areas saw 
guerrilla warfare quickly dissipate. In other areas, however, it lingered on for decades. Veterans 
from the established armies returned to much different homes than the ones they had left. For 
those who had fought for the Confederacy, many came to the realization they had “lost all except 
honor” and the clothes on their backs. When local elections occurred in West Virginia in 
September 1865, any who refused to take the Oath of Allegiance were denied the opportunity to 
participate. In a letter to her northern relatives, Nancy Hunt, who lived in the Kanawha Valley, 
wrote, “The secesh looked badly because they could not vote.” She explained that some 
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Confederate veterans had had the audacity to show up in their gray uniforms, but if they were 
seeking to make mischief, they had not succeeded. Many civilians and veterans who had 
remained loyal to the Union were as destitute as former secessionists, however, and nearly a 
decade after the war ended, a West Virginia Senator petitioned the Federal Government to repay 
Unionists for any destruction the Union army had caused in West Virginia. To properly reimburse 
only those who had remained loyal, he estimated the state needed over $20 million. 	
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As news of the armies’ surrenders spread throughout western Virginia, many residents 
reacted with disbelief that they might once again experience peace. One Fayette County resident 
wrote to her friend on April 23, 1865, “Can it be true that there will be no more fighting? Shall I 
see no more armies pass here? Nary another Reb? No more fear of guerrillas? This is too much 
to take in all at once! I hope it is all true.” By the end of May, one Kanawha Valley resident 
wrote optimistically, “You can do business here as safely now as ever. The Rebels, 
bushwhackers, and guerrillas have all been disbanded, been parolled and gone home.” Guerrillas 
who had fought to assist military strategy had disbanded, and many who had participated in 
guerrilla warfare for self-preservation were soon able to return to their homes in safety. Another 
West Virginia resident expressed surprise at how quickly she noticed the absence of those 
guerrillas, writing, “All in peace and quiet here much more than I expected it to be in so short a 
time.” While rumors swirled that successful partisans such as McNeill and Mosby would 
continue to fight for the Confederate cause after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, those rumors 
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had no truth to them. 	
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The restoration of civilian law during peacetime did bring more security to the region, but 
some who had fought for personal advancement did not find it necessary to give up guerrilla 
warfare. In October 1863, the Louisville Daily Journal ran an editorial that noted, “The truth is, 
there have been bushwhackers from Virginia to Kansas ever since the war began, and we shall 
have them long after the war shall have ended.” That prediction turned out to be true in western 
Virginia. With the region so evenly divided, the conflict had truly been brother fighting brother or 
neighbor against neighbor, and the desire for revenge did not dissipate with the organized armies. 
Many family feuds began during the war, spurred on by political fidelity, and the animosities 
over the vandalism and retaliation that were a part of guerrilla warfare took years to be laid to 
rest. Because so many bushwhackers had operated in areas where they were known, they and 
their descendants were feared and hated in the family lore of their opponents. 	
17
As the nation turned toward reunification, Union troops remained busy in western 
Virginia tracking down bushwhackers and marauders who cared little for political causes and 
continued to attack their neighbors. In August 1865, the Boston Herald reported that a small 
detachment of soldiers had encountered a band of bushwhackers in western Virginia and had 
been unable to overcome them. This forced the military commander in western Virginia to have 
to dispatch a much larger number of troops to dispose of the bushwhackers and restore peace to 
the area. The County Clerk of Scott County, Virginia, recorded on October 11, 1865 that “the 
person and property of law-abiding citizens of this county bordering on Tennessee are in great 
danger of being depredated on by marauding bands of thieves, robbers, and marauders (called 
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bushwhackers) that still remain organizes along and near the Tennessee line for carrying out their 
felonious purposes, aforesaid, whenever they find the citizens in a defenseless and unprotected 
condition.” For civilian protection, then, the court appointed special police forces to preserve 
order and arrest any people who entered the county seeking to harm its residents. 	
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How much impact guerrilla warfare in western Virginia had on the Civil War as a whole 
was minimal, as it offered the Confederacy few political or military advantages and remained a 
stalemate throughout the war. It did force the Union to keep a large number of occupying troops 
in the area, and at times it delayed Union military advances for weeks or months. Any gains the 
Federal army made in the area were offset by the endless need to conquer, occupy, and pacify the 
secessionists in the region. However, the Union never lost control of major communication lines, 
and the enduring presence of Union troops allowed token elections in the northwestern counties 
to assure the survival and success of the statehood movement. Additionally, the Confederacy was 
hurt by some of their own irregular bands, as residents in Confederate-held areas who never saw 
any Union invaders often complained about theft from those who fought under the Confederate 
cause in name yet cared little about it. These gangs, who were involved in the war for their own 
interests, forced residents to make meals for them while they helped themselves to any supplies 
or materials they found. The only thing they accomplished was making protracted enemies of 
their own neighbors and undermining the Confederate cause in areas loyal to the South by 
claiming to fight with its sanction. 	
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Although it made little significant impact beyond its own boundaries, guerrilla warfare in 
western Virginia did help to permanently divide the region with the establishment of West 
Virginia. It also impacted the new state in the decades following its founding, as Richard Curry 
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and Gerald Ham found in their study of the bushwhackers’ war in western Virginia. They 
concluded, “There is no doubt, however, that guerrilla warfare intensified the spirit of 
lawlessness, intolerance, and partisan vindictiveness that characterized the Reconstruction era in 
West Virginia.” While the war was officially over, the mountaineer mindset that had allowed 
guerrilla warfare to grow so prevalent in western Virginia from 1861-1865 lingered, filling a 
supposed time of peace with violence.  20
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